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ABSTRACT 
Zerella, Michael  (Ph.D., Philosophy) 
Biological Mechanisms and Evolution 
Thesis directed by Professor Carol Cleland 
 
Recent work in philosophy of biology has challenged the traditional assumption in 
philosophy of science that proper scientific explanations and predictions must be grounded in 
laws of nature that hold with necessity.  Philosophical work on mechanisms in biology and 
cognitive science has shown that the traditional view, on its own, is too restrictive to account for 
scientific explanations and predictions in the complex, contingent realm of living systems.  In the 
first part of my dissertation, I defend the view that a mechanistic approach to biology is 
preferable to the traditional approach, and I defend my own realist account of biological 
mechanisms.  While most authors seem to consider the mechanistic approach in the life sciences 
to be a heuristic device rather than an objective description of nature, I argue that biological 
mechanisms are real in the same sense that planets, molecules, and life itself are real.  
Specifically, I argue that a biological mechanism is a structure or process that is part of and 
maintained by a living organism, and works to promote continuation of the ongoing living 
process of which the mechanism is a part.  So, as long as organisms and life are real, biological 
mechanisms are also real.   
 In the second part of my dissertation, I apply the mechanistic approach defended in Part 
One to the three process that together result in biological evolution: hereditary reproduction, 
generation of new variations, and natural selection.  I show that the mechanistic approach helps 
clarify our understanding of how each process works (and does not work) on its own, and how 
each contributes to biological evolution.  I consider whether each process, along with the 
physical realizers that bring it about, meet the criteria for being a biological mechanism as laid 
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out in Part One.  All three processes are often referred to as mechanisms, but I conclude that 
while there are biological mechanisms for achieving heredity and generation of new variations, 
the process of natural selection does not meet the criteria for being a biological mechanism, nor 
does the overall process of biological evolution. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
This dissertation is a work in philosophy of science and philosophy of biology.  Science 
is in the business of exploring and understanding natural phenomena, and with that 
understanding, scientists can explain how and why those phenomena occur.  Furthermore, they 
are also well equipped to generate predictions about what will happen under current conditions 
as well as to offer counterfactual statements about what might happen if conditions were other 
than they actually are.  Since it is clear that scientists, by and large, are successful at 
understanding nature, I believe that philosophy of science should pay close attention to the actual 
practices of scientists, including the conceptual framework and ontological commitments under 
which they achieve such success.  That said, it is also true that investigations of nature remain 
incomplete, and scientific understanding is regularly revised and improved.   With this in mind, 
one of my central goals is to describe the thinking of mainstream biologists, and then propose 
and defend a variety of updates and improvements.  More precisely, my dual goals for this 
dissertation are 1) to better understand how biology works as a field of science, and 2) to better 
understand the processes at work in evolution by natural selection.  In this introductory section I 
summarize my project and my approach to understanding of biological evolution. 
My first two chapters establish that scientists in general, and biologists in particular, no 
longer see themselves as searching for laws of nature.  Instead, they are searching for 
mechanisms of nature.  This does not, by itself, imply that there are no laws of nature or that 
scientists are not committed to their existence.  Rather, my position is that while there may be 
laws of nature underpinning the basic causal structure of the universe, discovery of a law is not a 
major goal of science as it is practiced today.  In order to understand nature, scientists are 
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searching for mechanisms.  In Chapter One, I describe the nature of biological research in order 
to argue that scientific explanations and predictions in biology are not based on laws of nature, 
but rather on biological mechanisms.  I call this the mechanistic approach, and in Chapter Two, I 
defend my own account of biological mechanisms at the heart of the mechanistic approach.  A 
biological mechanism, I argue, is any process that 1) achieves a biological function, where a 
biological function promotes the continuation of the life of which the process is a part, and 2) is 
composed of entities that achieve their function non-aggregatively and are part of the organism 
whose life is being supported by the mechanism.  The remaining chapters assume the 
mechanistic approach in understanding and describing biological systems. 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five are organized around my belief that adaptive evolution is 
the result of three separate processes working in tandem: hereditary reproduction, generation of 
new variations, and natural selection.  Evolution in general is the accumulation of changes over 
time, and in biological evolution the most important changes that accumulate are, by and large, 
adaptive changes.  In order for ongoing accumulation of adaptive changes, all three processes 
must be present and active (Lewontin, 1970; Lloyd, 2005).   
Chapter Three covers hereditary reproduction.  This is a necessary element of adaptive 
evolution because in order for changes to accumulate, any adaptive traits that help an individual 
succeed in its environment must be reliably inherited by offspring.  Chapter Four concerns 
generation of new variations, as there must be a source of new traits in order for an evolutionary 
process to continue indefinitely.  Without new traits, a population will eventually settle on the 
most adaptive set of already existing traits and no further adaptive evolution will occur.1  Finally, 
Chapter Five concerns natural selection, which occurs whenever an individual is struggling to 
                                                 
1 Plus, without a way to generate new traits, the population may be unlikely to survive any major shift in 
environmental conditions.    
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survive in its environment.  That struggle necessarily involves complex, ongoing interactions 
between the individual and its environment, and if the interactions don’t destroy the individual, 
then it has been naturally selected for continued survival and may go on to reproduce.2   
A central argument of Chapters Three, Four, and Five is that while all three processes are 
needed for long-term, adaptive evolution, each of the three can occur on its own, without either 
of the other two.  However, in life as we know it, all three processes usually are intimately 
intertwined, so I will take some time to describe what I take to be their individual contributions 
to adaptive evolution and what can (and cannot) happen when only one or two of the three 
processes are in place.  This will set the stage for the more detailed discussions in Chapters 
Three, Four, and Five.   
If only one of the three elements of adaptive evolution is in place, then while some 
interesting things might occur, long-term adaptive evolution in very unlikely to be one of them.  
Suppose we have only diversity among individuals in a population, but no hereditary 
reproduction and no environmental interactions affecting survival.  In order to consider what 
would happen in such a situation, let us set aside how it could be achieved or whether that is 
even possible for any actual organisms.3  If there is no reproduction of any kind, then there 
cannot be any new individuals (barring immigration) and the population cannot change by 
growing.  If there is reproduction, but it is not hereditary reproduction, then while the population 
could grow, any traits possessed by new individuals would be unrelated to any of their parents’ 
traits, and so there could be no reliable accumulation of changes and, therefore, no evolution.  
                                                 
2 Many authors include reproduction in their accounts of natural selection, but I maintain that reproduction is a 
separate process from natural selection.   This is defended in Chapter Five. 
 
3 If we want to flesh out the possibility more thoroughly, science fiction may provide some inspiration.  Consider 
some kind of fusion powered life forms existing in interstellar space and with an on-board fuel supply.  They face no 
specific dangers or lack of resources, and do not have much in the way of environmental interactions, so they are not 
subjected to natural selection. 
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There only would be ever-increasing amounts of variation.  Further, if there is diversity but no 
interaction affecting survival (no natural selection), then the concept of adaptedness does not 
even apply because adaptedness necessarily involves an ability to survive in an otherwise hostile 
environment.  Actual biological organisms are described as well adapted only because they are 
able to survive despite environmental challenges such as oxidation, freezing, over-heating, 
dilution, desiccation, and attack from other organisms.  If there are no environmental interactions 
like these that affect continued survival, then there is no sense in which individuals can be 
adapted to their environments because there is nothing to adapt to.  Therefore, adaptive evolution 
would be impossible.  For all of these reasons, generation of new variations by itself is 
insufficient for adaptive evolution. 
 Next, suppose we have only hereditary reproduction without any diversity or 
environmental interaction affecting survival.  As before, if there is no environmental interaction 
affecting survival, then there is no sense in which individuals can be adapted (or maladapted), 
and so there can be no adaptive evolution.  Further, if there is no diversity, then even if 
individuals are successfully reproducing and the population increases, all individuals have the 
same traits and reproductive capacities, so there is no change in the population (other than its 
size), and so there is no adaptive evolution.  Therefore, hereditary reproduction, by itself, is not 
sufficient for adaptive evolution.   
 Now suppose we have environmental interaction affecting survival (natural selection), 
but no diversity or hereditary reproduction.  In this situation, there can be a sense in which 
individuals are adapted (or maladapted) to their environments because an individual’s set of 
traits can have an affect on its likelihood of survival.  However, if there is no diversity, then even 
if some individuals end up surviving while others die, the population will not change, except to 
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get smaller.  There will be no new traits or changes in frequencies of existing traits, and so there 
will be no adaptive evolution.4  Further, if there is no hereditary reproduction, then even if the 
existing individuals are very well adapted to their environments, they cannot create offspring 
with the same or similar traits.  If they cannot reproduce at all, then the population will either 
remain static or decline to extinction.  If they can reproduce, but not with heredity, then any 
adaptive traits of parents will not be preserved in offspring, and there can be no adaptive 
evolution.  Therefore, natural selection by itself is not sufficient for ongoing adaptive evolution. 
 We also can consider what can happen when only two out of the three elements are in 
place.  If hereditary reproduction and a source of variations are in place, then a population can 
increase its numbers, and it can even accumulate changes.  However, the evolution of such a 
population would not be adaptive evolution in the relevant sense. As already discussed above, if 
there is no natural selection, then there are no positive or negative consequences of having one 
set of traits over another.  Therefore, there is no sense in which one individual is any better 
adapted than any other, and so there can be no adaptive evolution.  Rather, most evolutionary 
changes would be roughly random.5  The only directionality to any evolution in this population 
would be toward greater reproductive potential.  If reproductive potential—the speed of 
reproduction and number of offspring per generation—is one of the traits that varies between 
individuals, then there can be evolution of ever-increasing reproductive potential because the 
faster reproducers will outpace the slower reproducers.6  Although I maintain that reproduction is 
separate from natural selection, this phenomenon is similar to natural selection, and is sometimes 
                                                 
4 In addition, if there is no adaptive evolution in this population, then the origin of these already-adapted individuals 
is left unexplained.   
 
5 Of course, potential changes are always constrained by what reproduction and development are able to support.   
 
6 This is closely related to “fitness,” which is a measure of reproductive success. 
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called “reproductive selection”.  However, reproductive selection is not the same as “viability 
selection,” and only the latter is central to adaptive evolution.  Reproductive selection does 
require a minimum amount of viability, but reproductive selection by itself does not promote 
evolution of environmental adaptations.  In fact, reproductive potential can be increased by 
diverting energy or other resources toward reproduction at the expense of individual viability.  
Therefore, if there is no viability selection favoring individuals that are better adapted to 
surviving in their environments, evolution will not lead to increasing adaptedness even if it leads 
to increasing rates of reproduction.7      
 Now suppose we have hereditary reproduction and environmental interaction affecting 
survival or reproduction, but no diversity.  In that case, even though individuals may be adapted 
(or mal-adapted) to their environments, there are no differences in adaptedness between 
individuals, so the population cannot experience adaptive evolution and may very likely go 
extinct, especially if the environment is changing.  Some individuals may survive and reproduce 
while others do not, but the traits possessed by individuals in the population cannot change over 
time if there is no diversity and no source of any new variations.  In such a scenario, extinction 
seems very likely, especially in a changing environment. 
 Finally, suppose we have variation and environmental interaction affecting survival, but 
no hereditary reproduction.  In this scenario there actually could be some change in average 
adaptedness in the population, but there is not likely to be ongoing adaptive evolution.  A source 
of new variations means that some individuals might be better adapted to the environment than 
others, and when less adapted individuals begin to die at a faster rate, the population will be left 
with a greater proportion of better-adapted individuals than it started with.  However, as long as 
                                                 
7 This means that viability selection and reproductive selection usually are opposing evolutionary tendencies, and 
long-term continuation of a lineage usually requires balance between the two, rather than maximization of either one 
by itself. 
  
7
 
the individuals have limited life spans and a limited ability to generate new variations in 
themselves, the population will be unable to continue any further adaptive evolution.  This 
amounts to what Dawkins (1980) calls “one-off selection” in which interactions between 
environment and individuals leads to elimination of some and preservation of others, and then 
that’s it.  However, if the individuals remaining after one round of selection are able to continue 
generating new variations in themselves without reproducing, it could be that some of the newly-
generated traits are more adaptive than others, and the process of differential natural selection 
between individuals could continue, resulting in a remaining population that, on average, is even 
better adapted than it was before.  Thus, there could be some adaptive evolution even without 
reproduction.  Without a source of new individuals, however, even this process is destined to 
terminate when the last individual finally dies. 
 Only when all three processes occur together can a population sustain long-term adaptive 
evolution, and obviously this is the case in actual biological populations.8  In most biological 
species, all three processes are intimately bound up with one another so that it can be difficult to 
distinguish any one of the processes from the other two.  Nevertheless, I maintain that they all 
are separate and distinguishable and can be fully characterized individually.  This is done in 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five. 
In Chapter Three, I clarify contemporary views on biological heredity, including 
historical sources of the gene-centric concepts and assumptions that typically frame most of the 
work on heredity.  I then argue that proper understanding of heredity, supported by the 
mechanistic approach, makes clear why the traditional, gene-centric approach is too restrictive.  I 
then present a variety of non-genetic processes of heredity and assess the extent to which they 
                                                 
8 Other possible explanations for adaptation, such as divine intervention and Lamarckian evolution, are discussed in 
Chapter Five. 
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are biological mechanisms on par with genetic mechanisms.  I also use the mechanistic approach 
to diagnose some special challenges faced by Developmental Systems Theory, which has 
become a prominent alternative to gene centrism. 
In Chapter Four, I clarify contemporary views on generation of new variations, including 
historical sources of current concepts and assumptions, and the reasons for rejection of 
Lamarckian evolution.  I then argue that proper understanding of generation of new variations, 
supported by the mechanistic approach, makes clear why the traditional, gene-centric approach 
inappropriately ignores non-genetic mechanisms that generate new variations.  I also argue in 
favor of a reintroduction of directed generation of variation and inheritance of acquired 
characteristics, which are ideas traditionally associated with Lamarckian evolution. 
In Chapter Five I clarify contemporary views on natural selection, including historical 
sources of current concepts and assumptions.  For the previous two processes, heredity and 
variation, debates usually have been concerned with how the processes are realized, not what the 
processes are.  When it comes to natural selection, however, there continues to be a great deal of 
debate over process itself, how it works, and whether it makes sense to call it a mechanism.  I 
argue that most of the disagreements over natural selection stem from a failure to consistently 
distinguish natural selection from reproduction or generation of new variations.  My own account 
of natural selection maintains the proper distinctions, and I use that account to resolve some of 
the most prominent debates over natural selection. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
THE MECHANISTIC APPROACH AND THE TRADITIONAL VIEW 
 
1.1  Introduction 
A dominant tradition in philosophy of science has maintained that scientists rely on laws 
of nature to support their explanations, predictions and counterfactuals.  Indeed, scientific work 
rooted in Newtonian mechanics relied heavily on laws of nature to make sense of the world, but 
more recent work in all fields of science has moved away from explicit reference to laws of 
nature and instead is more likely to rely on so-called mechanisms.  However, it is not entirely 
clear what scientists mean when they claim to be studying mechanisms, and scientists from 
different fields may not even mean the same thing by “mechanism.”  This first chapter is 
dedicated to sorting out these issues, and I defend a contemporary version of what I call “the 
mechanistic approach” for developing and justifying scientific explanations, predictions and 
counterfactual statements in the biological sciences.  Although the mechanistic approach is often 
contrasted with a traditional view that relies on laws of nature and formal, logical arguments to 
generate and justify scientific explanations, predictions and counterfactuals, I argue that the 
mechanistic approach is compatible with and even complementary to the traditional approach. 
In Section 1.2, I present the relevant history of the use of mechanism and laws of nature 
in science.  I show that the mechanistic approach I advocate is not the same as what is often 
called the mechanical view that grew out of the work of Descartes, Boyle, and Newton.  Unlike 
the mechanical view, the mechanistic approach is not necessarily linked to any particular theory 
from physics (such as Newtonian mechanics), is not synonymous with naturalism (though it may 
entail naturalism), and does not imply reduction of the special sciences to physics.   
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In Section 1.3, I describe more carefully the traditional view that relies on laws of nature 
used in formal, logical arguments to justify scientific explanations, predictions and 
counterfactuals.  While I am not inclined to endorse that traditional view, I do not argue for its 
replacement.  Rather, I argue that by itself, the traditional view provides an insufficient account 
of how scientists actually develop and justify their explanations, predictions, and counterfactuals, 
and that the mechanistic approach complements the traditional view by filling in gaps in the 
traditional view. 
 
Section 1.2  History 
In this section, I present a historical overview of the ways in which scientists and 
philosophers have formulated their understanding and explanations of nature.  This is intended to 
provide context for the rest of the chapter rather than present any new historical work.  However, 
within this overview I make the case that the mechanistic approach I defend is not necessarily 
linked to any particular theory from physics (such as Newtonian mechanics), is not synonymous 
with naturalism (though it typically comes with a commitment to naturalism), and does not imply 
reduction of special sciences to physics.   
 A naturalistic approach to characterizing and understanding nature has been a rival to 
supernatural views at least as far back as Ancient Greece.  Atomists, such as Democritus and 
Epicurus believed that all natural phenomena are the result of particles of different sizes and 
shapes moving, combining, and recombining in different ways (see Boas, 1952 for an overview).  
This was a reductive view of nature in the sense that all macroscopic phenomena were thought to 
be explainable in terms of the action and interaction of tiny, indivisible particles. 
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An opposing, nonreductive view came from Aristotle, especially in the Posterior 
Analytics, who believed that in addition to any bits of material, our understanding and 
explanation of natural phenomenon must include irreducible formal causes (essences, substantial 
forms) and final causes (innate functions or purposes).  In De Anima, for example, Aristotle 
explains that all living creatures are held together by their essences, or souls, and have the innate 
purpose of continuing to live and reproduce.  The basic materials of which organisms are made is 
not enough, by itself, to cause organisms to exhibit their distinctive physical characteristics or 
their purposive behavior, and so, according to Aristotle, an explanation of life cannot be reduced 
to mere atomic interactions. 
Another relevant contribution from Aristotle, found mainly in his Posterior Analytics, is 
the use of logical demonstration to explain natural phenomena.  According to Aristotle’s 
approach, scientific explanation of a natural phenomenon should take the form of a deductively 
sound argument, the conclusion of which is a description of the phenomenon.  Although 
Aristotle’s specific ontology of nature eventually was rejected, his general method of using 
logical arguments to generate scientific explanations has continued in modern philosophy of 
science (e.g. Hempel, 1962, 1965; Railton, 1978).   
 Aristotle’s ontology eventually was rejected by the scientific community because, during 
the European Renaissance, scientific explanations in terms of Aristotelian substantial forms or 
teleological forces was having trouble explaining some the new knowledge being gathered by 
naturalistic philosophers.  Consequently, the Aristotelian view was in need of radical updating or 
replacement by a better theoretical foundation.  Alchemists tended to favor the former strategy, 
allowing for a greater variety of substantial forms, some of which could shift from material to 
material, thus accounting for some of the radical changes observed in chemical reactions.  For 
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example, the alchemists’ view famously implied the possibility of transmutation since the 
substantial forms associated with gold could move into some other substance, thus converting 
that substance into gold.   
Those who wanted to reject and replace Aristotelian science, particularly Gassendi, 
Galileo, Descartes and Boyle, wanted to replace it with something very much like the reductive 
atomist view from ancient Greece in which macroscopic phenomena are explained in terms of 
the characteristics and interactions of microscopic particles of various shapes and sizes (Boas, 
1952).  That view was able to provide superior explanations and predictions for technologically 
important phenomena such as wind, air pressure, phase changes and the action of heat.  Those 
examples are technologically important because they were (and still are) used to support 
mechanical innovation and industrialization.  Thus, the resurgent atomic theory had a huge 
advantage over its rivals because of its ability to yield practical results for mechanical engineers, 
and so it slowly started to dominate scientific theorizing.  Perhaps since it coincided with and 
supported the rise of mechanical technology, the reductive, atomist view became known as a 
mechanical view9 of nature in which all natural phenomena could be understood and explained in 
terms of constant pushing, pulling, bumping, sticking, separating, combining, and recombining 
of microscopic particles of various shapes, sizes, and velocities.  As the mechanical view became 
the dominant view of nature in the Western world, Aristotelian substantial forms and final 
causes, or anything similar, were expunged from science.  Any theorizing not consistent with the 
new view was (and, to a large extent, continues to be) labeled religious, occult, magical, or 
otherwise non-scientific thinking, and therefore not likely to reflect the real world (Muenzinger, 
1935; Mayr, 1982).   
                                                 
9 I use the term ‘mechanical view’ here (rather than ‘mechanistic’) because, at the time, the view is closely 
connected to Mechanics as a theory in physics, and I want to distinguish this mechanical view from the mechanistic 
view that I ultimately wish to defend.   
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Let us take a closer look at why the mechanical approach coming out of the 17th century 
was so successful.  A big part of its power came from its reduction of complex processes to the 
collective action of simple entities that are describable in precise terms and whose relationships 
can be represented mathematically.  Individual elements of a system could be understood in 
isolation, and once each element is understood individually, one can come to understand the 
whole, complex system.  Then, since the relationships among the parts could be represented 
mathematically, the mechanical approach was able to generate very precise and accurate 
predictions and counterfactual statements that led to great success in manipulating nature and 
creating useful technology.  Some of the relationships described in scientists’s equations were so 
reliable that they were believed to be laws of nature in the sense that they were universal and 
exceptionless relations or regularities.  As described more fully in Section 1.3, laws of nature can 
be used to support deductive arguments (what Aristotle called “demonstrations”) that explain and 
predict natural phenomena.  Although Aristotle’s ontology had been rejected, it is difficult to 
deny that his deductive argumentation, if successful, can provide very strong justification for 
scientific explanations, predictions and counterfactuals, and since the proposed laws of nature fit 
neatly into that scheme, everything seemed to be working out very well for the mechanical view. 
The mechanical view hit an apex with the success of Newtonian Mechanics.  Newton’s 
ability to describe and explain a large number and variety of complex phenomena led to a 
common belief that every natural phenomenon could be understood in terms of basic physics.  In 
other words, all other fields of science could ultimately be reduced to just physics, once all of the 
details had finally been discovered.  Further, since Newtonian Mechanics was overwhelmingly 
accepted as the correct theory of physics up until the early 20th century, the mechanical 
approach—and even naturalism in general—seemed to overlap completely with Newtonian 
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Mechanics in the minds of scientists (Muenzinger, 1935; Turner, 1940; Boas, 1952; Allen, 
2005).  This complete overlap between naturalism, the mechanical approach, and Newtonian 
mechanics became problematic when Newtonian mechanics finally was rejected in the early 20th 
century.  General relativity, quantum mechanics, and molecular chemistry do not resemble the 
basic collisions and push-pull interactions of solid particles envisioned by the classical 
Newtonian view.  But if Newtonian Mechanics got its ontology wrong, what should we conclude 
about naturalism and the mechanical view which were so closely tied to that rejected ontology?   
Some argued that all three stood or fell together, and since Newtonian mechanics was 
wrong, the mechanical approach to biology and even naturalism in general also were wrong 
(Haldane, J.S., 1884, 1930; Oparin, 1964).  Such was the opinion of vitalists, who resisted any 
attempts to reduce biological phenomena to physics.  Biology, they argued, includes complex 
organic molecules all working together to achieve survival and reproduction.  Individual, non-
living bits of matter that are completely describable in terms of basic physics, are incapable of 
working together to produce the purposive behavior of living organisms, and so there must be 
some other constituent, a vital substance, force, or fluid, present in living creatures that gives 
them their cohesion and purposiveness.  Thus, vitalists were harkening back to Aristotelian 
substantial forms and teleological forces as described above, as well as to Kant, who argued in 
his Critique of Judgment (1790) that our conception of life and living organisms necessarily 
includes a sense of purposiveness and design, and thus cannot be reduced to Newtonian, non-
teleological terms.  That approach put vitalists at odds with most naturalists, even those that 
accepted the failure of Newtonian Mechanics, since most naturalists assumed that teleological 
forces do not exist as part of the fundamental constituents of nature.  As a result, vitalism was 
considered by many to be a departure from the naturalistic view and was eventually dismissed as 
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non-scientific, or even mystical (Turner, 1940; Mayr, 1982).  The vitalists’ cause was not helped 
by the fact that any explanations, predictions, or counterfactuals from their program were far less 
precise or useful when compared to alternatives based on the relatively simple ontology and 
methodology of physics.  After all, vitalists explicitly rejected the ability of mathematics to 
describe living processes adequately, and when it comes to acceptance of theories in science, 
precision, accuracy and usefulness are key, and mathematization of a theory gives it a huge 
advantage in all those respects.  Consequently, vitalism ended up fading from mainstream 
science and the reductionist viewpoint prevailed.   
As mentioned above, contemporary physics includes non-classical properties and 
interactions that are very unlike those in classical Newtonian theory.  However, general relativity 
and quantum mechanics are still expressible in mathematical terms, and so many of the 
important benefits of the Newtonian program have been maintained, especially the use of 
precise, mathematical formulations that can generate very clear and accurate descriptions of 
experimentally controlled phenomena.  When used in deductive logic, those descriptions can 
generate clear and accurate explanations, predictions and counterfactuals, very much like 
classical physics.  As a result, reductive10 views of nature now are based on quantum mechanics.  
This, combined with the fact that the term “mechanics” remains attached to the contemporary 
theory, has led some authors to continue referring to a generally reductive view of nature that 
relies on fundamental physics as a “mechanical” or “mechanistic” view of nature (Muenzinger, 
1935; Turner, 1940).  This is especially true of non-reductionists in philosophy of biology or 
philosophy of mind (e.g. Haldane, 1930; Hanna, personal communication).  
                                                 
10 To be clear, I am talking about the kind of reductionism that assumes all natural phenomena can be understood 
and explained using only basic physics.  
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Since it does not include Newtonian ontology, however, it is not clear to what extent 
contemporary physics and chemistry still represent the mechanical view.  Reductionism by itself 
entails neither acceptance nor rejection of the mechanical view, and reductionist philosophers of 
science over the last century have tended not to speak much about mechanisms, either positively 
or negatively, so while there has not been acceptance of mechanisms, they have not been 
explicitly rejected either.  Mitchell (1997, 2000) suggests that part of the reason mechanisms 
have not been included in the conversation is because most philosophy of science has relied 
heavily on deductive logic, and unlike laws of nature, it is not clear that mechanisms can be 
described adequately using only sentences or mathematical formulae, as standard systems of 
deductive logic require.11  In any case, one option for naturalists after the rise of quantum 
mechanics has been to embrace the new physics and reject the mechanical view entirely because 
it is too closely connected to Newtonian Mechanics.  The mechanical view, this reasoning goes, 
was a specific philosophical position developed by people committed to the view that all natural 
phenomena are the result of classical pushing, pulling, and colliding of solid bits of matter.  
Modern physics has shown us that the real constituents of matter do not conform to the classical 
conceptions, and so beliefs based on the classical conception of matter are wrong.  The 
mechanical approach is based on the classical conception of matter, and so the mechanical 
approach is wrong (for example, Haldane, 1930; Oparin, 1964).  According to this view, to claim 
that the mechanical view survives the collapse of Newtonian theory is akin to claiming that rigid 
three-dimensional space survives the shift to general relativity.   
Critics of this line of reasoning point out that it overstates the link between the 
mechanical view and a particular theory of Mechanics (Muenzinger, 1935; Turner, 1940; Allen, 
2005).  For example, Turner (1940) argues that we must maintain the distinction between a 
                                                 
11 This issue will be explored in much more detail in Section 1.3 
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particular theory of Mechanics on the one hand, and the mechanical (what I will eventually be 
calling the “mechanistic”) approach on the other.  Although they often have overlapped 
significantly, the mechanistic approach itself is not committed to any particular theory of 
Mechanics, whether it is Newtonian Mechanics or Quantum Mechanics.  I agree with Turner 
(1940) and believe that while the original formulators of the mechanical view got their ontology 
wrong, it still is true that living organisms share many important similarities to human-built 
machines and it is important to acknowledge this fact and use it to aid our understanding of 
nature, regardless of which particular theory of physics turns out to be correct (see also 
Machamer, Darden, and Craver, 2000; Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005).  In Section 1.3, I discuss 
the merits of the mechanistic approach as compared to the traditional approach that formulates 
explanations, predictions and counterfactuals rooted in laws of nature rather than natural 
mechanisms.   
One more position worth mentioning came from so-called holists of the early 20th 
century.  While some holists were perhaps best described as vitalists, Allen (2005) argues that 
holism can also be formulated in naturalistic terms.  A holistic view is opposed to reductionism 
because, like vitalists, holists argue that focusing only on individual activities of the individual 
bits of matter that compose an organism will provide an insufficient understanding of the whole, 
living organism.  In addition to the individual bits of matter, holists argue that one must also 
understand how those bits work together to accomplish complex tasks and how they are situated 
within and affected by the rest of the organism and its surrounding environment.  Although 
nothing seemingly occult or supernatural is necessarily involved, a problem with the holistic 
view was that its properties, relations, and interactions are so complex, contingent, and shifting 
that they were not precisely describable, especially in mathematical terms.  As a result, any 
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explanations, predictions, or counterfactuals from a holistic program were far less precise or 
useful, making it very difficult for holist to contribute anything substantial to biologists’ research 
programs.  Thus, by and large, reductionism remained dominant while holism faded away from 
mainstream biology and was considered little different from vitalism, even if some holists (such 
as J.S. Haldane) insisted that they were committed to naturalism (Allen, 2005).  It should be 
noted that critics of holism did not necessarily ignore the complexity to which holists refer.  As 
discussed in Section 1.3, that complexity is often expressed as ceteris paribus clauses that are 
attached to relatively simple statements of some scientific generalization or relation.    
To summarize the most important points from this section so far:  the most popular 
attitude in philosophy of science has been to maintain commitments to naturalism, reductionism, 
laws of nature, and the logical construction of scientific explanations, predictions, and 
counterfactuals.  I call this “the traditional view” in philosophy of science.  The traditional view 
has not included much talk of mechanisms partly because mechanisms are not readily 
representable as sentences in deductive logic, and partly because the mechanical view was too 
closely associated with the rejected theory of classical mechanics.     
The mechanistic12 approach has experienced a resurgence in philosophy of science in 
recent years, carving out a role for itself that is independent of the traditional view.  The 
contemporary mechanistic approach is not committed to the old Newtonian ontology, and 
focuses on biological systems (and sub-systems) as complex, coordinated processes that work to 
achieve particular functions, such as ion regulation or ventilation.  Only by understanding how 
all the parts of a biological system work together in context can we understand how the system is 
able to do what it does.  In this way, the contemporary mechanistic approach I am advocating 
                                                 
12 I use “mechanistic” rather than “mechanical” here because I am referring to the contemporary view rather than the 
classical view.   
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bears a resemblance to holism (Allen, 2005), except that we now are much better positioned than 
was early 20th century holism to use this approach to support successful and productive research 
programs. 
The mechanistic approach in the biological sciences starts by recognizing that every 
organism is a complex system composed of many interconnected sub-systems that contribute to 
the organism’s continued survival.  Most of those life-sustaining subsystems are similar to 
human built machines in that their component materials are arranged and coordinated in very 
particular ways that allow them to perform their functions.13  So similar to human built machines 
are these biological subsystems, that they are best described as biological mechanisms.  As with 
human built mechanisms, in order to understand a biological mechanism—and so to explain how 
and why it works and to make predictions about its future activity—we must gain an 
understanding of the causal interactions occurring within that mechanism and how its activity 
interacts with the larger system of which it is a part.  Such understanding was beyond the reach 
of biologists before the rise of molecular biology and biochemistry in the mid-20th century, and 
so the early holists described above were unable to flesh out their views.  Today, however, it is 
commonplace for researchers to adopt the mechanistic approach.  Indeed, failure to do so is often 
regarded as bad—or at least incomplete—science (Sarkar, 2005; Casadevall and Fang, 2009)   
  In Section 1.3, I discuss the use of laws of nature in philosophy of science in more 
detail, along with recent criticisms.  I also show how the mechanistic approach is better 
positioned than the traditional view to addresses those criticisms successfully (MDC, 2000; 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005).  While some authors argue that mechanisms should replace 
                                                 
13 Living systems do not employ much of the classical push-pull mechanisms that were central to the mechanical 
view, so in that sense they may be disanalagous.  However, the specific kind of causal interaction (push-pull vs. 
electrochemical vs. molecular vs. whatever else) is less relevant to the mechanistic view than is the spatiotemporal 
coordination of parts to achieve a function.      
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laws of nature as the justification for scientific explanations, predictions and counterfactuals 
(Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005), I argue, following Woodward (2003), that if one wishes to 
maintain a commitment to laws of nature, the mechanistic approach should not be seen as a rival 
view, but rather as complementary. 
 
Section 1.3  The Traditional View and the Mechanistic Approach 
In this section, I argue that the traditional view, by itself, provides an insufficient account 
of how scientists actually develop and justify their explanations, predictions and counterfactuals.  
However, I do not argue for its outright rejection or replacement.  Rather, I argue for inclusion of 
the mechanistic approach as complementary to the traditional view.   
The traditional view in philosophy of science maintains that in order to produce scientific 
explanations, predictions, or counterfactual statements, scientists must find laws of nature.14  
Without laws of nature, scientists would be restricted just to describing what exists and what 
happened, and they would be unable to justify any explanations for why things are the way they 
are, any predictions about what will happen, or any counterfactuals about what would have 
happened had things been different.   
The kinds of laws of interest here are universal and exceptionless generalizations that 
support counterfactuals.  The laws of logic have these features, and so not only do they support 
the validity of deductive arguments but they also help us explain why one particular conclusion 
rather than some other conclusion follows from the given premises.  Without reference to laws of 
logic, all we could say is that the conclusion just always does follow those premises and we 
could not explain why it follows.  Laws of logic are able to do this explanatory work because 
                                                 
14 Of course, not all prominent and influential philosophers of science rely on laws of nature in this way, but the law-
based approach is a dominant and enduring trend.   
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they are logically necessary.  That is, we can explain that the conclusion follows from the 
premises because it is logically necessary that they follow.  There may not be any further 
explanation for why the laws are the way they are, except to say that it is just plain impossible 
for things to be otherwise, and so “Because it’s a law of logic” may be considered an end to 
explanation.   
Laws of nature are thought to do for science what laws of logic do for logical deduction.  
Scientists should be able to tell us why, given certain initial conditions, a particular natural 
phenomenon is observed rather than some other phenomenon.  Without laws of nature, the 
thinking goes, all we could say is that the relevant phenomenon just always does occur after the 
preceding conditions obtain, and we could say nothing about why it occurs.  Paralleling the 
situation in deductive logic, “Because it’s a law of nature” may be considered an end to any 
scientific explanation because we then know that it’s just plain impossible for things to be 
otherwise, at least in a universe like this one.  In order to capture their similarity to deductive 
logic, laws of nature are typically expressed as universally quantified conditionals such as 
(x)(AxÆBx), or just (AÆB).  “A” represents some initial conditions and “B” represents the 
conditions that result, so the generic form of a law of nature says that whenever A happens, B 
happens.  In this way, a law of nature can be used as a premise in a deductive argument that, 
when combined with other premises stating that the relevant initial conditions obtain, can 
generate the phenomenon as its conclusion. 
According to this view—the traditional view—the above procedure can provide a 
scientific explanation, prediction, or counterfactual, depending on our needs.  If the phenomenon 
has already been observed and we are interested in an explanation, then the conclusion (the 
phenomenon) is the explanandum while the premises (initial conditions plus any relevant law(s) 
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of nature) constitute the explanans.  If, on the other hand, we believe we know the initial 
conditions and relevant laws of nature, then the conclusion would be a prediction.  
Counterfactuals are much like predictions except that one or more of the premises is 
hypothetical.  So, according to the traditional view, a single scientific argument can be construed 
as either an explanation, a prediction, or a counterfactual, depending on our epistemic position 
relative to the premises and conclusion of the argument (Carnap, 1966; Hempel, 1962, 1965).  
This aspect of the traditional view is known as the thesis of structural identity, or the symmetry 
thesis (Hempel, 1965). 
  The traditional view has its roots in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (see Section 1.2), 
and has been supported in one form or another by more recent philosophers of science such as 
Carnap (1966), Hempel (1962, 1965), Lewis (1973), Dretske (1977), Tooley (1977), Armstrong 
(1978), and Schiffer (1991).  Although these authors disagree on many things, a common thread 
in their work is a commitment to formal systems and laws of nature to construct and to support 
scientific explanations, predictions and counterfactuals.   
One initial problem faced by the traditional view is that laws of nature do not carry the 
power of logical necessity that laws of logic enjoy.  Instead, the general characteristics of the 
universe, including any laws of nature, are thought to be logically contingent.  To fix this 
problem, laws of nature are said to hold with natural (or nomological) necessity rather than with 
logical necessity.  Natural necessity applies in our actual universe, but what’s naturally necessary 
in our universe may not be naturally necessary in a universe with different characteristics, so 
rather than holding with logical necessity, a law of nature only holds necessarily in a universe 
just like ours.  Scientific explanations, predictions, and counterfactuals typically carry the 
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assumption that we are talking about the actual universe (unless they explicitly say otherwise), so 
any laws they invoke should carry the natural necessity we require.   
The best candidates for universal and exceptionless laws of nature come from 
fundamental physics, such as the law of conservation of energy or the Pauli exclusion principle.  
If such laws truly are universal and exceptionless15 and hold with natural necessity, then they are 
capable of justifying explanations, predictions and counterfactuals from physics in the way the 
traditional view requires.  However, when we get to the so-called special sciences such as 
biology and psychology, things become problematic.  Regularities and generalizations 
discovered in the special sciences are riddled with exceptions and caveats, yet somehow they still 
must be able to justify special science explanations, predictions and counterfactuals.  A 
pessimistic view might take the seemingly contingent nature of the special sciences to mean that 
their predictions, counterfactuals, and explanations are not properly justified (e.g. Rosenberg, 
1994).  However, it is difficult to deny that the special sciences have achieved a great deal of 
success, especially over the last several decades, and so there must be a way for their predictions, 
counterfactuals, and explanations to be properly justified despite their apparent contingency.   
Laws in the special sciences are not universal in the same way as fundamental laws of 
physics because special science laws only apply to complex systems that may exist in only one 
very small part of the universe.  They also appear contingent because a special science law may 
fail even when the appropriate complex system exists and is manifesting conditions to which the 
special science law typically applies.  A very common approach to accommodating these 
features of special science laws and making them work like the laws of physics is to include 
ceteris paribus clauses.  A ceteris paribus clause includes all of the background conditions 
                                                 
15 As discussed below, there may be good reasons to doubt that even these are truly exceptionless and universal, as 
the traditional account appears to require.   
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needed for the generalization expressed by the law to hold.  Following Sober (1997) we can 
represent ceteris paribus laws as CÆ(AÆB).  The conditional (AÆB) is the proposed 
generalization—the law itself—and C represents the background conditions as a ceteris paribus 
clause.  So, the generic form of a ceteris paribus (c.p.) law says that as long as the special 
conditions obtain, then if A happens, B happens.  This formulation says that if the background 
conditions obtain, then the generalization is a law and can be used in arguments justifying the 
relevant special science explanations, predictions, and counterfactuals.   
A critic of the traditional view might complain at this point by saying that even with c.p. 
clauses attached, special science laws still do not hold with natural necessity and so cannot be 
used to support scientific explanations.  The idea is that the c.p. conditions obtain only 
contingently, and so the generalization expressed by the law obtains only contingently.  A 
contingent law is not a naturally necessary law, and so special science laws that require c.p. 
clauses are not laws of nature.  Rupert (2008) presents a somewhat modified version of the 
traditional account of c.p. laws that fixes that potential problem with c.p. laws by showing that 
the laws themselves actually are universal and exceptionless and hold with natural necessity.  
Rupert shifts the supposed contingency of c.p. laws into what he calls “combinatorial laws” that 
describe how the properties represented in the antecedent of a c.p. generalization come together 
to generate the consequent properties.  This all requires some unpacking, so I’ll begin with the 
simplest case and then build to c.p. laws as Rupert describes them.  Instantiations of basic 
physical properties generate causal influences according to basic laws of nature and do so in a 
non-combinatorial way.  For example, consider a system consisting of just two electrons, each 
instantiating a –1 charge.  Interaction between these two electrons is governed by a single law of 
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nature16, and so a prediction about what will happen involves simple application of this single 
law.  In a slightly more complex system with multiple basic physical properties being 
instantiated, there may be many causal influences all at work at the same time.  Each individual 
causal influence works according to a law of nature, and the individual effects combine 
according to a “combinatorial law” of nature.  Therefore, in order to predict the behavior of a 
complex system, we need to combine the effects of the different laws according to the 
appropriate combinatorial law.  The best example comes from Newtonian mechanics in which 
the effects of multiple forces acting on an object are combined to determine the net force and the 
resulting acceleration.  So far this is nothing particularly new or different from previous views.  
The difference comes when we move to c.p. laws. 
 Rupert (2008) argues that in many respects, c.p. laws in the special sciences operate in 
the same way as laws in fundamental physics.  Paralleling the simplest case described above, a 
special science system that instantiates a single special science property will generate an 
instantiation of another special science property according to a law of nature, and that law will 
hold with natural necessity.  Then, in a more complex system that instantiates multiple special 
science properties that are each governed by a different special science law, with the effects of 
each law combining according to a combinatorial law from the relevant special science to 
produce the final outcome.  The contingency often associated with c.p. laws, according Rupert, 
lies in these combinatorial laws of the special sciences and their potential conflict with the 
combinatorial laws of physics.  As I discuss below, Rupert’s (2008) more thorough inclusion of 
the complex causal details included in the ceteris paribus clause of c.p. laws show how the 
mechanistic approach is complementary to commitment to laws of nature.  The precise 
                                                 
16 The relevant law comes from electromagnetism.  The effect of other forces is assumed to be negligible in this 
case. 
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characterization of laws of nature and c.p. laws in particular is not settled, but whether one 
adopts Rupert’s view or some other version of the traditional view, the mechanistic approach is 
still valuable. 
 
Criticisms of the Traditional View and Benefits of the Mechanistic Approach 
The traditional view has been challenged on many fronts.  For example, some have 
claimed that the traditional view is insufficient because one can construct explanations that 
appear to meet the relevant criteria for explanation based on laws, but are intuitively irrelevant or 
incomplete as scientific explanations.  Consider the following uncharitable example from Ruben 
(1990) in his argument against Hempel’s (1962) Deductive-Nomological (D-N) model of 
scientific explanation:  
1. All metals conduct electricity 
2. Whatever conducts electricity is subject to gravitational attraction 
        ∴3. All metals are subject to gravitational attraction  (p. 182) 
The argument is valid with true premises, and premise 2, as an exceptionless generalization, 
meets Hempel’s (1962) conditions for laws of nature.  Nevertheless, Ruben (1990) claims, the 
argument does not help to explain why metals are subject to gravitational attraction, and 
therefore the explanation is seriously incomplete.  Ruben (1990) does not conclude that the 
traditional view is worthless, but rather that any explanations based on laws of nature must 
include statements of causation, rather than mere exceptionless regularities, in order to provide 
good scientific explanations.  This view is shared by Railton (1978) who argues that an account 
of the complex causation—the mechanism—behind a phenomenon is needed to supplement any 
mere statements of regularity in order to explain satisfactorily how and why the phenomenon 
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occurs.  This call for greater detail concerning the causal process by which a natural phenomenon 
is produced is a running theme in this section.  A sufficient scientific explanation must include 
such causal details, and building on Railton (1978) and Ruben’s (1990) suggestions, I argue 
below that the mechanistic approach is well suited to provide those causal details.  First, 
however, I will discuss some other criticisms of the traditional view that will help to show why I 
believe the mechanistic approach is needed.  
Cartwright (1983) also argues that the traditional view is insufficient, but unlike me, she 
argues for its complete rejection.  Her reasoning is that if we rely on the traditional view to tell us 
what counts as a law of nature, then it turns out that there are no laws of nature.  Cartwright 
points out that even the laws of fundamental physics do not appear to meet the standards 
established by the traditional view because in any real-life situation, the state of affairs we would 
predict using any proposed law of physics never obtains in exactly the way the laws say it 
should.  Cartwright takes this to mean that the supposed laws of physics are just rough guides to 
nature rather than universal or exceptionless.  A defender of the traditional view might reply to 
Cartwright by pointing out a prediction generated by a given law of physics is based on an 
idealized view of the world in which only that single law is operative.  Under realistic 
circumstances, of course, a variety of laws of nature would be applicable, and so the pure 
prediction generated by any single law by itself is unlikely to be exactly correct.  In response, 
Cartwright then argues that if we revise our view of laws in the way suggested—so that single 
laws all by themselves only apply in idealized circumstances—then they are no longer laws 
describing the real, contingency-riddled world, but only an imaginary, idealized world.  
Therefore, they are not really laws of nature as it actually is.  Therefore, there are no universal, 
exceptionless laws of nature to provide the natural necessity that the traditional account requires. 
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It seems to me that whether one is inclined to accept the existence of laws of nature or 
not, Cartwright’s views seem to be overly pessimistic.  Scientists have invented a dazzling 
number and variety of clever ways to manipulate different aspects of whatever system they are 
studying in order to gain insight into the individual causal influences at work, and they have 
found great success in isolating, characterizing, and then re-combining various causal influences 
in order to produce very accurate and precise predictions, particularly in physics (Woodward, 
1997, 2002a, 2003; Woodward and Hitchcock, 2003).  It does seem true that, because of 
inevitable technological limitations, it is impossible in practice to generate exactly accurate 
predictions for even very simple systems, but that does not seem like enough reason to conclude 
that laws of nature do not exist.  Our experimental apparatus and measuring devices will always 
have a finite level of precision, so any results obtained using that apparatus cannot be expected to 
match predictions exactly.  Plus, some proposed laws of nature are inherently statistical while 
others, like the Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle, ensure that we cannot know everything about a 
given system.  Given these factors, our lack of complete accuracy and precision is not sufficient 
justification for rejecting the existence of laws of nature, so Cartwright’s (1983) arguments seem 
unconvincing (see also Rupert, 2008).   
That is not to say that Cartwright’s criticisms are completely off base.  We should be 
concerned about the traditional requirement that laws be universal and exceptionless.  Mitchell 
(1997, 2000, 2002), following Cartwright’s general line of reasoning, points out that according to 
contemporary physics, even the most fundamental laws break down under certain extreme 
circumstances.  For example, during the first tiny fractions of a second after the big bang, and 
even now within black holes, some proposed laws of nature do not seem to apply.  The reason is 
that some values, like space-time curvature, become infinite, and this cause the relevant 
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equations to produce undefined results.  Therefore, even the most fundamental laws of physics 
may fail to be universal or exceptionless, which means that even if there is such a thing as 
natural necessity, no known laws of physics have it.   
Since there are good reasons to think that even the most basic laws of nature fail to be 
universal or exceptionless, Mitchell (1997) concludes that there is no such thing as natural 
necessity that can operate like logical necessity in justifying scientific explanations, predictions 
and counterfactuals.  Unlike Cartwright, however, Mitchell does not wish to abandon laws of 
nature.  Rather, she argues that all natural regularities actually lie on a continuum of contingency, 
and we should abandon the distinction between basic, exceptionless laws of nature and ceteris 
paribus laws.  More specifically, Mitchell argues that the background conditions needed to 
support any supposed law of nature are contingent, with some conditions being more stable than 
others.  For example, the background conditions required for laws of fundamental physics are 
very stable (though not perfectly stable) and so have a correspondingly low level of contingency.  
By contrast, the conditions needed for the laws of biology are much less stable because the 
conditions can come into and go out of existence.  Plus, the same laws of biology can hold in a 
wide variety of different physical systems, and so it seems that laws from the special sciences 
come with a great deal more contingency.  Therefore, a proper explanation for any actual 
phenomena must include more than just a description of the regularity itself.  We also need to 
know something about the conditions needed for the regularity to occur (other than just that there 
are some conditions that need to occur, as expressed by a ceteris paribus clause) and how 
changes in these conditions will affect the final product.  In physics, very little extra information 
beyond the regularity or generalization itself is usually needed to justify any explanations, 
predictions or counterfactuals.  But when it comes to the special sciences, a great deal of extra 
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information about context, history, etc. may be needed in order to feel confident that the relevant 
laws are applicable.  Woodward (1997, 2002a, 2003) makes a similar case when he argues that 
even if laws of nature and the traditional view are adequate for explanations in physics or 
chemistry, they are not sufficient for the special sciences because understanding the background 
conditions for a proposed law in the special sciences is at least as important as recognition of the 
law itself.   
Mitchell’s (1997, 2000, 2002) arguments, which are later mirrored in MDC (2000) and 
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005), stem from her dislike for the traditional use of logical systems 
to represent laws of nature and to generate explanations, predictions and counterfactuals.  
Systems of formal logic are poorly equipped to handle the contingency inherent in the special 
sciences, forcing it all into unexamined ceteris paribus clauses (or combinatorial laws).  Mitchell 
(1997) argues that standard formulations of c.p. laws, such as CÆ(AÆB) hide two kinds of 
contingency17 that scientists find important.  First, the set of conditions represented by “C” is 
itself messy, diverse, and historically contingent.  It is historically contingent because, as 
discussed above, the appropriate conditions have not always existed in the past and may cease to 
exist in the future, and the universe could have unfolded such that the conditions never obtained 
at all (Beatty, 1994).  The second sort of contingency hidden in c.p. laws, according to Mitchell 
(1997), lies in the material conditional within “CÆ” which represents a very complex web of 
causal interactions that is likely to be nonlinear and extremely sensitive to initial conditions 
(p.S472).  That is, very small changes in C can result in a substantially different web of causal 
interactions and a different outcome.  To be clear, the charge here is not that any ceteris paribus 
                                                 
17 Mitchell (1997) uses the word “contingency,” but it may be more appropriate to call this “complexity.”  To say 
that a c.p. law is contingent implies that even when the relevant conditions obtain, the corresponding law might not, 
but this is not quite what Mitchell has in mind.  Rather, she is concerned with the complex details contained within 
the c.p. clause of a special science law that help us understand why the regularity occurs and why it sometimes does 
not happen when we might expect it to.  
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laws are wrong or incoherent.  Rather, the charge is only that c.p. laws do little to aid our 
understanding of natural phenomena because they tell us only that a regularity occurs, not how or 
why the regularity occurs. 
As Mitchell (1997) explains, “It is not that biological generalizations are contingent, but 
rather how they are contingent that is significant” (S472, emphases in original).  Also, “To know 
when to rely on a generalization we need to know when it will apply, and this can be decided 
only from knowing under what specific conditions it has applied before” (S477).  Then, as she 
puts it in Mitchell (2000), “The insights that scientists acquire about the causal structure of our 
world may be deformed by being squeezed into Boolean garb” (2000, 247), and “Because the 
[traditional] view has been wedded to representing epistemological relations (like explanation, 
prediction, confirmation) and causal relations in first order predicate logic, it has allowed a 
reification of the features of the representational apparatus to be imposed on the thing 
represented” (248).  As described in more detail below, Mitchell’s views are similar to the 
mechanistic approach, as Mitchell herself suggests in her example of “redundant mechanisms” in 
biological systems (2002, p. 338).  As explained in Section 1.2, although a mechanistic view of 
nature has been around for centuries, the contemporary version of the mechanistic approach in 
biology sheds the anachronistic classical ontology and focuses on how parts of living organisms 
come together to achieve different functions, with emphases on why the mechanisms do what 
they do and how the outputs of mechanisms can be changed by outside factors.  In other words, 
the mechanistic approach emphasizes the causal complexity with which Mitchell and other 
critics of the traditional view are so concerned. 
Since I am considering the roles of the traditional view and the mechanistic approach in 
the sciences, it is worth noting how often scientists actually invoke laws in their explanations, 
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predictions and counterfactuals.  After all, an explicit premise of the argument that philosophical 
investigation into laws of nature is important for philosophy of science is that scientists really are 
searching for laws to justify their scientific predictions, counterfactuals, and explanations.  For 
example, in his discussion of c.p. laws, Fodor (1991) writes, “I am, in general, in favor of taking 
the sciences at face value: Psychology, meteorology, and geology (to say nothing of physics) 
keep announcing hedged laws” so we should seek to find a proper account of such laws (p. 22).  
Nearly all prominent authors on this subject, regardless of their position on the issues, seem to 
accept something like Fodor’s premise that science concerns itself with the discovery of laws 
(Dretske, 1977; Schiffer, 1991; Tooley, 1977; Rupert, 2008).  Since this premise is supposed to 
justify our attempts to characterize laws of nature, it is worth examining whether this premise is 
true.  I believe that it is false. 
I believe, along with Woodward (2003), that it is false that researchers in the special 
sciences, especially the biological sciences, think of themselves as searching for laws of nature at 
all, whether c.p. or non-c.p. laws.  It is difficult, however, to evaluate the truth of this premise 
without a thorough polling of scientists’ beliefs.  In my own experience18, I have found it rare for 
those working in the biological sciences to refer to laws of nature when discussing biology.  
Even when it does occur, any talk of laws of nature among biologists usually is restricted to 
supposed laws of physics and their relevance to certain biological processes, or about scaling 
laws related to, for example, diffusion rates, that ultimately come from physics. 
To gain a rough idea, beyond my own personal experience, of whether scientists really 
are searching for laws, I conducted a variety of literature searches in different academic 
databases.  Since I am most interested in science as it is practiced today, I restricted my search to 
                                                 
18 This is, of course, of limited value as evidence, but I did live in the biologists’ world for many years:  taking 
classes, attending conferences, pursuing laboratory research, and ultimately earning a Master’s degree in biology 
and teaching life science for several years. 
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books and articles published after 1980.  In the biological sciences, around 1,500 peer-reviewed 
articles (less than 1%) contained the word “law,” and a cursory review of the titles revealed that 
in the vast majority of those works, “law” was used to refer to legal codes or to a law of physics 
or a scaling law as described above.  Only rarely did the title refer to a proposed law of nature 
restricted to life as we know it on earth.  Instead of searching for laws, a number of recent 
authors claim that researchers in the special sciences are looking for mechanisms to justify their 
explanations, predictions and counterfactuals (e.g. Machamer, Darden and Craver, 2000; 
Glennan, 2002; Woodward, 2002b; Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005; Craver and Darden, 2005; 
Casadevall and Fang, 2009; Thaggard, 2010).  Supporting this view is another literature search 
of titles in the biological sciences containing the word “mechanism” that yielded over 80,000 
results (over 30% of total).   
Put very briefly, as this is the focus of Chapter Two, a biological mechanism is a 
dynamic, physically instantiated process organized and maintained by an organism that performs 
a biological function, where a biological function is an output of the process that contributes to 
survival or reproduction of the organism that is maintaining the process.  For example, a 
mammalian heart is constructed and maintained by an organism and the heart, in turn, 
contributes to the continued survival of the living organism of which the heart is a part.  Once a 
mechanism has been identified and characterized, scientists can explain how and why the 
mechanism works and what we can expect of it in the future.  This is the mechanistic approach 
that scientists rely on to justify their explanations, predictions, and counterfactuals.  In fact, it is 
not uncommon to find criticisms of proposed scientific explanations that are based on a lack of 
any mechanism capable of producing the proposed phenomenon or regularity (Sarkar, 2005; 
Casadevall and Fang, 2009; Gould, 2002).     
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Although the mechanistic approach is sometimes portrayed as a rival to the traditional 
view (e.g. Bechtel and Abrahamsen, 2005), this is not necessarily so.  I believe that a 
commitment to laws of nature and their role in scientific explanations, predictions and 
counterfactuals does not preclude acceptance of the mechanistic approach, and acceptance of the 
mechanistic approach does not preclude a commitment to laws of nature.  Indeed, I believe that 
the mechanistic approach is complementary to the traditional view (see also MDC, 2000).  For 
example, Rupert’s (2008) component forces view of c.p. laws includes combinatorial laws 
governing the way the current state of a complex system produces a later state.  The mechanistic 
approach can be complimentary to such a view by filling in the details concerning how 
component forces actually combine to produce their effects.  Philosophers working on the 
mechanistic approach typically do not speak in terms of “component forces,” but the 
mechanisms they describe could theoretically be analyzed in terms of the individual component 
forces produced by the microscopic bits that make up the mechanisms, though such a task would 
be extremely tedious and difficult.   
As a real-world example of how the mechanistic approach can complement explanations 
in terms of laws, early geneticists cited the so-called Law of Independent Assortment and Law of 
Segregation in describing Mendelian inheritance patterns.  However, while recognizing that a 
law of nature connects parental traits to offspring traits may be interesting and even quite useful 
to plant and animal breeders, it does not help us understand how or why inheritance works that 
way, nor does it tell us how or why it occasionally deviates from the standard patterns.  Those 
questions can only be answered by investigating and understanding the mechanisms that produce 
the phenomena described by the laws.   
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Consistent with that example from genetics, Mitchell (1997, 2000) argues that 
understanding the complex, contingent circumstances associated with a given generalization is at 
least as important as discovering the generalization itself, and the mechanistic approach captures 
that sentiment very well.  Rather than ending with the discovery of a regularity, the mechanistic 
approach starts with observation of a regularity or other interesting phenomenon in need of 
explanation, and then does the investigative work needed to discover the mechanism responsible 
for producing that regularity.  We see a similar account in pro-mechanism author Lindley Darden 
(2002), who argues that researchers in the special sciences typically begin with a “mechanism 
schema,” which Darden describes as “a truncated abstract description of a mechanism” that 
amounts to little more than a description of a regularity, and “can be filled with more specific 
descriptions of component entities and activities” (S358).  The idea is that a mechanism schema 
may at first be highly speculative, based on a limited knowledge of the component entities or 
how such entities are able to produce the phenomenon.  Scientists may, for example, “sketch 
hypothetical roles that components of the mechanism being sought are expected to carry out” 
(Darden, 2002, p.S360).  Scientists then search for physical entities in the complex system under 
study that are capable of carrying out the hypothesized activities.  If appropriate entities are 
found, they can be used to turn the mechanism schema into a more concrete model of the 
mechanism that can be used to generate better explanations, predictions, and counterfactuals.  On 
the other hand (and just as importantly), if appropriate entities are not found, then scientists are 
forced to modify or abandon their original mechanism schema.  In other words, failure to find 
entities capable of achieving a hypothesized activity forces scientists to acknowledge an error in 
their characterization of the phenomena that had attracted their interest in the first place. 
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Two examples can help illustrate Darden’s (2002) account of how the mechanistic 
approach works in biology.  First, consider the example of Lamarckian inheritance patterns.  
Lamarck (1809) hypothesized that interactions between an organism and its environment caused 
adaptive changes in the organism that were then inheritable by that organism’s offspring.  This is 
the famous inheritance of acquired characteristics that has come to be the most recognizable 
feature of Lamarckian evolution.  In the 19th century,  environmentally-induced adaptations and 
inheritance of acquired characteristics were both believed to occur in nature.  In fact, even 
though Darwin’s (1859) theory of evolution is often held up in opposition to Lamarck’s, Darwin 
included both in his theory.  However, once the mechanisms of cellular and molecular biology 
became better understood, biologists did not find any mechanisms that were able to support the 
proposed Lamarckian phenomena.  That is, when more and more was discovered about how 
organisms and biological inheritance actually work, biologists sympathetic to Lamarckian 
evolution were left without any way to explain how organisms could manage to do what 
Lamarck required them to do.  As discussed more thoroughly in Chapter Three, it was that lack 
of any plausible supporting mechanisms, as much as any direct evidence against Lamarck, that 
sank his theory of evolution (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Sarkar, 2005). 
Contrast the failed case of Lamarckian inheritance with the successful genetic research 
program begun in the early 1900’s with the rediscovery of Mendelian inheritance patterns.  
Scientists had found some intriguing regularities in the way certain traits were passed from 
parents to offspring, and while they recognized that there must be some kind of underlying 
physical process that supported the phenomena, technological hurdles limited them to merely 
describing the phenomenon.  As described briefly above, before the underlying entities could be 
identified or characterized, the observed regularities were among the few ever to be called 
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biological laws: The Law of Segregation and the Law of Independent Assortment.19  Unlike the 
case with Lamarck, improved understanding of cellular and molecular mechanisms revealed that 
they were well suited to producing the Mendelian phenomena, and the genetic research program 
became extremely successful and popular.  In fact, as understanding of genetics progressed, any 
talk in terms of laws gave way to more nuanced, more accurate, and more broadly applicable 
explanations in terms of cellular and molecular mechanisms.  Today, geneticists no longer speak 
in terms of laws of inheritance, and instead provide explanations, predictions and counterfactuals 
in terms of the underlying mechanisms, with special attention paid to all of the contingent factors 
that can cause the mechanisms to change or stop their activities.   
A defender of the traditional view could argue that all of the geneticist’s explanations, 
predictions and counterfactuals in terms of mechanisms can be rephrased using ceteris paribus 
laws of nature in order to ensure their proper justification.  However, as I have argued above, 
such rephrasing does not constitute a replacement of the mechanistic approach.  Rather, the 
mechanistic approach complements the traditional view by characterizing what, exactly, is 
contained in the ceteris paribus clause of a particular special science law and how it affects any 
explanations, predictions and counterfactuals.     
Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) take up this point and spell out a number of advantages 
enjoyed by the mechanistic approach.20  Like Mitchell (1997, 2000, 2002), Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen (2005) argue that using standard logic to express and understand biological 
                                                 
19 Application of that label likely was aided by scientists’ ability to mathematically model the phenomena and use 
their equations to generate remarkably accurate predictions, at least under very controlled circumstances. 
 
20 Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) take a harder line against the traditional view than I do.  They argue that the 
mechanistic approach should replace the traditional view rather than compliment it, particularly in the biological 
sciences.  Although I have argued that such a replacement may not be necessary, I believe that Bechtel and 
Abrahamsen’s (2005) arguments are relevant because they help to describe the merits of the mechanistic approach 
very well.   
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regularities is too limiting (or at least too cumbersome).  They argue that mechanistic models 
used by scientists include modes of representation and styles of reasoning that cannot be 
captured by traditional logical systems.  For example, certain dynamic spatial or temporal 
relations that are represented relatively easily by diagrams (individually or in sequence) may not 
be expressible verbally or linearly, as required by standard logic.  Beyond questions of 
representation, Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) claim that actual reasoning processes employed 
by scientists involve some exclusively visual information that is never converted into verbally 
expressible language.  When thinking about biological processes, Bechtel and Abrahamsen 
contend that we construct non-verbal mental representations of mechanisms and then animate 
them forward and backward in time in order understand how they work and to make predictions 
about their behavior.  In this sense, humans are mentally simulating the proposed mechanism 
rather than making formal inferences about it, and so the actual reasoning of scientists is better 
captured by the mechanistic approach and its use of diagrams and other non-verbal 
representations rather than by the traditional view with its verbal statements and logical 
inferences.   
I believe that Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005) may very well be correct, but even if they 
are wrong and it turns out that all non-linguistic representations used by scientists can be 
converted to verbal representations compatible with the traditional view, the result would be 
unusable (or at least unused) by scientists or others who are reasoning about these matters.  The 
precise verbal descriptions of even a fairly simple diagram or graph are very long, complex and 
cumbersome, which is why nearly all science textbooks and research articles include nonverbal 
representations of the relevant material.  Further, it seems that diagrams and mental simulations 
are in some sense more accurate or realistic representations of the complex systems under study 
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than are verbal descriptions.  It may be difficult to spell out exactly how much more accurate or 
realistic diagrams and mental simulations are when compared to purely verbal descriptions, but 
the point is that we avoid linguistic descriptions of complex systems not merely because they are 
tedious and cumbersome, but also because they are more removed from the actual phenomena.   
It seems, then, that the mechanistic approach is able to match more closely the actual reasoning 
and successful explanations used by researchers in the special sciences. 
Another advantage of the mechanistic approach, argue Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005), 
lies in its inclusion of external context.  The exact behavior of a mechanism may change when its 
context changes, often because a given mechanism tends to be embedded within a kind of 
hierarchy of mechanisms.  That is, a given mechanism may be a component of some larger 
mechanism, and when the actions of that larger mechanism change, the actions of the component 
mechanism may also change (see also Craver, 2001; Craver and Bechtel, 2007) and so the 
mechanistic approach is able to incorporate context into its explanations more naturally than the 
traditional view.  In Chapter Two I flesh out the mechanistic approach that I am advocating by 
describing the features a system must have to distinguish it as a biological mechanism.  Then, in 
Chapters Three, Four, and Five, I use the mechanistic approach in addressing a variety of active 
debates in philosophy of biology.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
BIOLOGICAL MECHANISMS 
 
2.1  Introduction 
 It has become very common for scientists, especially biologists, to describe their work as 
a search for mechanisms (Craver and Darden, 2005; Casadevall and Fang, 2009).  However, only 
very recently have philosophers begun addressing what biological mechanisms are and how to 
identify them.  In distinguishing mechanisms from non-mechanisms, most recent authors try to 
identify special physical characteristics of mechanisms and special features of the actions of 
mechanisms versus non-mechanisms.  In this chapter I build upon that recent work to more 
carefully describe biological mechanisms and the mechanistic approach.  I argue that a biological 
mechanism is a dynamic system that is not a mere aggregate and serves a biological function.  In 
order for a mechanism to serve a biological function, the mechanism must contribute to 
sustaining the life of an organism, and, in turn, the organism must maintain the existence and 
operation of the mechanism.  As I explain in Section 2.4, my emphasis on functions introduces a 
form of natural teleology that previous authors have been reluctant to embrace.   
 
2.2  Natural Mechanisms in Biology 
Drawing from the historical overview in Section 1.1, there are at least two popular ways 
of thinking about natural mechanisms in contemporary science.  One way is to think of any 
physical process or event as a mechanism, making the mechanistic approach little different from 
a general commitment to physicalism.  According to this first view, not only are there 
mechanisms responsible for pumping blood and digesting food, but also mechanisms for splitting 
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radioactive nuclei, producing lightening, rusting iron, and keeping planets in orbit.  Many 
scientists appear to hold something like this version of the mechanistic view, especially when 
they claim that proper scientific research should be uncovering mechanisms (for everything) 
rather than merely providing descriptions (e.g.  Casadevall and Fang, 2009).  In contrast to this 
extremely permissive notion of mechanisms is the version found in the biological sciences and in 
cognitive science that marks a distinction between physical objects or processes that are 
mechanisms and those that are not.  According to this second view, living organisms make use of 
mechanisms of a different sort from non-living “mechanisms” included in the other, more 
permissive view.   
The mechanistic approach used in the biological sciences takes seriously the analogy with 
human-built machines, like clocks and motors, which are composed of interacting parts 
coordinated so as to perform a function.  Human-built mechanisms can be contrasted with static 
artifacts that are not mechanisms, like paperweights or doorstoppers.  Despite its functionality, a 
paperweights not a mechanism (in the relevant sense) because it does not achieve its function 
through the dynamic, coordinated interaction of its parts.  In other words, a paperweight is just a 
static lump rather than a mechanism.  According to the mechanistic approach in biology, hearts 
are more similar to clocks and motors and so are properly considered natural mechanisms.  By 
contrast, a gall stone, which is more like the paperweight, is not a natural mechanism because it 
is just a static lump of material. 
Much of the contemporary efforts to clarify and develop the concept of a biological 
mechanism has been framed by Machamer, Darden and Craver (MDC) (2000), who build upon 
the work of Wimsatt (1974), Cummins (1975), and Salmon (1984, 1997), among others.  MDC 
(2000) develop what they call a “dualist” account of natural mechanisms that incorporates the 
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physical entities that compose the mechanism and the overall activity that the mechanism 
achieves.  Thus, MDC (2000) define a mechanism as “entities and activities organized such that 
they are productive of regular changes from start or set-up to finish or termination conditions” 
(2000, p.3).  Their account is dualist because it resists attempts by previous authors to 
characterize mechanisms solely in terms of the individual physical entities, or solely in terms of 
the overall activity the mechanism performs.  Both are necessary for a complete account of any 
mechanism because even if we think we’ve observed some activity, if there are no physical 
entities to perform the task, then there is no mechanism.  And even if a variety of entities are 
present, if they do not perform the right kind of overall activity, then, again, there is no 
mechanism.  I largely agree with this approach to characterizing mechanisms and will use it to 
build a more complete account.      
Before unpacking MDC’s (2000) account of natural mechanisms, however, I will 
mention a prominent, alternative account from Glennan (2002).  Glennan, in describing what he 
calls the “complex systems” approach to natural mechanisms, believes that “a mechanism for a 
behavior is a complex system that produces that behavior by the interaction of a number of parts, 
where interaction between parts can be characterized by direct, invariant, change-relating 
generalizations” (p. S344).  In apparent contrast to MDC (2000), Glennan (2002) focuses on the 
parts of the mechanism (the entities) and their direct interactions and apparently ignores the 
overall activity of the mechanism.  At least this is how Glennan’s view is perceived (e.g. Tabery, 
2003; Craver and Darden 2005; Barros, 2008).   
Contrary to this received view, however, I believe that Glennan’s (2002) account actually 
is as dualist as MDC’s (2000).  Although he does place a great deal of emphasis on the 
interaction of parts, the behaviors of Glennan’s mechanisms appear to do the same work as 
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MDC’s activities.  For example, Glennan explains that “mechanisms are not mechanisms 
simpliciter, but mechanisms for behaviors” (2002, p. S344, emphases in original), which sounds 
very much like MDC’s insistence that “it is artificial and impoverished to describe mechanisms 
solely in terms of entities, properties, interactions, inputs-outputs, and state changes over time.  
Mechanisms do things…and so ought to be described in terms of the activities of their entities” 
(MDC, 2000, p.5).  Both accounts make it clear that including only the physical parts is 
insufficient for a full account of a mechanism.  To drive the point home, we should note that 
immediately after introducing his definition of a mechanism, Glennan (2002) introduces what he 
calls a “mechanical model” which is a complete description of a mechanism.  Tellingly, 
Glennan’s mechanical model has two necessary components, “… (i) a description of the 
mechanism’s behavior; and (ii) a description of the mechanism which accounts for that 
behavior” (2002, p. S347).  While Glennan refers to “the mechanism” in the second part of his 
account of a mechanical model and keeps that separate from “the behavior,” this should not 
automatically be taken to mean that a mechanism can be characterized independently of its 
behavior because, as seen in the previous quotation, “mechanisms are not mechanisms 
simpliciter, but mechanisms for behaviors.”  So it seems that when Glennan refers to “the 
mechanism that accounts for the behavior” he is talking about the actual, physical instantiation of 
the mechanism (the “entities” in MDC’s terminology) and how that particular instantiation is 
able to produce that behavior.  With this in mind, we can re-phrase Glennan’s two-part 
description of a mechanical model as (i) a description of the mechanism’s behavior; and (ii) a 
description how the mechanism is physically realized.  This seems to capture Glennan’s 
intentions while showing more clearly how his account is not really so different from MDC 
(2000).  So, whether it is given the dualist label (MDC, 2000) or not (Glennan, 2002), a proper 
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account of natural mechanisms must include an activity (a behavior) and a set of entities that 
produce the activity. 
Although I believe that MDC (2000) and Glennan (2002) have very similar accounts of 
natural mechanisms, in developing my own account of mechanisms in biology, I will use the 
terminology from MDC (2000) since they more explicitly acknowledge the insufficiency of an 
account formulated in terms of entities only.  I claimed above that biologists mark a distinction 
between natural mechanisms and mere physical objects or processes, and so I must make clear 
the circumstances under which something counts as a mechanism rather than a non-mechanism.  
That is, I must characterize the conditions that the entities and activities of a system must meet in 
order for the system to qualify as a biological mechanism.   
 
2.3  Entities 
MDC (2000) do not have much to say about the entities except that they must exist and 
be capable of producing the proposed activity.  They say only that “one identifies and 
individuates entities in terms of their properties and spatiotemporal location” (p. 5).  This tells us 
that entities must be specifiable in physical terms but says nothing about whether there are any 
constraints on the kinds of entities or their arrangements.  The only real guidance comes from 
their examples of entities that are parts of mechanisms, including ions, nucleotide bases, 
neurotransmitters, membrane ion channels, cells, and hearts.  Perhaps MDC (2000) are thinking 
that their entities must meet some reasonably robust, commonsense notion of objecthood that is 
satisfied, at least, by individual molecules, proteins, protein complexes, and internal organs, but 
they do not say explicitly whether this is the case. 
  
45
 
Glennan (2002) spends much more time characterizing the entities that compose 
mechanisms, but still ends up without clear guidelines.  Glennan is trying to set himself apart 
from Railton (1978) and Salmon (1984) who seem willing to allow just about any physical, 
causal process to qualify as a mechanism.  By contrast, Glennan (2002) says that the parts of a 
mechanism must be objects “in the most general sense…with a relatively high degree of 
robustness or stability” (p. S344) and cannot be composed of fleeting arrangements and 
interactions of parts.  As an example of a non-mechanism, Glennan suggests a boy accidentally 
hitting a ball through a window.  “While the sequence of events leading to the breaking of the 
window certainly involves some entities that are stable enough to be called objects,” writes 
Glennan, “…the complex of these objects do not form a stable enough configuration to be called 
an object” and so the “Salmon/Railton mechanisms are [mere] sequences of interconnected 
events while complex systems mechanisms are things (or objects)” (p. S345).  Here Glennan 
clearly states that a complex system itself must count as an object in order for it to be a 
mechanism, and by example he suggests some things with very stable configurations, such as 
watches, cells, and organisms.   
On the other hand, Glennan later appears to soften his view by explaining that the 
examples on his list count as mechanisms because they are “systems consisting of stable 
arrangements of parts” and “the systems as a whole have stable dispositions,” which seems a 
much more lenient requirement than full-blown objecthood.  This interpretation is supported by 
Glenna’s example of certain social groups in his list of mechanisms because social groups (p. 
S345) do not match our commonsense notion of an object at all.  Glennan (2002) also spends 
some time explicating an even more tenuous and fleeting mechanism in his example of a “phone-
calling chain” that disperses information via an organized set of telephone calls (p. S346).  
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Glennan argues that this is a mechanism that has people as some of its parts, but the problem is 
that while there may be a somewhat stable arrangement of the parts (insofar as the people 
involved know their roles and are ready to act when called upon), it is quite a stretch to think of 
the dispersed group of people as an object.  There are some other examples of mechanisms that 
Glennan presents that are similarly problematic in that the proposed mechanism is not itself an 
object, but rather a collection of objects that operate together to achieve some behavior, such as 
the process that results in Mendel’s law of segregation (p. S346) and neural components of 
information processing mechanisms in the brain which, Glennan admits, have parts that are 
spatially distributed and realized by different neurological components in different instances of 
the mechanism’s operation.  Taken together, then, it seems that Glennan intends for dispersed 
collections of parts to be able to interact as a mechanism, and that his claim that mechanisms 
should be objects is meant only to capture the idea that a mechanism should be a somewhat 
stable arrangement of parts that can consistently interact to produce the behavior.  
Much clearer guidance on the composition of mechanisms comes from Craver (2001),21 
who builds on the work of Wimsatt (1986, 1997) in providing specific criteria that can be used to 
determine whether a group or system of physical items, the Xs, is a mere aggregation or is an 
actual mechanism.  Recall the examples from the beginning of this section:  Watches and hearts 
are mechanisms, while paperweights and gall stones are not.  Paperweights and gall stones fail to 
be mechanisms, but not because they lack any activities.  It is clear that paperweights hold down 
papers and gall stones block bile ducts.  They also obviously are composed of entities since they 
both are material objects of some sort.  The reason that paperweights and gall stones do not count 
as mechanisms is because of how entities are able to achieve their respective activities.  
Following Wimsatt (1986, 1997), Craver (2001) lays out four criteria under which a system is a 
                                                 
21 Craver is the ‘C’ of MDC (2000) 
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mere aggregation of things rather than a mechanism.  When considering a system with a certain 
output (activity), the system is a mere aggregate when the output of the system 1) will be 
produced even when the parts are rearranged and intersubstituted, 2) remains qualitatively 
similar with the addition or subtraction of parts, 3) will be produced even when the parts are 
disaggregated and reaggregated, and 4) is not produced as a result of cooperative or inhibitory 
interaction among the parts.   
 According to Craver’s (and Wimsatt’s) criteria, paperweights and gall stones are mere 
aggregations (not mechanisms) because their parts can be extensively rearranged and replaced 
and they will still do the same things they always did.  In Wimsatt’s terms, they achieve their 
function aggregatively.  By contrast, a mammalian heart, in terms of its ability to pump blood, 
can suffer only very minor rearrangements of its parts without losing its ability to pump blood, 
and so its function is achieved non-aggregatively (not by mere aggregation of its parts) and is 
therefore a good candidate for being a mechanism.  Of course, the actions of gall stones and 
paperweights are not completely impervious to rearrangements.  Very radical rearrangement of 
their parts could ensure that a gall stone no longer blocks its bile duct or that a paperweight no 
longer holds down papers.  This indicates that aggregativity is a vague property, but it can still be 
used to help distinguish mechanisms from non-mechanisms.  The general idea is that the number 
of rearrangements that disrupt the function of a mechanism is much greater than the number of 
rearrangements that do not disrupt the function.  For aggregative activities, on the other hand, 
only a relatively small percentage of possible rearrangements will cause a disruption.  There may 
be a large gray area in which it is not clear whether a given system produces its activity 
aggregatively or non-aggregatively, but there are many clear cases on either side, and so the 
predicate is able to do substantial work in distinguishing mechanisms from non-mechanisms. 
  
48
 
 Notice that Craver’s (2001) criteria are not meant to be criteria for objecthood, and so this 
account does not entail that mechanisms must be objects in any strict sense.  It does, however, 
place some appropriate physical constraints on what can count as a mechanism rather than a 
mere aggregation.  Craver’s account applies very well to biological mechanisms since most 
biological mechanisms are composed and controlled largely by proteins, and proteins are very 
sensitive to rearrangement of their parts.  Even small differences in amino acid sequence can 
alter the shape of a protein, and altering a protein’s shape can easily change its activity.  Even 
when macromolecules other than proteins are major constituents of a proposed biological 
mechanism, as in cell membranes (phospholipids) and chromosomes (DNA), Craver’s criteria 
apply.  Small changes in the parts of membranes or of chromosomes can change their activity in 
dramatic ways.  Contrast this with features of an organism that are biological but not themselves 
mechanisms.  For example, consider the layer of oil many land animals produce on their outer 
surface.  While the production and excretion of the oil may be accomplished by a mechanism, 
the oil itself is not a mechanism.  The parts can be rearranged in a wide variety of ways without 
significantly changing or eliminating its protective activity.   
One objection to Craver’s (2001) view may be that he is being selective about what he 
views as the parts (the entities).  Take my example of oil on the surface of the skin.  While it may 
be true that rearrangement of the individual oil molecules may not result in significant 
differences in the behavior or functionality of the oil layer, if we rearrange the atoms that 
compose the oil molecules, then we may disrupt the behavior of the material quite dramatically.  
Thus, a critic could claim that according to Craver’s (2001) account, almost nothing would count 
as a mere aggregate because rearrangement of parts on the atomic or subatomic scale will always 
significantly disrupt the behavior of a system, whether it’s a complex, dynamic system or just a 
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static, seemingly homogenous lump.  Therefore, says the critic, Craver’s non-aggregativity 
requirement fails to help us distinguish between a biological mechanism and a non-mechanism. 
This objection to Craver (2001) is blunted by considering that every mechanism operates 
at a certain level of organization (Machamer, Darden, and Craver, 2000; Darden, 2002; Craver 
and Bechtel, 2007), and at each level there are entities that are understood to be basic.  MDC 
(2000) call this “bottoming out” at a given level.  A given level bottoms out when we reach 
entities whose properties are taken to be basic or unproblematic for explanation of items at that 
level.  Oftentimes, the entities we find at the bottom are themselves mechanisms, but if so, they 
are mechanisms at a different (smaller) level of organization that contribute to the higher-level 
mechanism.  In themselves, the activities of any lower-level mechanisms that compose a higher-
level mechanism may be taken as basic when accounting for the high-level mechanism.  This 
helps to blunt the objection to Craver (2001) because when we consider the level at which a 
proposed mechanism bottoms out, we need to ask whether rearrangement of those parts would 
disrupt the proposed mechanism’s activity.  If so, then the object or process potentially is a 
mechanism.  If not, then it is a mere aggregate.  In a heart, for example, the basic entities may 
include contractile proteins.  The activity of the heart is very sensitive to rearrangement of those 
entities, and the actions of those proteins can be taken as basic in describing the heart.  Perhaps 
those proteins also are mechanisms that are sensitive to the rearrangement of their amino acids22, 
but amino acid sequence would not be relevant to a description of the heart as a mechanism and 
so they are below the bottom.  By contrast, in descriptions of the layer of oil on our skin or a gall 
stone in a bile duct, where the molecular level is taken to be basic, rearrangement of component 
molecules will not significantly change the activity of either, and so their activities are 
                                                 
22 Amino acid sequence is but one aspect of protein structure, as there can be a great deal of post-translational 
modification of proteins, including extensive cutting and re-arranging of parts, connection to other proteins, and 
addition of multiple saccharides.   
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aggregative.  Therefore, such items do not have the structural characteristics required to be 
biological mechanisms.  Mechanisms must have structure that, while perhaps falling short of full 
objecthood (whatever that may require), must still have a structure that does not allow for 
significant alterations without disruption of its activity.   
 
2.4  Activities 
Now I will consider the activities of mechanisms.  According to MDC (2000), activities 
are simply what the entities accomplish.  Of course, any given entity or process may end up 
doing a large variety of different things, so there needs to be a way to identify just one (or one 
small set) of those things as the activity, leaving the rest of the things that happen as mere side 
effects.  I argue that the activity of a biological mechanism must be a biological function, where 
a biological function is an output that furthers the life of the organism of which the mechanism is 
a part.  This general sentiment, if not its specific formulation, can be seen in Aristotle’s de 
Anima, in which furtherance of life is an essential function of all creatures, and in Kant’s 
Critique of Judgment in which he argues that we cannot understand something to be alive 
without it having the natural purpose of continued life.  More recently, Dennet (1989, 1996) has 
argued that when examining living processes, we always adopt an “intentional stance” because 
we always assume that any living system acts with the intention of furthering its own life. 
MDC (2000) hold something similar to my view in that they associate activities with 
functions, but their account of functions is more observer-dependent than I am comfortable with.  
They tell us that “[t]o see an activity as a function is to see it as a component in some 
mechanism, that is, to see it in a context that is taken to be important, vital, or otherwise 
significant” (MDC, 2000 p.6; see also Craver, 2001).  MDC’s account of functions is observer-
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dependent in that a mechanism requires an activity that is the mechanism’s function, and a 
function is determined by whatever the observers take “to be important, vital, or otherwise 
significant.”  Similarly, MDC (2000) also describe both the “set-up conditions” and the 
“termination conditions” for a mechanism in an observer dependent fashion.  They explain that 
when scientists describe how a mechanism begins, they pick out a “static time slice” of an active, 
ongoing process as the starting point and explain how the conditions at that moment will be able 
to lead to the termination conditions (p. 11).  Then, the termination conditions describe a 
“privileged endpoint” that is something that “we set out to understand or create” with the 
mechanism (p. 12).  Thus, as long as a case can be made that a certain product or endpoint can be 
characterized as a function, then the responsible entity or process may be thought of as a 
mechanism.   
Craver (2001) elaborates on MDC’s view by explaining that since a given system (S) is 
likely to have a wide variety of outputs, mechanistic explanations are “ineliminably perspectival” 
and “rely upon shared background assumptions that S can ψ or that the ψ-ing of S is important, 
significant, or relevant.  The idea that the heart is for making glub-blub noises only seems absurd 
until one is able to conjure (often with some contortion) a suitable mechanistic context for those 
glub-blub noises” (p.71).  Glennan (2002) makes a very similar point when he explains that “A 
complex system may exhibit several different behaviors, and the decomposition of the system 
will depend on which behavior is under consideration… the heart qua pump may admit of a 
different decomposition than the heart qua noisemaker.”  Finally, Darden (2002) also reinforces 
this view in her discussion of how mechanisms are discovered.  She explains that one way the 
search for a proposed mechanism may begin is when “some phenomenon to be produced, some 
start or end stage, and some entities and/or activities (or roles for them) are specified” or when 
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researchers “sketch hypothetical roles that components of the mechanism being sought are 
expected to carry out” (p. S360).  Again, the work of identifying the function of a proposed 
mechanism seems entirely up to the creativity of the researcher. 
Although they clearly acknowledge the importance of functions, I believe that functions 
are more central to a proper account of mechanisms than the above authors imply, and more 
careful focus on biological functions can help make the distinction between natural mechanisms 
and non-mechanisms less observer dependent.  Before doing so, however, we should be clear 
about the relevance of this issue.  If the mechanistic approach is merely a methodological tool 
that provides a useful heuristic for scientific investigation, then perhaps it is appropriate for 
functions to be completely observer-dependent.  If it is merely a researcher’s tool, then the 
researcher should feel free to use that tool in any way she thinks is useful.  However, I am 
defending the view that the mechanistic approach more than just a useful heuristic.  The 
mechanistic approach is useful because it captures something important about living organisms 
themselves, not just something about our peculiar way of understanding organisms. 
There is an extensive literature concerning biological functions and teleology (e.g. Ayala, 
1970; Wright, 1973, 1976; Cummins, 1975; Nagel, 1977; Falk, 1981; Nissen, 1993; Millikan, 
1998).  As mentioned in the historical overview in Section 1.1, modern, naturalistic science 
assumes that there are no vital forces, and aside from sentient animals and their intentional 
mental states, there are no fundamental teleological forces that drive simple physical matter 
toward a particular goal like life or adaptation.  Therefore, when biologists (and philosophers of 
biology) speak of natural functions, they do not mean to invoke any Aristotelian final causes or 
vital forces.  Instead, they prefer to invoke only standard causation as understood in physics and 
chemistry to account for the functionality of biological systems and subsystems.  However, as 
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Kant suggested, it is not clear that causation as understood in physics or chemistry (what 
Aristotle would have called “efficient” causation) can be teleological by itself.  Basic causal 
forces just do what they do, without any goals or functions. 
To get a sense of the issue, let us start with a common (and incorrect) first attempt to 
characterize biological functionality.  One might say that an item (X) in a living system (S) has 
function (F) if S does F, X contributes to the performance of F in S, and S would not be able to 
do F without X.  For example, consider a specific living mammal.  There is a heart that 
contributes to the pumping of blood in that mammal, and the mammal would not be able to pump 
blood without its heart.  Therefore, that heart has the function of pumping blood in that animal.  
The problem with this relatively simple formulation, as pointed out by Wright (1973), is that it 
allows side effects to count as functions.  For example, under normal environmental conditions, 
the heart produces a thumping sound when it is working inside the body.  Production of the 
thumping sound meets all of the criteria above, but we are not at all inclined to think that the 
heart functions to make a thumping noise.  This example shows that we need to add something 
else to our account of natural functions that distinguishes functions from side-effects.   
Perhaps the most common strategy is to use an etiological (historical) account of 
biological functions based on evolution by natural selection (see, for example, Allen (2004), 
Ayala (1970), Cummins (1975), Falk (1981), Woodfield (1998), and Sober (2003)).  Put very 
briefly, as this is the focus of Chapter Five, here is how evolution by natural selection works.  
Individuals with characteristics that happen to make them better suited to living in their 
environments will tend to survive and reproduce better than individuals without those favorable 
characteristics.  As a result, the favorable characteristics will tend to become more prevalent in 
the population.  For example, many mammals have fur that provides very good camouflage.  
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From among the diversity of fur colors in the ancestral population, individuals with fur that made 
them harder to detect by predators survived to produce offspring with a similar fur color.  
According to the etiological account of natural teleology, since the fur color was naturally 
selected because of camouflaging properties, the purpose, or function of the fur is to provide 
camouflage.   
 While the etiological account based on natural selection captures evolutionary reasoning 
fairly well, Lowell Nissen (1993) presents a serious problem.  He writes, 
Suppose that, as a glacial period slowly approaches, the fur of rabbits gradually changes 
from brown to white.  Regarding a certain generation, e.g. the fiftieth after the first 
snowfall, saying that a few rabbits had slightly lighter fur than the rest and also survived 
and reproduced at a slightly higher rate than the rest does not mean that they had lighter 
fur in order to live longer and reproduce better or that the lighter fur was supposed to 
protect from predators, neither does it justify or support such claims.  If a historical 
account of one generation provides no grounds for such claims, neither will fifty 
repetitions of that account, nor a large number of such repetitions describing such events 
over a long span of time (p. 33). 
As Nissen sees it, since teleology implies a goal toward which the system is working, teleology 
is necessarily forward-looking, while etiological accounts are exclusively backward-looking.  By 
and large, new variations arise spontaneously and blindly (see Chapter Three), and when a new 
variation causes an organism to be better adapted than its conspecifics, that increase in 
adaptedness manifests after the new variation has appeared.  This leads to a problem because 
when we claim that a new variation has an adaptive purpose we imply that the trait exists 
because the trait has that function.  But if the function only manifested after the trait appeared, 
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then the function cannot be a reason for the trait’s existence because that would require reverse 
causation from a future state to a present one.  Aside from strange effects in quantum mechanics, 
reverse causation is considered impossible.  Hence, argues Nissen (1993), the etiological account 
of natural teleology based on evolution by natural selection fails.  
One route to salvaging the etiological account of natural teleology in the face of the 
above critique is represented by Karen Neander (1991).  In order to avoid problems with reverse 
causation, Neander focuses on the type of trait in question as opposed to the individual token of 
that type.  She writes, “It is the/a proper function of an item (X) of an organism (O) to do that 
which items of X’s type did to contribute to the inclusive fitness of O’s ancestors, and which 
caused the genotype, of which X is the phenotypic expression, to be selected by natural 
selection” (p.180).   Consider again our example of hearts as blood pumps.  Neander explains 
that it is clear that hearts in general have contributed to the fitness of animals in the past, and the 
reproductive success of a given animal’s ancestors is a causal antecedent of the existence of the 
animal now.  Therefore, the presently living animal’s heart has the purpose of pumping blood 
because its heart belongs to the type of thing that contributed to its ancestor’s survival and 
reproductive success by pumping their blood in the past.     
 Neander’s account seems to capture something of the spirit of evolutionary explanations, 
but, as explained again by Nissen (1993), there remains a serious causal problem.  In Neander’s 
theory, the teleological relation between X and O (the item and the organism) is a relation 
between the types to which X and O belong.  But types are abstractions from their instances, and 
as such do not have any causal power of their own.  Therefore, an explanation of the existence of 
an adaptive trait cannot be based on the type to which the trait belongs because a type of thing 
cannot cause an actual thing to come about.  So, rather than suffering from reverse-causation, 
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Neander’s account fails to include any causation at all, and so she also fails to show how an 
etiological account based on natural selection can establish biological functionality.   
In addition to the problems discussed above, an etiological account also runs the risk of 
excluding the first living organisms.  The first organisms (or first living systems, if “organisms” 
is an inappropriate label) which emerged some 3.5 billion years ago, may not have had the 
proper history of natural selection required by etiological accounts, yet it seems inappropriate to 
claim that such organisms lacked any biological functions.  A similar problem arises from a well-
known thought experiment.  Suppose that the lifeless muck of a stagnant swamp just happens to 
come together in such a way as to produce a living animal, sometimes called “swampman” (from 
Davidson (1987)).  Swampman appears to be every bit alive as any other organism, so if other 
organisms possess some kind of teleology, then swampman must too, even though swampman 
fails to have a history comparable to other organisms.  
Because of the problems with the etiological account, my own account of natural 
teleology does not rely on etiology at all, but rather focuses only presently existing biological 
systems.  I believe that biological functionality comes from the fact that living systems are 
inherently directed toward continued living, where being alive is a special sort of property that 
exists in the world independent of any human (or human-like) observers.  The precise differences 
between living and non-living systems are notoriously difficult to pin down (Schrödinger, 1945; 
Mayr, 1998; Kauffman, 2000; Korzeniewski, 2001; Cleland and Chyba, 2002).  However, the 
existence of biology as a field of research is based on the uncontroversial assumption that there is 
a very real difference between life and nonlife.  To be alive is a real property23 of certain 
complex systems, and systems with that property are able to exhibit natural functionality because 
                                                 
23 There may be a variety of ways to be alive, so perhaps “alive” is not a single property.  However, all known life 
on earth appears to share in the same fundamental style of living so at least all terrestrial organisms share the same 
property of being alive.   
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their processes have a natural goal:  continuance of that life.  Continuance of a life is most 
straightforwardly achieved by the continued survival of the living organism, and so most 
processes carried out by an organism that aid survival have organismic survival as their function.  
However, reproductive processes also have biological functionality even though they do not 
contribute to the survival of the reproducing organism.  In fact, reproduction often directly harms 
survival of the reproducing organism.  That is why I chose to call the goal “continuance of that 
life” rather than “survival or reproduction.”  We tend to think of life in terms of individuated 
organisms, but the process of life is really an unbroken, ever-branching set of lineages dating 
back to life’s origins over 3 billion years ago.  Therefore, it is perfectly legitimate to say that 
both survival and reproduction by an individual organism contribute to furtherance of the life—
the ongoing, living process—that is happening in that organism’s lineage.  So, most processes 
carried out by organisms serve the general function of promoting the continuance of the life of 
which the process is a part. 
My account does not run into causal problems because there is an ongoing, reciprocal 
causal relationship between a mechanism with a biological function and the life to which the 
mechanism contributes.  The living organism is responsible for the continuing existence of the 
process, and the process contributes to the continuing existence of the organism.  More formally, 
some biological item X performs a biological function for organism O when X contributes to the 
continued life of O and the life of O contributes to the continued existence of X.   
My account of biological functions requires that the entities that carry out the relevant 
process must be constructed and controlled by an organism.  Many things external to an 
organism, such as rainfall and sunshine, may also contribute the organism’s survival, but it is not 
appropriate to say that rainfall and sunshine have the function of aiding some particular plant.  It 
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is appropriate to say that the leaves of that plant have the function of absorbing sunlight.  The 
difference is that a plant’s leaves are constructed, maintained, and regulated by the plant, while 
sunlight, rainfall, and other external processes are not.  Interestingly, a process need not be part 
of an organism to have a biological function.  For example, certain kinds of niche construction, 
such as bird nests and ant hills, are constructed and maintained by organisms in order to further 
the life of those organisms, and so serve that function even though they are not part of the 
organism itself.24   
Although life and natural functionality are not observer-dependent properties of living 
systems, when it comes to investigating natural mechanisms, there still is an element of observer 
dependence at work.  A certain mechanism may have more than one biological function, or the 
entities that compose a mechanism may also be involved in composing another mechanism, and 
so one researcher’s characterization of a mechanism may depend on which function is under 
consideration.  Thus there still is an element of observer dependence in the mechanistic approach 
because the activity to be studied is up to the researchers, as long as the activity can be shown to 
have a biological function.   
A final issue to address in this section is the reliability of mechanisms.  Recall the 
account from MDC (2000) who require that mechanisms be “productive of regular changes from 
start or set-up to finish or termination conditions” (2000, p.3).  For his part, Glennan (2002) says 
that mechanisms produce their results by way of “direct, invariant, change-relating 
generalizations” between the parts of a mechanism (p. S344) and must be distinguished from 
“genuinely singular events” (p. S348).  Calling the action of mechanisms “regular” or “invariant” 
suggests a very high level of reliability, but a strictly deterministic result where we get exactly 
                                                 
24 I am not claiming that bird nests are mechanisms.  Biological functionality is just one criterion for being a 
biological mechanism.  
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the same result every time a mechanism operates is far too strict of a criterion for at least two 
reasons.  First, it may be that because of micro-physical variabilities, no actual mechanisms are 
ever able to achieve such an extreme level of reliability.  Second, there are many examples of 
mechanisms that are supposed to produce variable results, such as lottery number selectors and 
sexual reproduction.  Therefore, some amount of variation in the outputs of a mechanism must 
be allowed.  Then, as long as the criteria I laid out above are met, then the concerns about unique 
or highly fleeting processes is alleviated.  If the process is maintained and regulated by an 
organism and is directed toward continuance of the life of which the organism is a part, then the 
process will not be unique, fleeting, or random occurrence, but will instead produce regular 
results in the way desired. 
 In summary, a biological mechanism is composed of entities with an activity.  The 
activity must be a biological function and the entities must achieve their function non-
aggregatively.  A mechanism has a biological function when the mechanism is part of an 
organism and positively contributes to continuing the organism’s life and, in turn, the organism 
actively maintains the existence of the mechanism.  The activity is achieved non-aggregatively 
when the entities must be properly coordinated in space and time in order to function.  The 
entities of a biological mechanism cannot be rearranged in any significant way without 
disrupting the mechanism’s ability to achieve its biological function.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
HEREDITARY REPRODUCTION 
3.1  Introduction 
Evolution involves accumulation of changes over time, and since all organisms 
eventually die, organisms must be able to pass their traits on to their offspring in order for 
evolution to continue over the long term.  Therefore, heredity is essential for adaptive evolution.  
There never has been significant controversy over whether organisms can reproduce with 
heredity.  Instead, questions have concerned what kinds of traits are inheritable, and what 
physical entities are involved in heredity and how they work.  Answers to these questions have 
had significant impacts on evolutionary theory, closing off some possibilities (such as 
Lamarckian evolution) while supporting others (such as neo-Darwinian evolution).  Section 3.2, 
is a historical overview of research into biological heredity and how it has shaped the way 
scientists think about biological evolution. 
Most of the really successful research into heredity has come from genetics, so genetics 
has dominated the field of heredity during most of the history of modern biology.  The success of 
genetics led to a gene-centric view of biology, especially evolutionary biology, that overshadows 
the roles of non-genetic processes in biological heredity and evolution.  In Sections 3.3 and 3.4 I 
use the mechanistic approach detailed in Chapter Two to dislodge the gene-centric approach and 
elevate non-genetic process to their rightful place in biological theory.   
Before going any further, however, it should be noted that sometimes it can be difficult to 
distinguish a mechanism of heredity from a mechanism that produces new variations.  There 
seem to be at least two reasons for this.  First, many of the biological mechanisms that generate 
new variations work in conjunction with mechanisms of heredity, sometimes even using the very 
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same machinery (or very same “entities” in the language of MDC (2000)).  For example, Meiosis 
in preparation for sexual reproduction includes steps that systematically introduce new 
combinations of traits into the resulting offspring.  Thus, Meiosis is a good candidate for being a 
mechanism of heredity (see Section 3.4) and for being a mechanism for generating new 
variations (see Section 4.4).  Perhaps it can be difficult to conceive of two separate kinds of 
mechanisms at work at the same time and realized by some of the same cellular machinery, but 
this is the view that I defend.   
The second reason for the difficulty in distinguishing a mechanism of heredity from a 
mechanism for producing new variations is that, within evolutionary biology, a mechanism of 
heredity is only considered evolutionarily relevant if it can carry new variations to the next 
generation,25 and so heredity and variation typically are discussed in tandem.  For example, the 
gene-centric view, which still dominates most biological sciences in one form or another, 
assumes that genetic changes (those associated with nucleic acids) are the only changes that can 
be biologically inherited, and so genetic mechanisms of heredity (those that replicate and transfer 
nucleic acids) have come to be thought of as the only mechanisms of heredity.  Just because a 
process cannot preserve changes over multiple generations does not mean that it is not a proper 
mechanism of heredity, and so I will not restrict my discussion only to processes that are thought 
to be evolutionarily relevant.  Then, once other, non-genetic processes of heredity are accepted, it 
will become clear that at least some of them actually can preserve changes over many 
generations and so really are evolutionarily relevant after all. 
 
 
                                                 
25 The reverse is also true:  production of new variations is evolutionarily relevant only if the changes are 
inheritable.   
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3.2  Historical Development of Concepts and Terms 
Although it had always been obvious that heredity is operative in biological reproduction, 
technological limitations severely hampered investigations into the physical process(es) by 
which heredity is achieved, at least until the rise of molecular biology in the mid-20th century.  
As a result, proper understanding of the actual mechanisms of heredity remained somewhat of a 
mystery.  Nevertheless, biologists were able to observe and measure the phenomenon of 
heredity, and so were able to refine their account of the activity even when they only had 
rudimentary knowledge of the entities.  Modern biology really started to take form near the turn 
of the 19th century, so I begin my account there. 
At the end of the 18th century, most scientists assumed that species represented 
unchanging types of organisms.  While some superficial variability could be observed in any 
species, if species are types, then there is a standard form or essence for every species, and 
members of the species should never stray too far from the standard form (Mayr, 1982; Gould, 
2002).26  According to this view, an account of the overall activity of any hereditary mechanism 
is relatively simple because all it needs to do is produce more of the same.  While popular within 
the scientific community at the time, such typological thinking about species was tempered by 
plant and animal breeders who recognized that novel traits could emerge in a population and be 
passed on to offspring, and they knew that selective breeding could change a species quite 
radically.  However, despite the plant and animal breeders’ track record of changing species in 
dramatic ways, typologists were able to dismiss their results by pointing out that domesticated 
animals, when returned to the wild, tended to revert to their wild forms and to lose any special 
traits that had been promoted through artificial breeding programs (Mayr, 1982, 2001a).  Thus, 
                                                 
26 Occasional extreme deviations from the standard form were considered “monstrosities” and did not persist in the 
population. 
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the effects of artificial breeding programs, though sometimes quite dramatic, seemed superficial 
and readily reversible, and there was little reason to think that the very large, permanent changes 
needed for general evolution of one species into a new species was at all possible.   
By the early 19th century, enough evidence from the fossil record had been gathered to 
indicate very strongly that some sort of long-term change in species on the planet had occurred, 
and so typologists needed to explain how this could occur.  One option for typologists such as 
the influential anatomist and paleontologist George Cuvier, who wanted to avoid any kind of 
change in species, was to say that old species regularly went extinct and were somehow replaced 
by new species, perhaps via immigration from other areas (Mayr, 1982; Hull, 1984).  Not all 
typologists were opposed to evolution of species, however.  But those inclined toward 
evolutionism faced a problem because typology typically assumed that an organism’s set of traits 
form a coherent whole, and that changing just one or a few traits would disrupt the essence of the 
organism to the point that it would not be viable (Mayr, 1982).  Thus, gradual, step-by-step 
evolution was considered impossible because small changes would result in non-viable offspring.  
A prominent way of reconciling evolution with typology was to adopt some version of 
“saltationism” (Mayr, 1982; Dawkins, 1983) in which very rare but very radical changes 
(saltations) could appear suddenly in a lineage—even over a single generation—thus converting 
the species into a different viable type.  Although no plausible mechanisms were suggested that 
could perform the activity proposed by saltationsts, it seemed consistent with the fossil record, 
which was relatively discontinuous at the time, and so saltationism (or something like it) 
remained entrenched among evolutionists in the mid-19th century (Mayr, 1982; Hull, 1984). 
An obvious deviation from early 19th century typological thinking was J.B. Lamarck 
(1809) who presented one of the first full theories of biological evolution.  Lamarck’s theory 
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famously included a process of heredity in which certain characteristics acquired by a parent 
could be passed down to its offspring, thus leading to evolution of the lineage that, over many 
generations, resulted in very dramatic changes.  Lamarck was unable to suggest any entities that 
could carry out his proposed hereditary activity, but that problem was common to all theorists, 
and so was not what caused the biggest problems for Lamarck during his lifetime.  Rather, it was 
his commitment to gradual, continuous evolution of species from very simple to very complex, 
which required transitional forms, that led to his marginalization (Mayr, 1982; Hull, 1984).  In 
particular, George Cuvier and Charles Lyell used their knowledge of the fossil record to show 
that although life on earth may have changed over time, it occurred in discontinuous jumps rather 
than through gradual evolution of lineages (Mayr, 1982; Hull, 1984).  Further, Lamarck 
theorized that all lineages go through similar progressions from simple to complex forms, but 
Cuvier showed that there is no overall trend or plan in the history of life on earth.  So, even as 
long-term and large-scale evolution of species was gaining serious attention, typological thinking 
still held sway.   
 The next prominent theory of biological evolution to challenge typological thinking was 
Darwin’s in 1859.  Like Lamarck, Darwin proposed gradual evolution of species rather than 
species stasis or discontinuous jumps, but unlike Lamarck, Darwin avoided postulating an 
overall trend toward complexity or any other kind of goal other than mere survival.  In that way, 
Darwin was careful to avoid the penetrating criticisms of Lamarck made by Cuvier and Lyell.  
However, Darwin’s gradual evolution of species still ran afoul of typological thinking, which 
partly contributed to the slow rate of acceptance of Darwinian’s ideas. 
Regardless of the differing views on species as types or on evolution, it was clear that 
hereditary mechanisms must cause offspring to resemble their parents.  As mentioned above, 
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technological limitations severely constrained what could be known about the entities that 
carried out the activity of heredity.  The most common hypotheses from before the 19th century 
usually involved some sort of “preformationism” in which offspring were provided with some 
preformed material, perhaps very small versions of their adult tissues and structures, that would 
grow into the adult form.  By the late 18th century, advances in microscopy had allowed 
biologists to observe cell division and the early stages of embryological development.  While 
they failed to observe anything like the smaller versions of their adult forms, they did find some 
cellular structures.  Thus they were able to rule out the homunculus version27 of 
preformationism, but not more sophisticated versions of preformationism such as Darwin’s 
gemmule theory (Darwin, 1868; Mayr, 1982; Jablonka and Lamb, 2005) in which offspring 
inherited preformed gemmules that contribute to forming the offspring’s tissues and organs.  
Thus, preformationism endured as a viable option in the 19th century, even though nobody had 
yet been able to verify the existence or specific characteristics of entities that could carry it out. 
As an alternative to preformationism, some proposed instead that the action of some 
special, undifferentiated substance, often called ‘germ plasm,’ was responsible for hereditary 
activity (Mayr, 1982).  It was not clear what the germ plasm was or how it worked, so when it 
was introduced it was little more than a placeholder for whatever entities actually composed the 
mechanism.  However, that does not mean that biologists couldn’t make some informed guesses 
about what hereditary activities could be performed by the germ plasm and which could not.   
For example, in the late 1880’s, August Weismann took note of observations showing 
that very early in embryological development, cells that eventually become those used in 
reproduction, what Weismann called “germ cells,” are sequestered away from all other cells that 
                                                 
27 The homunculus version of preformationism posited that offspring were provided with a small version of its adult 
form, and that development consisted of little more than growing of the homunculus.   
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compose the rest of the organism’s developing body, dubbed “somatic cells.”  Weismann 
reasoned that since germs cells are isolated away from somatic cells, any changes to the somatic 
cells cannot be transferred to the germ cells.  Then, since any changes acquired by a parent 
organism during its lifetime will only affect its somatic cells, its offspring cannot inherit any new 
characteristics the parent had acquired.  This helped convince Weismann that the only inheritable 
changes were those generated in the germ cells or during the production of offspring.  
Weismann’s views were given a boost when change-inducing processes were observed during 
Meiosis, which only happens to germ cells, but not in Mitosis, which is the method by which 
somatic cells divide.  For example, before homologous chromosomes28 are distributed into 
gametes, small segments of each member of the homologous pair physically overlap (cross over) 
and are exchanged, thus slightly shuffling the chromosomal material that ends up in each gamete.  
Then, when a randomly selected male gamete fuses with a female gamete, new homologous pairs 
of chromosomes are matched together to form an individual with a unique hereditary endowment 
not seen in either parent. If chromosomes carry hereditary information (a plausible but not fully 
established proposal at the time29), then all that shuffling and recombining of chromosomes is 
likely to be an important source of variation.  And since all that mixing of hereditary material 
happens in parental germ cells rather than to somatic cells, the processes do not end up altering 
any parental traits.  Therefore, any new traits that show up in the offspring were never displayed 
(were never acquired) by parents.  Thus, Weismann argued, there was no inheritance of acquired 
characteristics. 
                                                 
28 Homologous chromosomes are pairs of chromosomes that contain similar hereditary information.  An individual’s 
parents each contribute one member of every homologous pair.   
 
29 The details of how chromosomes contribute to heredity was not known until the mid-20th century, but 
observations of cellular activity had already made it clear that chromosomes were key to hereditary processes.  
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In addition to the germ cell / somatic cell distinction endorsed by Weismann, there is a 
closely related distinction, established a few decades later and attributed largely to Wilhelm 
Johansson, between an organism’s genotype and its phenotype.  The phenotype is the set of 
observable characteristics an organism possesses, while its genotype is the hereditary 
information (contained in the germ plasm) that the organism received from its parents and that 
directs development of the organism’s phenotype.  The term “genotype” comes from the notion 
that this stuff, whatever it is, is able to generate the proper traits in the offspring.  The term 
“phenotype” refers to the observable phenomena—anatomy, physiology, behavior, etc.—that an 
organism displays (Downes, 2010).  With this terminology in place, we can say that according to 
neo-Darwinism, changes to an organism’s genotype can change its phenotype, but changes in an 
organism’s phenotype that occur during the organism’s lifetime cannot change its genotype, and 
therefore such acquired changes cannot be passed on to offspring. 
Since Weismann could support his views with available knowledge of plausible 
hereditary mechanisms, his arguments eventually proved to be very effective against remaining 
supporters of inheritance of acquired characteristics.  When Weismann’s views were combined 
with Darwin’s theory of evolution (minus Darwin’s own views on heredity) the result was what 
came to be known as neo-Darwinism.  Neo-Darwinian evolution was Darwinian because it 
involved common descent and evolution by natural selection, but it did not allow for inheritance 
of acquired characteristics (Mayr, 1982). 
Weismann’s version of heredity eventually won out, as discussed below, but in the late 
19th century, neo-Darwinism was by no means the consensus view.  Typologists opposed to any 
long term evolution still held sway, and even among evolutionists there was much doubt 
concerning the power of natural selection to drive the dramatic, long-term changes implied by 
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common descent.  This is relevant to heredity because criticism of the effectiveness of natural 
selection was based in large part on the presumed inability of the hereditary mechanisms (which 
were still mostly mysterious) to preserve any new variations, even if they provided a selective 
advantage.  That is, even if significant new variations could appear in some members of a 
species, and even if some of those new variations were advantageous, it was believed that those 
new variations would not be preserved over the generations and so would not cause the species 
overall to evolve.  This view was supported by the common belief that heredity involved some 
amount of blending between parents.  If heredity really did involve blending, then since most 
individuals would not possess the new, advantageous trait, the new trait would be diluted by 
successive rounds of blending reproduction until there was no trace of it left (Mayr, 1982).   
Things began to change in the early 20th century, with the rediscovery of Gregor 
Mendel’s mid-19th discovery that certain traits are inherited as discrete units and that the units 
can be mixed and matched in different ways during the process of sexual reproduction.  
Although this new work described the activity of heredity without directly studying the 
underlying physical processes, the proposed activity fit very neatly with what little was known of 
the entities (germ cells and chromosomes) that were thought to compose the hereditary 
mechanisms.  In particular, observations of chromosome behavior inside of germ cells during 
Meiosis were compatible with Mendel’s Laws of Segregation and Independent Assortment30, and 
so it appeared that the Mendelian program was on the right track.  This emerging view of 
heredity also was consistent with Weismann’s views on hard inheritance, but it was not clear that 
                                                 
30 The Law of Segregation states that the two alleles associated with a particular trait are separated (segregated) 
during gamete formation so that each gamete has one allele for each trait.  The Law of Independent Assortment 
states that allele pairs for different traits are segregated independently from one another, so that segregation of one 
allele pair does not affect the way other allele pairs are segregated.        
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Mendelian inheritance could support evolution by natural selection, so neo-Darwinism remained 
a minority view until the 1930’s.   
It is worth taking a moment to assess this historical episode using the mechanistic 
approach.  Mendelians had some important advantages over their rivals.  Experimental 
manipulation and quantitative analysis of Mendelian inheritance patterns was relatively easy, and 
their research generated clear, reproducible results with interesting practical implications.  
Drawing upon Chapter One, we can say that the Mendelians were able to provide very good 
explanations, predictions and counterfactuals, and that this drove their success.  Mendelians even 
claimed to make use of laws of nature that govern the way gene variants (alleles) are distributed 
to offspring.31  We know now that Mendel’s Laws no longer deserve such status, and it seems 
that this episode instead is more consistent with Darden’s (2002) account of mechanism 
discovery.  When searching for mechanisms, observation of activities guides the search for 
entities that can perform those activities.  At the same time, even rudimentary knowledge of the 
entities involved in a mechanism can guide further understanding of the activities (MDC, 2000; 
Darden, 2002; Woodward, 2002b, 2003).  As discussed above, Weismann used basic 
observations of the entities, namely germ cells and chromosomes, to argue that the activity of 
heredity was did not allow for inheritance of acquired characteristics (Mayr, 1980, 1982).  The 
Mendelians’ views on inheritance were also consistent with what was known of chromosome 
actions, and since they also were providing precise characterizations of the activity of heredity, 
their project took the lead.  Contrast this with the relative failure of those who still defended 
some version of Lamarckian evolutionary processes, especially inheritance of acquired 
characteristics (IAC).  Defenders of IAC were unable to point to satisfactory activities or entities 
to support their views, and so their research programs faded away in favor of Mendelian 
                                                 
31 The proposed laws were the Law of Segregation and the Law of Independent Assortment. 
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inheritance (Burkhardt, 1984; Hull, 1984; Sarkar, 2005).  In addition, since the mechanisms of 
inheritance did not appear compatible with natural selection, Darwinian evolution also remained 
a minority view.   
With its successful use of the mechanistic approach, the science of heredity at the 
beginning of the 20th century came to be dominated by the Mendelian research program.  
Mendelians soon adopted the term ‘genetics’ as a label for their field, and they claimed to be 
studying “genes.”  As with ‘genotype,’ the term ‘gene’ (attributed to Wilhelm Johansson) comes 
from early ideas about the genesis or generation of life.  However, since geneticists at the time 
still knew very little about the entities that realized the mechanisms they were studying, they 
conceived of genes as abstract bearers of hereditary information associated with specific 
phenotypic traits (Mayr, 1982; Rheinberger and Müller-Wille, 2010).   
According to early Mendelian genetics, a single trait, such as eye color, could be 
attributed to one gene, and researchers could track the inheritance of that gene through the 
generations by tracking the trait it produced.  Further, geneticists eventually recognized that new, 
inheritable traits could spontaneously appear in a lineage and be preserved over multiple 
generations.  Despite Hugo de Vries’ previous use of the term ‘mutation’ to refer to large, whole-
organism changes needed for saltationism, Thomas Hunt Morgan dubbed those new gene 
variants ‘mutations’ as the label stuck.  In retrospect, we can see that the discovery of mutations 
helped pave the way for acceptance of neo-Darwinism, but since genetics was the more 
successful and respected research program, that acceptance would need to wait until natural 
selection was formally reconciled with genetics.  
That process of reconciliation began when simple Mendelian genetics gave rise to 
population genetics.  Rather than simply tracking inheritance patterns between parents and 
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offspring, population genetics tracks the frequency of different gene variants (alleles) in whole 
populations and tracks how allele frequencies change over time.  Since they were studying 
population changes over time, their work provided a way for genetics to be connected to long-
term evolution.  The connection was not easy to establish, however because the process of 
heredity, as understood by Mendelians of the first decades of the 20th century, still seemed 
unable to preserve incremental changes needed for evolution by natural selection.  By the 1930’s 
and 1940’s, however, a more mature field of population genetics used newly developed 
statistical techniques for modeling populations to show that genetics is indeed compatible with 
neo-Darwinian evolution by natural selection.  The resulting combination of population genetics 
and neo-Darwinian evolution came to be known as the Modern Synthesis and is the basis of 
contemporary evolutionary theory.32   
Soon after development of the Modern Synthesis, new methods for studying biological 
molecules finally began to gain access to the entities that carry out heredity, focusing mainly on 
chromosomes as the most likely entities for carrying our genetic inheritance.  By the 1950’s it 
was clear to geneticists that the activity of genes was accomplished by double-stranded DNA.  
Consequently, the term ‘gene’ became attached to specific stretches of DNA, in particular, 
stretches of DNA that are transcribable.  In the process of transcription, DNA is used by cells to 
produce specific proteins that go on to play major roles in producing the phenotypic 
characteristics.  So, according to the new understanding of the Modern Synthesis, transcribable 
sections of DNA—genes—carry the genotype that is responsible for producing the phenotype.  
Further, the term ‘mutation,’ which previously was used to refer to inheritable phenotypic 
                                                 
32 The contemporary theory of evolution has modified and added to the Modern Synthesis so extensively that it is 
not clear whether today’s version is the same theory in modified form, or whether we now have a completely 
different theory from the Modern Synthesis.  This issue does not affect my arguments, so I take no stand on the 
matter.   
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changes, came to refer to changes in nucleotide sequence of genes because such sequence 
changes are the cause of those inheritable changes in phenotype (Rheinberger, 2000; 
Rheinberger and Müller-Wille, 2010).  Consequently, the field of genetics, while still tracking 
changing allele frequencies with the techniques of population genetics, shifted much of its focus 
onto the molecular study of how protein-building information is stored in sequences of nucleic 
acids and how such sequences are passed on to and expressed in offspring.     
The amazing success of this continuing line of research combining molecular genetics 
and population genetics led some in the biological community to assume that passing on of genes 
from parent to offspring is the process (or mechanism) of heredity and that all other cellular 
processes active in reproduction and development are just the background conditions needed for 
genes to do their work (Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976, 1980; for critiques see Gould, 2002; 
Robert, 2004; Jablonka and Lamb, 2005).  Even more dramatically, this gene-centric approach 
tended to appropriate not just the study of inheritance, but all of evolutionary biology.  For 
example, Theodosius Dobzhansky, a founder of the Modern Synthesis, helped popularize the 
notion that biological evolution is nothing more than changes in gene (allele) frequencies in a 
population over time.  This positioning of population genetics at the center of evolutionary 
biology has had large consequences for biological theorizing, as will be discussed in Section 3.3 
and in the following chapters.   
 As molecular biology progressed through the latter part of the 20th century, the gene-
centric view remained dominant, but the concept of a gene and its role in heredity continued to 
change.  Molecular geneticists discovered ever more complex gene interactions, making it very 
difficult for geneticists to associate specific genes with specific phenotypic traits, as was done in 
basic Mendelian and population genetics.  In addition, the molecular concept of a gene simply as 
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a transcribable section of DNA was shaken by the discovery of diverse gene regulation 
processes.  For example, there are extensive segments of DNA that control which genes are 
transcribed and when.  Such segments of DNA do not carry information concerning any 
particular proteins but have nevertheless come to be called ‘regulatory genes’ because they are 
inheritable sections of DNA that actively contribute to the development of an organism’s 
phenotype.  Then, by the end of the 20th century, biologists had become aware of so-called 
‘epigenetic’ processes, such as DNA methylation, that involve chemical modifications to 
existing DNA that can activate or inhibit specific genes, producing dramatic impacts on 
phenotype (Robert, 2004; Jablonka and Lamb, 1989, 2005).  Discovery of all these gene 
regulation mechanisms, along with growing recognition of the importance of environmental 
conditions on development, led to rejection of the strongest forms of gene-centrism in which 
transcribable genes all but determined an organism’s phenotype.  Nevertheless, a softened form 
of gene-centrism continues to dominate biology, with other cellular processes and environmental 
conditions acting as mere support for gene actions.  That is, while the roles of regulatory 
mechanisms and environmental conditions are acknowledged, explanations and predictions, 
especially in heredity and evolutionary biology continue to be couched in terms of gene actions 
(Robert, 2004).   
 Recent authors have argued that even a softer version of gene-centrism is unjustified 
(Landman, 1991; Robert, 2004; Jablonka and Lamb, 1989, 2005.  They argue that other 
mechanisms of heredity exist besides genetic heredity, and some of those mechanisms are 
evolutionarily relevant.  In the following sections I continue those efforts.  I do this by first 
clarifying, in section 3.3, what activity a mechanism of heredity should be performing, regardless 
of what entities compose the mechanism.  Then, in Section 3.4 I use that account of hereditary 
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activity to show that non-genetic heredity is as vitally important to successful reproduction as is 
genetic heredity.   
 
3.3   Activity of Heredity 
Recall that every biological mechanism must have an activity and entities that carry out 
that activity.  Research programs like those discussed in Section 3.2 typically study both activity 
and entities, but considering the activity by itself can be very instructive.  When we leave out the 
entities (e.g. genes, germ cells, etc.), then an account of the activity of heredity is fairly 
uncontroversial.  As a first approximation, Lewontin (1970) described heredity merely as 
correlation between parent and offspring, a view echoed in Downes (2010).  While that seems in 
the right direction, Lewontin’s account allows for correlation due to chance while biological 
heredity is not something that can happen by chance.  That is, if one individual produced 
another, and the second resembled the first only by chance, then the process was not of heredity, 
but mere luck.  Instead, heredity is something that is caused to happen by the parent and is 
regulated by that parent.  More precisely, heredity occurs when a process that is initiated and 
coordinated by the parent causes characteristics of the parent (or other recent ancestors) to appear 
in the offspring.  The resemblance need not be exact, but in order for a process to have heredity 
as its activity, the process must make it likely that at least some characteristics of the parent 
appear again in the offspring in roughly the same form (Gould, 2002). 
Before proceeding, a terminological clarification is needed for both ‘replication’ and 
‘reproduction’ since both are used extensively in the literature on heredity.  Roughly speaking, 
replication occurs when an individual (typically a single kind of molecule or polymer) serves as 
a template for making a high-fidelity copy of that individual.  An uncontroversial example is so-
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called semi-conservative replication of DNA in which the two complimentary strands of a 
double-stranded DNA polymer are separated, and both are used as templates for constructing 
new complimentary strands.  The result is two double-stranded DNA molecules with nucleotide 
sequences roughly identical to the original.  On the other hand, standard examples of 
reproduction all involve a more complex process in which an individual (typically a complex 
entity composed of many different kinds of molecules) is built to resemble another, pre-existing 
individual.  Although the terms typically are used without much controversy, it seems that there 
is no clear, consistent distinction between reproduction and replication available in the 
philosophy of biology literature.   
Evidence of confusion over the proper distinction between replication and reproduction 
can be seen in the highly influential work of David Hull (1980), who uses replication as a sort of 
catch-all for any copying or reproduction.  Consequently, Hull does not distinguish between 
replication and reproduction per se, but between direct replication (e.g. the kind that involves 
DNA) and indirect replication (e.g. production of offspring).  Hull (1980) starts out, roughly 
following Williams (1966) and Dawkins (1976), by distinguishing between a replicator, which is 
“an entity that passes on its structure largely intact, directly in replication,”(p. 318) and an 
interactor,33 which is an organism that houses and supports the replicators.  Hull then explains 
that while replicators “replicate themselves directly, but interact with increasingly inclusive 
environments only indirectly,” interactors “interact with their effective environments directly, 
but usually replicate themselves only indirectly” (319).  Hull then goes on to explain that while 
unicellular organisms would, under this view, be considered replicators, multicellular, sexually 
reproducing organisms would not because “replication at the level of sexual organisms is 
                                                 
33 Dawkins (1976) referred to organisms as ‘vehicles’ for the genes in order to emphasize their subordinate role.  
Hull (1980) calls them ‘interactors’ in order to emphasize the notions that organisms interact with the environment 
while genes do not.  
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indirect” (p. 321).  So, according to Hull, some entities can replicate without being replicators, as 
long as their replication is indirect.  If something can replicate without being a replicator, then it 
seems that Hull is using ‘replication’ to refer to any kind of biological copying process, including 
what we normally call reproduction, as evidenced by his willingness to concede that 
reproduction of unicellular organisms probably counts as replication according to his view.   
A more promising suggestion comes from Szathmáry and Maynard Smith (1997) and 
Wimsatt and Griesemer (2007) who describe reproduction as a composite process of 
“progeneration,” where progeneration involves material overlap between the original and the 
copy.  A potential problem I see with using this account to mark the distinction between 
reproduction and replication is that the proposed account of reproduction applies to DNA 
replication.  Semiconservative DNA replication results in two new double-stranded DNA 
molecules, each with one old strand and one new strand.  Thus, DNA replication involves 
substantial material overlap—progeneration—resulting in numerically distinct individuals, and 
therefore would count as reproduction rather than replication.   
In the face of this inconsistency, I will use the terms in the following way.  Formation of 
a whole, living organism from another organism I consider to be reproduction.  Replication, on 
the other hand, is copying of a single kind of molecule that is either very simple or is a polymer 
composed of highly similar repeating units, where new units are added to a growing molecule in 
a way that matches the pattern of units present in a previously-existing molecule.  A further 
difference is that replication is a single process performed on a single kind of molecule, while 
reproduction involves many different kinds of processes (including replication in most cases) 
that are coordinated so as to build something (a whole organism) composed of many different 
kinds molecules and structures. 
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With the above account of replication and reproduction in place, we can see that both 
may count as hereditary activities.  Reproduction obviously is a process of heredity because it 
results in a new organism with traits similar to the organism(s) that produced it.  Replication can 
also count as a hereditary activity when it is contributing to reproduction, as it does during 
Meiosis or in preparation for bacterial cell division.  Recall from Section 2.3 that the activity of 
any biological mechanism must be a biological function, where a biological function is any 
output of a process that promotes the continued life of which the process is a part.  Heredity 
counts as a biological function because it helps offspring to continue living by providing them 
with characteristics that helped the parents survive, and in every case of biological reproduction, 
at least some materials and processes that were part of the parent become part of the offspring, as 
captured by Szathmáry and Maynard Smith’s (1997) notion of progeneration described above.  
Therefore, even though we distinguish parent and offspring as separate living individuals, 
offspring participate in the very same overall, multigenerational living process that has been 
sustained by all of their direct ancestors.  Therefore, a process of biological heredity serves a 
biological function (as detailed in Section 2.4) because it promotes continuation of the life of 
which the process is a part.  The only difference between heredity and most other biological 
functions (such as thermoregulation or nutrient acquisition that directly promote the continued 
living of a single organism) is that heredity promotes continuation of life by producing a new 
organism that is numerically distinct from its ancestors yet is still an offshoot of the very same 
life process in which its ancestors participated.   
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3.4  Mechanisms of Heredity 
In this section I show how the mechanistic approach is able to characterize a mechanism 
of inheritance, and I show that when it is consistently applied, the mechanistic approach indicates 
that biological inheritance involves much more than just the action of genes.  I also use the 
mechanistic approach to explain why developmental systems theory (DST), while capturing 
important facts about biological development, faces especially high hurdles in establishing a 
successful research program.  Put briefly, the problem with DST is that it readily includes 
processes that are not biological mechanisms and such processes are less open to experimental 
manipulation than are mechanisms (Woodward, 1997, 2002b; Machamer, Darden and Craver, 
2000; Darden, 2002).  Consequently, DST is less able to supply satisfactory explanations, 
predictions and counterfactuals in support of a full research program.     
 
Genetic Mechanisms of Inheritance 
Although my primary goal for this chapter is to use the mechanistic approach to support 
arguments against gene-centrism, I first will use the mechanistic approach to explain how genetic 
heredity easily qualifies as a biological mechanism.  While this insight into genetics may be 
somewhat unsurprising, it illustrates the effectiveness of the mechanistic approach in preparation 
for its application to more contentious cases.  As discussed in Section 3.2, genetics, especially 
molecular genetics, has been extremely successful and has dominated the study of heredity for 
the last several decades, so the most obvious candidate for a biological mechanism of heredity 
comes from genetics and the action of nucleic acids.  An important way for parents to cause their 
offspring to display parental traits is for parents to copy and then transmit some or all of their 
  
79
 
genes (that is, the nucleic acids that constitute their genome) to their offspring.  Therefore, any 
entities that perform those activities are good candidates for being mechanisms of heredity. 
Replication of genetic material (typically DNA) is performed by a host of enzymes and 
cofactors that are precisely organized and coordinated with the polymer being replicated.  The 
spatial positions of the enzymes and cofactors relative to each other cannot be changed 
significantly without sacrificing function, so the entities clearly meet the non-aggregativity 
criterion.  Further, replication occurs intracellularly, so any entities directly involved in 
replication are parts of the organism whose genetic material is being replicated.  Therefore, the 
entities involved in replication meet the mechanism criteria.  Then, as made clear in Section 3.3, 
replication in preparation for reproduction contributes to the continuation of the ongoing life 
process in which the organism and its eventual offspring all participate.  Therefore, replication in 
preparation for reproduction has an activity and entities that show it to be a biological 
mechanism of heredity.  As a biological mechanism, subtle manipulation (Woodward, 1997, 
2002b, 2003) of the enzymes and cofactors involved in replication have yielded deep insight into 
the process, and genetic mechanisms are regularly used by scientists to support useful 
explanations, predictions and counterfactuals.  The same can be said about transmission of genes 
to offspring, whether that involves nothing more than coordinated cell division or it involves 
complex delivery and fusion of male gametes with female gametes.     
The more contentious cases come when we consider the possibility of hereditary 
mechanisms aside from replication and transmission of genes.  Genetics has been such a 
successful research program, any work on heredity have tended to treat the rest of the cell as 
mere background conditions for gene action (see Section 3.2).  Gene-centrism has become so 
prevalent that, at least when speaking informally, the term ‘genetic’ has almost come to be 
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synonymous with biological heredity and is commonly used to distinguish biological heredity 
from environmental influences.  Although defenders of gene-centrism acknowledge the ever-
increasing complexity of the connection between genotype and phenotype and the importance of 
environmental factors, I argue, following Robert (2004) and Jablonka and Lamb (1989, 2005) 
that any kind of gene-centrism is unjustified, and that expanding our view of heredity to include 
non-genetic mechanisms will improve our biological explanations, predictions and 
counterfactuals.   
An initial problem with any kind of gene-centrism is that, by themselves, genes can do 
very little.  Simply transmitting them to offspring does not cause offspring to have traits similar 
to parental traits.  In order for heredity to work, genes must be included within at least one fully 
functioning cell.34  A fully functional cell is a complex network of interacting parts—ribosomes, 
mitochondria, plasma membranes, cell walls, cytoplasmic contents, as well as genes—that all 
work together to support the life of which they are a part.  It certainly is true that a cell depends 
on proper functioning of its genes, but it also is true that genes only exist because of the proper 
functioning of the cells of which they are a part.  Since the various different parts of a living cell 
are so interdependent, picking out any one component as causally prior is arbitrary.  This means 
that the standard distinction between replicators and interactors, so popular in the literature on 
evolution by natural selection (e.g. Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976, 1980; Hull, 1980; Sterelny, 
2001) is seriously mistaken.  While it is important to recognize the unique role played by genes, 
and singling them out as the most important part of an organism may occasionally be a good 
research heuristic, it is important to remember that, in reality, no one part of a living organism is 
causally prior over all other parts.  Dawkins’ idea of the “selfish gene” (1976, 1980) famously 
                                                 
34 This point is made clear by viruses that have a full genome but, since they do not have any metabolism of their 
own, are unable to make reproduce themselves.  Only when a virus makes its way into a proper host cell and hijacks 
the host’s internal machinery are viral genes able to contribute to viral reproduction.   
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gave rise to the suggestion that organisms are just genes’ way of making more genes.  While that 
may be a catchy aphorism, it is no more true than the belief that genes are nothing more than an 
organism’s way of making another organism.  Neither viewpoint is accurate because in a 
complex, dynamic, interconnected system like a living cell all parts are working for the mutual 
benefit of all other parts. 
 In order to establish the case against gene-centrism more fully, it is necessary to show 
how the arguments of the most influential advocates, Williams (1966) and Dawkins (1978, 1980, 
1984), fail.  It is important to do so because they, along with Hull (1980), are largely responsible 
for establishing the problematic replicator–interactor distinction into the literature.  In arguing 
against gene-centrism I am following the work of Lloyd (1986), Mitchell (1987), Gould (2002), 
Jablonka and Lamb (2005), and Robert, (2004).  Richard Dawkins (1978, 1980, 1984) begins his 
argument in favor of gene-centrism with the uncontroversial assumption that biological 
adaptations displayed by extant organisms have evolved by natural selection over many 
generations.  Dawkins then argues that in order for evolution to occur over many generations, 
there must be something that physically persists over those generations.  Evolution is happening 
to something over all those generations, and it can’t be happening to individual organisms 
because they regularly die off while the process of evolution continues.  The only things that 
physically persist through the process of reproduction, Dawkins believes, are the genes, and so it 
turns out that biological evolution is really evolution of genes.  By contrast, he explains, all 
phenotypic characteristics are absent at one time or another during the process of reproduction, 
and most are passed on imprecisely, as when an offspring inherits a certain limb structure from 
its parents, but the exact size and shape of the offspring’s limbs is somewhat different from 
either parent’s.  The genes, however, are inherited much more precisely and reliably.  Sexual 
  
82
 
reproduction may combine parental chromosomes in unique ways, but the individual genes that 
an offspring actually inherits are exact copies of genes found in its parents.  Therefore, Dawkins 
concludes, genes persist through the generations while other aspects of organisms do not, and so 
adaptive biological evolution is evolution of genes.   
In order for his description of evolution to be applicable to life in general rather than only 
to known, earthly life, Dawkins (1978, 1980, 1984) actually prefers to talk about replicators as 
the subjects of evolution, though he believes that replicators in earthly organisms happen to be 
genes made of nucleic acids.  A replicator, in Dawkins’s terminology, is any entity of which 
exact copies are made, and an active replicator is able to have some causal influence on its own 
likelihood of being replicated.  For example, active replicators inside a biological organism 
influence their own likelihood of being replicated by influencing the organism’s phenotype in a 
way that impacts survival and successful reproduction, where reproduction includes passing 
replicators on to offspring.   
In contrast to active replicators, passive replicators have no effect on their own ability to 
be replicated.  That is, a passive replicator has no effect on phenotype and merely gets copied 
and passed on to offsping along with any active replicators.35  Second, Dawkins distinguishes 
between germ-line replicators and somatic-line replicators.36  Germ-line replicators are those that 
are contained in the cells used for reproduction and are available to be passed on to the next 
generation.  Somatic-line replicators, what Dawkins calls “dead end” replicators, are those 
contained in all of the somatic cells.  In other words, dead end replicators in somatic cells are 
                                                 
35 In actual organisms, passive replicators are sometimes called ‘junk DNA’ because they appear to have no 
functionality.  Since cells do not seem able to identify and eliminate junk DNA, it all gets copied and transmitted 
along with active genes. 
 
36 This is essentially the same distinction between germ cells and somatic cells made by August Weismann and 
discussed in Section 3.2, but now expressed with Dawkins’s terminology. 
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responsible for producing phenotypic characteristics, and hence are responsible for survival and 
reproductive success of the organism of which they are a part.  Meanwhile, germ line replicators 
are passed on to offspring, thus ensuring that the replicators persist into the next generation.  To 
drive his distinctions home, Dawkins refers to organisms, with all of their phenotypic 
characteristics, as mere “vehicles” in which replicators reside and whose phenotypic 
charactersitcs are largely determined by its active replicators.  This centrality of replicators 
(genes) in Dawkins’s understanding of biology and evolution is the source of his now famous 
“selfish gene” view in which any evolutionary adaptation must be something that benefits the 
genes since gene are what do the actual evolving.   
 This brings us to one of the central tensions within Dawkins’s account of evolution as the 
story of active germ-line replicators.  Recall that to be active, a replicator must have some causal 
influence on its own chances of being copied.  The problem is that in multicellular, sexually 
reproducing animals, the germ-line replicators are not in somatic cell, and so are not the actual 
genes responsible for producing phenotypic traits and therefore cannot have any causal influence 
on the chances of their own replication and transmission to offspring.  Far from being active, 
germ-line replicators just sit there in the gonads waiting to be used in sexual reproduction while 
replicators in somatic cells (dead end replicators, as Dawkins calls them) actually work to 
produce the phenotype.  Further, any DNA molecules passed on to offspring are very unlikely to 
be the very same DNA molecules that were present in any of the offspring’s ancestors.  Rather, 
any DNA that actually ends up in a germ cell is a copy of a copy (of a copy of a copy…) of the 
DNA that was in the cells of that organism’s ancestors.  Therefore, the replicators used by 
earthly organisms (nucleic acids) do not phsycially persist over multiple generations in the way 
Dawkins suggests.  This is a problem because Dawkins believes that whatever actually evolves 
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over the generations must physically persists over those generations, and since genes (nucleic 
acids) do not physically persist over multiple generations, genes cannot undergo adaptive 
evolution after all. 
Dawkins recognizes this problem, and his solution is to appeal to gene types, rather than 
gene tokens, as the subject of evolution.  A gene type is a segment of DNA with a specific 
nucleotide sequence, and since germ cells and somatic cells contain DNA with identical (or very 
similar) nucleotide sequences, we can say that somatic cells and germ cells have the same genes 
types.  Thus, a single gene type can simultaneously be an active replicator and a germ line 
replicator that both influences its own chances of being passed on to the next generation and 
actually gets passed on.  Therefore, gene types (rather than gene tokens) persist over multiple 
generations and evolve by natural selection. 
The main problem with Dawkins’s shift to gene types is that an active replicator is 
supposed to have a causal influence over its own chances of replication, and types cannot cause 
anything; only tokens can.  Types are abstract universals, and as such cannot have causal 
influence in the world over and above the causal influence of the various tokens of that type.  
Therefore, Dawkins’s appeal to types continues to run afoul of his need to have active replicators 
be part of the causal process that results in their own replication. 
Another serious problem for Dawkins’s account is that the move to gene types that he 
makes for replicators can also be made for his so-called vehicles (Mitchell, 1987).  Dawkins 
originally concluded that genes are central to biology and evolution because they are the only 
physically continuous part of any lineage.  But then, since no actual DNA molecules are 
physically preserved across generations, Dawkins appealed to gene types as what gets preserved.  
However, once this has been done to preserve the continuity of gene lineages, the same move can 
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be made to shore up the continuity of the rest of the organism, which Dawkins had dismissed as 
mere vehicle for the genes.  That is, we can say that even though vehicle tokens are not 
continuous across generations, vehicle types certainly are.37  This is especially true for 
unicellular organisms that reproduce via simple cell division with little or no development, an 
area of the biological world that Dawkins ignores almost entirely.  Thus, there is nothing unique 
about genes in terms of persistence across generations, and so Dawkins-style gene-centrism is 
not justified.  There is no question that gene-centrism has been an extremely useful research 
hueristic, but it does not capture the whole story of how heredity is achieved.  That is, while 
genetic mechanisms of inheritance have supported very fruitful research programs, there may 
very well be other mechanisms of inheritance that, once recognized, can also be the subjects of 
fruitful research and can support more complete explanations of biological inheritance and and 
evolution. 
 
Epigenetic Inheritance 
Expression of genes (where expression of a gene amounts to its transcription into RNA 
that is translated into protein) can be controlled in a number of different ways.  One common 
way that cells regulate expression of their genes involves sections of DNA that are not 
themselves transcribed into RNA, but instead influence the rate at which other, nearby sections 
of DNA are transcribed.  Such “regulatory genes” can influence whether nearby genes are 
transcribed and at what rate, and so they have a dramatic effect on phenotype.  Regulatory genes 
                                                 
37 The point here is not to claim that organisms belong to any strict notion of types, as that may lead to a 
commitment to old typological thinking that viewed species as unchangeable (see Section 3.2). Rather, the point is 
that Dawkins’ notion of types, whatever it is, can be applied to whole organisms as well as to genes, and so his 
arguments do not support his preferred conclusion.  
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and their position in the genome are inherited via genetic replication and tranferral mechanisms 
described above, so regulatory genes are inherited via familiar genetic inheritance mechanisms. 
 In addition to control by regulatory genes, however, gene expression can be influenced 
by so-called epigenetic control systems.  The term ‘epigenetic’ once refered to a theory of 
biological development that was set in opposition to preformationism.  Recall from Section 3.2 
that preformationists, still common until the late 18th century, believed that development 
involved mere enlargement of tissues already present in a newly formed embryo.  The opposing 
view at the time, dubbed ‘epigenesis’ (Mayr, 1982 p.106), was that an embryo did not contain 
pre-made tissues, but instead an offspring’s own tissues and organs somehow developed out of 
an amorphous egg.  As described in Section 3.2, preformationism faced a serious setback when 
microscopy revealed that the preformed tissues resembling the adult form were not present in a 
newly formed embryo.  However, epigenesis was not in a better position to suggest any specific 
mechanisms by which heredity is assured, so epigenesis was not universally accepted either.  In 
Mayr’s (1982) description of the history, both sides were partially vindicated.  Preformationism 
was correct insofar as offspring inherit a preformed genome (what Mayr calls a “genetic 
program”), but epigenesis was also correct in that embryos, relying on their inherited genome, 
must construct their tissues and organs anew.  However, as knowledge of cell structures 
progressed, and especially after establishment of the Modern Synthesis in the early 20th century, 
‘preformationism’ and ‘epigenesis’ both dropped out of the lexicon of biology in favor of the 
language of genetics. 
 In the latter part of the 20th century, however, ‘epigenesis’ was revived and used to refer 
to a new variety of genetic control systems.  An epigenetic control system influences gene 
expression without changing the nucleotide sequence or genomic location of any somatic or 
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regulatory genes.  One of the best known epigenetic control mechanisms is DNA methylation.  
When a stretch of DNA on a chromosome is methylated, it becomes less available to 
transcription mechanisms and so any genes in that location have a dramatically decreased chance 
of being transcribed.  Biologists became aware of DNA methylation from its importance in 
embryonic development.  When somatic cells differentiate into specialized tissues, they use 
DNA methylation to effectively disable genes that are are not relevant to their specialzed 
functions.  For example, liver cells methylate stretches of DNA that contain genes relevevant to 
other kinds of specialized cells such as skin cells or neurons. 
Proper methylation of DNA is important for development of phenotypic traits and 
appears to be accomplished by biolgical mechanisms, and so an important question is whether 
DNA methylation also acts as a mechanism of inheritance.  That is, do parents use DNA 
methylation as a way to make their offspring look like them?  There is some evidence that this 
occurs.  For example, DNA methylation is responsible for allowing cells to differentiate between 
paternal and maternal chromosomes (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005), in some cases allowing only 
one to be used.  In addition, at least some inheritable changes in plant lineages are attributed to 
DNA methylation.  Jablonka and Lamb (1989, 2005) call inheritance of DNA methylation 
patterns a “non-genetic” mechanism of inheritance, but I think their designation is somewhat 
misleading because modern epigenetics is still concerned with genes and their regulation. 
 
Cell Walls and Membranes 
A better example of truly non-genetic inheritance comes from the inheritance of cell 
walls (Landman, 1991), which are the relatively rigid structures surrounding the cells of most 
non-animal organisms.  Production of new cell walls in plants, algae, fungi, or bacteria is vital 
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for viability of offspring and is an important part of causing offspring to resemble their parents.  
Therefore, when new germ cells are built for use in reproduction, or when unicellular organisms 
with cell walls divide, contruction of new cell walls for the offspring is a hereditary activity.  The 
entities involved in building new cell walls (mostly cytoskeletal components such as 
microtubules along with polymerized sugar molecules) must be precisely coordinated in time and 
space in order to build a new cell wall that matches the old cell wall (Salisbury and Ross, 1992; 
Campbell, 2004).  This means that the entities cannot be rearranged or jumbled without loss of 
function, and so they achieve their function non-aggregatively.  Since the entire process is 
accomplished within the cell itself, the entities certainly are part of the organism, and so the cell 
wall-building entities and their activity constitute a biological mechanism.  And when the 
building of new cell walls is done as part of producing offspring, it is a mechanism of heredity. 
At this point, a defender of gene-centrism might object that cell walls end up getting built 
only as a consequence of gene actions.  That is, gene products such as cytoskeletal proteins and 
enzymes are responsible for building cell walls and so it seems justified to say that cell walls are 
built by genes.  Therefore, genetic inheritance is still the mechanism of inheritance that really 
matters because all other feature follow from inheritance of genes.  This gene-centric criticism 
fails because it is well known that genes are only one factor in determining the characteristics of 
cellular features such as cell walls.  The way in which the wall elements assemble is not 
determined by genes, but rather by existing wall elements.  Similar to crystal formation, new 
pieces of a cell wall are arranged according to the pre-existing pattern of cell wall pieces rather 
than to a pattern somehow encoded in the genes.  In other words, while genes help produce some 
of the building blocks, they do not determine how the building blocks will be arranged in the cell 
wall.  This means that non-lethal changes to the pre-existing cell wall pattern can cause any new 
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cell wall to be built to match the new pattern even though no genetic changes have occurred 
(Landman, 1991).   
Finally, since building of new cell walls in preparation for reproduction is a mechanism 
of inheritance, there is the potential to preserve cell wall changes over multiple generations, 
which makes this mechanism evolutionarily important.  If adaptively advantageous changes to 
cell walls can be inherited, then a lineage’s cell wall features can evolve even when the lineages 
genome remains unchanged (Landman, 1991; Jablonka and Lamb, 1989, 2004).   
A very similar acount can be given for inheritance of plasma membranes, which are the 
fatty layers that separate internal cell contents from the environment.  Every offspring must be 
supplied with cell membranes resembling parental membranes in order for offspring to display 
parental traits.  Indeed, any new membranes are always built from existing membranes in 
existing cells.  New phospholipids38 line up with those already in the membrane, and new 
glycoproteins and other membrane structures are delivered and inserted into the growing 
membrane, which increases the size of the cell to which this is happening.  When the cell reaches 
a certain size, a finely choreographed sequence of protein actions constrict the cell near the 
center and split it into two cells in a process known as cytokinesis.  The processes involved in 
membrane building and cytokinesis are relevantly similar to those described above for cell wall 
production, and also are biological mechanisms.  Therefore, when new plasma membranes are 
made in construction of offsrping, any mechanisms involved are acting as mechanisms of 
heredity. 
 
 
                                                 
38 Cell membranes are composed primarily of phospholipids, with a wide variety of channels, pumps, receptors, and 
other glycoprotein structures embedded throughout. 
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Cytoplasmic Inheritance 
Another interesting example of non-genetic inheritance invovles transfer of cytoplasmic 
contents from parent to offspring.  In their discussion of very early life forms, Segre, et. al. 
(1998), Segre and Lancet (2000), and Segre, Ben-Ali and Lancet (2000), call this transfer of cell 
contents from parent to offspring “compositional inheritance.”  As they explain, metabolic 
cycles, including any necessary ions, dissolved gasses, reaction substrates and catalysts are 
contained within a cell’s cytoplasm.  Cytoplasmic contents are maintained within strict 
concentrations limits by the collective action of various molecualr channels and pumps 
embedded in cell membranes.  While the amino acid sequences of the proteins that make up 
channels and pumps are coded for by genes, the relative concetrations of cytoplasmic solutes are 
not encoded in any genes.  When it comes time for a cell to reproduce cytokinesis will split the 
cell roughly in half, thus providing each daughter cell with a full compliment of ions and 
molecules needed to continue all vital metabolic processes.  Metabolism has long been 
considered a necessary feature of any living system (e.g. Sagan, 1970; Luisi, 1998; Boden, 1999; 
Cleland and Chyba, 2002), so inheritance of metabolic cycles occuring in the cytoplasm is 
absolutely necessary for successful reproduction.  Therefore, every offspring must receive at 
least one cell with cytoplasm very similar to parental cells in order for the offspring to resemble 
the parent (see also Landman, 1991; Jablonka and Lamb, 2005).     
Segre, et. al. (1998), Segre and Lancet (2000), and Segre, Ben-Ali and Lancet (2000) 
refer to compositional inheritance as a mechanism, and consider it as a rival to polymer-based 
mechanisms of inheritance.  They even go so far as to call the makeup of a cell’s cytoplasm its 
“compositional genome” and talk about the “compositional genome replication mechanism” 
(Segre and Lancet, 2000 p. 218).  The question, then, is whether this process of compositional 
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inheritance is a biological mechanism or merely a mechanism in the more permissive sense 
discussed in Section 2.1, according to which any identifiable causal process is a mechanism.    
As discussed above, transfer of cytoplasmic contents from parent to offspring is a 
hereditary activity, so its status as a mechanism comes down to the characteristics of the entities 
that carry out this activity.  Cytoplasmic contents of parental cells are, of course, part of the 
parent, so cytoplasmic inheritence meets the criterion that the mechanism be a part of the life it is 
supporting.  However, transfer of cytoplasmic contents does not appear to meet the non-
aggregativity requirement detailed in Chapter Two, section 2.2.  Since cytoplasm is liquid, 
solutes continually float around and mix without sacrificing functionality.  Concentrations of the 
various solutes are kept within fairly strict ranges, but a wide variety of radical rearrangements of 
cytoplasmic contents will have little effect on the success of cytoplasmic inheritance, so any 
cytoplasmic functions are achieved aggregatively (Wimsatt, 1974, 1997; Craver, 2001).  
Therefore, cytoplasmic inheritence is not, in itself, a biological mechanism of inheritance.  
Perhaps cytoplasmic inheritance qualifies as a physical mechanism in the much more permissive 
sense in which a mechanism is just a describable physical process, but it is not a biological 
mechanism in the restricted sense associated with the mechanistic approach.   
This leaves cytoplasmic inheritance in a somewhat unclear position.  It is true that 
offspring must receive cyplasmic contents from their parents in order for offspring to inherit 
parental traits, but the process does not seem to be a mechanism.  Instead, I believe that 
cytoplasmic inheritance is best viewed as a side effect of other mechanisms.  Mechanisms in the 
plasma membrane such as ion channels and pumps work to maintain proper concentrations of 
various solutes. Cytokenisis mechanisms pinch the cell in two, and since the cytoplasm is 
roughly homogenous, each resulting new cell receives roughly equivalent cytoplasmic contents.  
  
92
 
So it seems that cyoplasmic inheritance, while extremely important, is nonetheless achieved as a 
sort of side-effect of other mechanisms that are geared toward other, non-hereditary activities.  
This does not mean that research into the effects of cytoplasmic contents on heredity are 
uninteresting or unfruitful.  Rather, it means that study of cyoplasm in and of itself, and its roles 
in heredity are studied from the view of chemistry more than from the mechanistic approach in 
biology.   
 
Developmental Systems Theory 
 Rejection of the gene-centric view in favor of a more inclusive account of heredity and 
development has led some authors to embrace Developmental Systems Theory (DST).  
Supporters of DST argue that development of an organism involves a complex web of 
interactions between a wide variety of what they call “developmental resources” (Gray, 1992; 
Griffiths and Gray, 1994; Oyama, 2000).  Developmental resources include anything that is 
needed for proper development of offspring.  Genes, of course, are developmental resources, but 
so are epigenetic control systems, cytoplasmic contents, organelles, cell walls, and cell 
membranes.  More boldly, DST even includes factors external to the organism, such as local 
nutrients, energy sources, and perhaps even ambient temperature and pressure.  All of these 
things affect development such that changing any one of them could change an offspring’s 
phenotypic traits, and so all of them are developmental resources according to DST.  
 Supporters of DST rightly criticize gene-centrism for picking just one part (the genes) of 
the complex web of interacting developmental resources as causally primary.  However, I 
believe that DST suffers from a fate similar to that of the holists of the early 20th century.  Recall 
from Chapter One, Section 1.2, that holism was a naturalistic (rather than vitalistic) theory of 
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living systems that focused on whole organisms in addition to the individual parts of organisms.  
Holists tried to resist the trend toward reductionism, but they found it difficult to develop holistic 
research programs that could rival the success of the reductionist research programs (Allen, 
2005).  Reductionists found it easier to develop clear and useful explanations, predictions, and 
counterfactuals by isolating and analyzing individual parts of organisms, while holists faced the 
seemingly intractable problem of accounting for all parts and processes of an organism all at 
once.  Similarly, DST, in its attempt to account for all factors relevant to development all at 
once, faces difficulty formulating clear and useful explanations, predictions and counterfactuals.  
This is not to say that DST is wrong or misguided, but rather that it faces significant hurdles as a 
research program. 
 The mechanistic approach helps in diagnosing the challenges faced by DST.  One 
problem is that DST seeks to include all mechanisms of heredity and development into one 
theory.  This is a laudable goal, but the mechanisms involved are very diverse and are realized in 
different ways in different species, and so a single, over-arching theory may not be possible.  As 
a further difficulty, DST includes processes that are not biological mechanisms, and such 
processes are less open to the style of mechanism-based research that has been so successful in 
biology over the last several decades (Woodward, 1997, 2002b; Machamer, Darden and Craver, 
2000; Darden, 2002).  For example, DST includes cytoplasmic contents as developmental 
resources, and while that seems correct, cytoplasmic inheritance is not achieved via a biological 
mechanism.  Further, and even more problematically, some of the developmental resources DST 
includes exist out in the environment.  Recall from Chapter Two that in order for a process to be 
a biological mechanism, the entities that realize the proposed mechanism must be part of an 
organism.  External nutrients and energy sources are not part of the developing organism, and 
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neither are general environmental conditions such as temperature and pressure.  Therefore, 
external developmental resources are not part of any biological mechanisms and so are not open 
to the kind of investigations available under the mechanistic approach (Woodward, 1997, 2002b; 
Darden, 2002).  Again, this does not mean that DST advocates are incorrect in their belief that 
external resources are crucial for biological development to produce phenotypic traits similar to 
parental traits.  Rather, it means that DST faces special research challenges that can hamper its 
success relative to programs that focus on individual biological mechanisms.    
 
Summary  
In this Chapter I showed how and why the gene-centric view was established, and argued 
that it should now be abandoned in favor of a less restrictive account of biological heredity that 
includes non-genetic hereditary processes, some of which are biological mechanisms.  I also 
showed that Developmental Systems Theory, while capturing important truths about biological 
development, includes a variety of processes that are not mechanisms and so faces special 
difficulties in providing explanations, predictions and counterfactuals expected of a strong 
research program.   
In Chapter Four I shift to generation of new variations, which is the second of the three 
processes needed for ongoing, adaptive evolution.  I use the mechanistic approach to address 
how variations are generated and how they contribute to biological evolution.    
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CHAPTER FOUR 
GENERATION OF NEW VARIATIONS 
4.1  Introduction 
 Before the rise of modern biology, common wisdom was that all species represent 
unchanging types of organisms, and any variation was mere deviation from an established 
standard.  An evolutionary view, by contrast, requires a source of new variations that can 
accumulate indefinitely and eventually produce new species.  Once evolution of species finally 
began to replace typological thinking, debate shifted to how variations generated, and which 
sorts of variations are inheritable and which are not.   
In this chapter I use the mechanistic approach defended in Chapters One and Two to 
address current debates over generation of biological variation and its role in evolution.  My 
focus will be on two processes commonly associated with Lamarckian evolution: acquired 
characteristics and adaptively directed changes.  Lamarck proposed that individual organisms 
could acquire new characteristics that were adaptive improvements and that those newly 
acquired characteristics could be inherited by offspring.  Although Lamarck was not the first to 
suggest such possibilities, he was the first to work them into a full theory of biological evolution, 
and so they have come to be most associated with his name.  By the middle of the 20th century, 
directed generation of variation and inheritance of acquired characteristics had lost their place in 
evolutionary theory, but I argue in favor of their limited reintroduction.   
Section 4.2 is an overview of the history of biological theorizing on generation of new 
variations.  I show how the relevant concepts and terms have changed over time, and explain 
why Lamarck’s ideas fell out of favor.  In Section 4.3 I work to resolve some of the confusion 
left over from the historical account presented in Section 4.2, especially when 19th century 
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Lamarckian ideas are re-considered in light of contemporary cellular and molecular biology.  In 
Section 4.3 I present a variety process for producing inheritable variations, and I assess 1) 
whether they are biological mechanisms, 2) whether they generate acquired or nonacquired 
characteristics, and 3) whether the changes are blind or directed toward increased adaptedness.  I 
show that many of the processes that generate changes are not biological mechanisms, but 
among those that are mechanisms, some are directed toward increased adaptedness and allow for 
inheritance of acquired characteristics.   
 
4.2  Historical Development of Concepts and Terms 
As already mentioned several times, generation of new variations is only evolutionarily 
relevant if the change can be inherited by future offspring.  As a result, much of the history 
presented in Section 3.2 also will be relevant here.  For example, as was noted in Chapter Three, 
a dominant assumption in biology up into the 19th century was that species are natural types of 
organisms, and individual members of a species never stray too far from that type.  Based on that 
assumption, generation of new variations is of relatively little concern because they will not be 
preserved over multiple generations.  The occasional birth defect or monstrosity may be 
observed, but such deviations do not persist in any natural species. 
Such typological thinking was tempered by plant and animal breeders who recognized 
that novel traits could emerge in a population and be passed on to offspring, and that selective 
breeding could change a species quite radically.  However, typologists were able to dismiss the 
plant and animal breeders’ track record by pointing out that domesticated animals, when returned 
to the wild, tended to revert to their wild forms and to lose any special traits that had been 
promoted through artificial breeding programs.  Thus, the effects of artificial breeding programs, 
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though sometimes quite dramatic, seemed superficial and readily reversible, and there was little 
reason to think that the very large, permanent changes needed for general evolution of one 
species into a new species was at all possible (Mayr, 1982). 
By the early 19th century, enough evidence from the fossil record had been gathered to 
indicate very strongly that some sort of long-term change in species on the planet had occurred, 
whether through evolution of species or for some other reason.  Of course, divine intervention 
could account for the fossil record (e.g. Paley, 1802), but I am considering naturalistic options 
only.  One naturalistic option for typologists who wanted to avoid any kind of species evolution 
was to say that old species regularly went extinct and were somehow replaced by new species, 
perhaps via immigration from other areas (e.g. Cuvier, 1825; see also Mayr, 1982; Hull, 1984).   
Not all typologists were opposed to evolution of species, but those inclined toward evolutionism 
faced a problem because the most popular form of typology assumed that an organism’s set of 
traits form a coherent whole, and that changing just one or a few traits would disrupt the essence 
of the organism to the point that it would not be viable (Mayr, 1982; Dawkins, 1983).  Thus, 
gradual, step-by-step evolution was considered impossible because small changes would result in 
non-viable offspring.  A prominent way of reconciling evolution with typology was to adopt 
some version of saltationism in which very rare but very radical changes could appear suddenly 
in a lineage—even over a single generation—thus converting the species into a different viable 
type.  Although no plausible mechanisms were suggested that could perform the activity 
proposed by saltationsts, it seemed consistent with the fossil record, which was relatively 
discontinuous at the time, and so saltationism (or something like it) remained entrenched among 
evolutionists in the mid-19th century (Mayr, 1982; Hull, 1984).  The term ‘mutation,’ introduced 
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into the biological lexicon by Hugo De Vries in the early 20th century, originally referred to the 
whole-organism changes proposed by saltationists.   
An obvious deviation from 19th century typological thinking was J.B. Lamarck (1809) 
who presented one of the first full theories of biological evolution.  Lamarck’s theory was 
discussed briefly in Chapter Three, Section 3.2, but there the focus was on Lamarck’s account of 
inheritance.  Here, I will focus on his account of how new variations are generated.  Put briefly, 
Lamarck believed that organisms contain certain special fluids in their bodies that have a strong 
tendency to expand and develop the tissues in which they flow.  He suggested that this general 
tendency to expand and develop is the ultimate driver of new characteristics for all organisms.  
Then, since Lamarck also believed that whatever new complexity an individual achieves during 
its lifetime can be passed on to its offspring (via inheritance of acquired characteristics), lineages 
tend to become more complex over time. 
Organisms are not merely complex, but also very well adapted to their particular 
environmental circumstances.  Lamarck explained adaptedness by proposing that the rate at 
which a tissue grows and the manner of its expansion are affected by the behavior of the 
organism.  That is, increased use of a particular tissue will promote growth of that tissue, while 
decreased use will retard or even reverse growth of that tissue.  This is Lamarck’s famous “use 
and disuse” hypothesis about the source of most new variations.  He believed that use and disuse 
can lead to greater adaptedness because all creatures tend to form particular survival habits in 
their environments, and such habits inevitably require use of some tissues more than others.  For 
example, an organism may come to rely on a certain way of obtaining food makes use of certain 
parts of its anatomy more than others.  Since, according to Lamarck, any repeated use of a tissue 
promotes that tissue’s growth and development, formation of a habit will result in growth and 
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development of any tissues associated with that habit.  In this way, an individual organism 
gradually becomes better equipped to accomplish whatever goals its habits were intended to 
accomplish.  In other words, the organism will become increasingly better adapted to its 
environment.  Then, since Lamarck allowed for inheritance of acquired characteristics, the trend 
toward increased adaptedness could continue indefinitely.  Finally, since each species faces a 
different set of challenges, different species will develop different habits, eventually leading to 
wide diversity between species.  Thus, Lamarck was able to account for both adaptedness and 
diversity of species. 
Lamarck’s (1802) theory of biology was far more complete and detailed than any rival 
naturalistic theories of the time.  However, Lamarck’s completeness came at a cost because his 
theorizing often went far beyond what the available evidence could support.  Prominent 
biologists of the time were trying to establish their field as a serious science in which theorizing 
is tightly constrained by evidence, so Lamarck’s penchant for speculation earned him an 
unfavorable reputation, leading most scientists to distance themselves from Lamarckian theory 
(Burkhardt, 1984; Hull, 1984).  It didn’t help that Lamarck’s inclusion of an innate tendency for 
living tissues to expand and increase complexity can seem like a supernatural, teleological force 
of the sort that was being expunged from biology.  Thus, even though many biologists were 
sympathetic to some of Lamarck’s proposals, they actively distanced themselves from his overall 
theory lest they be perceived as sympathetic to his speculative methods (Stocking, 1962; Mayr, 
1982; Burkhardt, 1984; Hull, 1984).  
Charles Darwin was much more careful about theorizing beyond the available evidence 
than was Lamarck, even though some of his views on generation of new variations were similar 
to Lamarck’s.  For example, as described in Chapter Three, Darwin (1868) hypothesized that 
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inheritance was achieved by way of what he called “gemmules” that allowed for inheritance of 
acquired characteristics (Winther, 2000).  Gemmules were supposed to be small particles 
generated in every tissue of the body and that carried information about the characteristics of the 
tissues in which they were generated.  Over an organism’s lifetime, gemmules from all of its 
tissues would collect in its gonads where they could then be used in production of offspring.  
Importantly, since new gemmules were being produced all the time, any new characteristics that 
an individual acquired during its lifetime could give rise to gemmules carrying information about 
those newly acquired characteristics.  If the new gemmules got passed on to offspring, then the 
offspring would inherit characteristics the parent had acquired.  Hence, Darwin advocated a kind 
of inheritance of acquired characteristics that is typically associated with Lamarck.  At the same 
time, however, Darwin also proposed that new variations could be generated within the gonads 
themselves, especially during times of environmental change (Darwin, 1859, 1868).  It is 
important to note that any changes to hereditary material happening in the gonads would not 
produce any phenotypic changes to the possessor of the gonads, and so would not result in an 
acquired characteristics.  If the change is to produce any phenotypic effects, they will only show 
up in future offspring.  Another difference between changes happening in the gonads versus 
those happening to somatic cells is that changes occurring in the gonads were unlikely to be 
directed toward increased adaptedness because of their relative isolation from the environment.  
While somatic cells could adapt to environmental challenges via direct interaction with the 
environment, gonadal cells cannot.  In his earlier versions of the Origin of Species, Darwin 
preferred to emphasize the gonadal source of variation that produced so-called blind variations—
those not correlated with adaptedness in any way—but felt forced to shift emphasis in later 
editions.  Estimates of the age of the earth were far too small for Darwin’s preferred processes to 
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produce the wide diversity of organisms, and so Darwin, in later editions of Origin of Species, 
downplayed blind variation and emphasized directed generation of variation and inheritance of 
acquired characteristics, despite their association with Lamarck. 
In the latter 19th century, however, evidence began to accumulate against the possibility 
of inheritance of acquired characteristics (IAC) and directed generation of new variations.  As 
described in Section 3.2, August Weismann’s distinction between germ cells and somatic cells 
seemed to count against such possibilities, but so too did work by people like Francis Galton.  
Galton transferred blood from rabbits of one color into rabbits of a different color, with no effect 
on the color of the latter rabbits’ offspring.  If acquired characteristics could be inherited, and if 
hereditary information about an acquired characteristic was transferred to germ cells via the 
bloodstream (as with Darwin’s gemmules), then transferring blood from one kind of rabbit to 
another should cause the latter rabbit to produce offspring similar to the rabbit from which the 
blood was taken.  Since offspring continued to resemble parents regardless of whether the 
parents had received blood from a differently-colored rabbit, Galton concluded that the 
bloodstream did not carry hereditary information, thus depriving supporters of IAC the main 
route by which hereditary information about acquired characteristics was thought to be delivered 
to germ cells.  Weismann himself conducted somewhat more blunt experiments in which he cut 
the tails off of a large number of rats to see if the newly acquired “no-tail” characteristic could be 
passed on to offspring.  Despite the crudeness of such experiments, August Weismann used the 
results to argue in favor of what came to be called “neo-Darwinism,” which combined Darwin’s 
natural selection and common decent with Weismann’s assumptions that variation is blind and 
acquired characteristics are not inherited (Mayr, 1982; Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; see also 
Section 3.2).     
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Since little was known about the entities involved in inheritance, there was not enough 
evidence on any side to drive consensus.  Plus, typology still infected the thinking of most 
biologists, resulting in problematic ways of framing their debates over production and 
inheritance of new variations.  For example, as described by Mayr (1980, 1982), many biologists 
of the time distinguished between so-called continuous and discontinuous variations.  
Continuous variations were the normal, though somewhat minor, variations seen in any species.  
There always will be some small amount of variation in exact size, shape, etc., and such 
variability tends to be continuous in the sense that body size or limb length may fall anywhere 
within a range of values.  However, such variability was assumed merely to be variation around a 
standard type, with species never drifting too far away from their standard.  On the other hand, 
discontinuous variations were the occasional, dramatic differences observed in some individuals 
that did not conform to the standard type.  That is, the new trait was truly different rather than 
just at the extreme end of a continuous range of possible variations on a standard.  By and large, 
discontinuous variations were either not inherited at all, or existed only for a few generations, 
thus supporting typologists’ view that species remain fixed.  Even the rising number of 
evolutionists in the latter 19th century still held some amount of typological assumptions and so 
were inclined toward saltationism rather than toward gradual evolution (Mayr, 1982; see also 
section 3.2). 
Another distinction with roots in typology was that between soft inheritance and hard 
inheritance.  Soft inheritance, if it existed, allowed for changes to accumulate over multiple 
generations, while hard inheritance did not.  Typologists predictably preferred hard inheritance 
since they believed species could not change in any significant way.  On the other hand, those 
inclined toward gradual evolution preferred inheritance that was at least somewhat soft so as to 
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preserve small evolutionary changes over time.  This distinction became central to the debate 
over neo-Lamarckism because directed variation coupled to inheritance of acquired 
characteristics (IAC) was the most prominent example of soft inheritance.  Neo-Lamarckians of 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries acknowledged that Lamarck’s original ideas were unlikely to 
be correct, but still maintained that at least some new, inheritable variations could arise as 
adaptive responses to environmental challenges.  However, since it was assumed that any 
adaptively-directed changes would have to be acquired by a parent before they could be passed 
on to offspring,39 debate over the existence of directed variation was collapsed into the debate 
over IAC.  Evidence was mounting against IAC, so biologists—even those sympathetic to 
gradual evolution—were turning against neo-Lamarckism (Mayr, 1982; Hull, 1984; Jablonka 
and Lamb, 2005).  When combined with the unorganized and even dangerous nature of some 
prominent neo-Lamarckian research programs,40 the case for directed generation of new 
variations eventually was lost (Stocking, 1962; Hull, 1984; Burkhardt, 1984; Mayr, 1982). 
Typology eventually was undermined by a mature field of genetics, but when Mendelian 
genetics was first re-discovered at the beginning of the 20th century, it seemed to support 
typology and count against long-term evolution by natural selection.  The reliable transmission 
of traits and consistent patterns of heredity looked a lot like hard inheritance, thus supporting the 
typologists’ views that either evolution did not happen or, if it did happen, it occurred in 
discontinuous jumps (saltations) as described by saltationists.  The sustained popularity of 
saltationism indicates just how little was known about the entities that carry out heredity.  Given 
our contemporary understanding of the mechanisms of inheritance and development, it is 
                                                 
39 The alternative is that adaptively-directed generation of new variations occurred inside germ cells in the gonads, a 
possibility that was even more difficult to defend because of the relative isolation of gonads from the environment. 
 
40 The most famous example has come to be known as “the Lysenko affair” in which Soviet biologists used neo-
Lamarckian assumptions to drive agricultural policies.  The result was mass starvation. (Medvedev, 1969)  
  
104
 
difficult to see how saltationism could work without divine intervention.  Nevertheless, 
saltationism was compatible with the assumptions of Mendelian inheritance and seemed to 
explain glaring discontinuities in the existing fossil record, so it remained popular (Mayr, 1982).    
Things finally began to change when early geneticists noticed some so-called 
discontinuous changes, such as a change in eye color, would occasionally appear and be 
inherited over multiple generations according to Mendelian principles.  By incorporating new 
variations that could be preserved over multiple generations, the young, though highly respected 
field of genetics was inching toward compatibility with gradual evolution.  Thomas Hunt 
Morgan, who first recorded this effect in his famous fruit fly breeding experiments, used the term 
‘mutation’ to refer to these inheritable, single-trait changes even though they were far more 
modest than the whole-organism “mutations” proposed by Hugo de Vries and other saltationists 
of the previous decades.  Nevertheless, Morgan and his followers still distinguished their newly 
discovered mutations from what they called the “wild type,” where the wild type was the 
standard or normal version of the trait, and so some typological thinking still persisted.    
By the 1920’s, basic Mendelian genetics had given rise to population genetics.  
Population genetics had the conceptual and mathematical tools for describing and tracking 
changes in gene frequencies in a population over many generations.  When combined with 
Morgan’s new account of mutations as inheritable changes in single phenotypic traits, population 
genetics was eventually shown to be compatible with gradual evolution, resulting in the Modern 
Synthesis of the 1930’s and ‘40’s (see Section 3.2 for more discussion).  Only when genetics was 
shown to be compatible with gradual evolution by natural selection did neo-Darwinian evolution 
seem like a better explanation for biological adaptedness and diversity than the alternatives 
(Mayr, 1982; Kitcher, 1985)  
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According to the Modern Synthesis, acquired characteristics could not be inherited so it 
was assumed that any adaptively-directed variations were not evolutionarily relevant.  However, 
it was still an open possibility that adaptively-directed changes could occur within germ-line 
cells rather than being acquired by parents.  Evidence concerning adaptively-directed generation 
of new, inheritable variations in germ cells is difficult to obtain because one would have to 
examine every change made to any germ cell’s hereditary material in order to determine its 
potential impact on an offspring’s adaptedness, which would be extremely expensive and time 
consuming (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Sarkar, 2005) especially before the rise of molecular 
biology.  Consequently, such studies typically relied on a statistical approach (Sarkar, 2005).  For 
example, Luria and Delbrük (1943) studied multiple generations of microbes grown under 
stressful conditions and concluded that new variations were not generated as adaptive responses 
to environmental challenges.  Even though the work had some serious flaws that throws their 
results into doubt (Jablonka and Lamb, 2005; Sarkar, 2005), and even though the limited results 
could not be used to conclude that directed generation of adaptive changes never happens, most 
biologists were coming around to the neo-Darwinian view that inheritable variations were only 
generated blindly. 
Work in molecular biology in the mid- to late 20th century changed the field dramatically, 
though the Modern Synthesis remained as the basis for evolutionary theory.  One major change 
was that the term ‘gene’ came to be associated with transcribable section of DNA (see Section 
3.2) and, consequently, the term ‘mutation’ came to be associated with an inheritable change in 
DNA nucleotide sequence.  In addition, the rise of molecular biology provided yet stronger 
reasons to doubt the existence of directed generation of new, inheritable variations.  When the 
roles of DNA and proteins became clear, it became extremely difficult to conceive of a natural 
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process that could introduce any adaptive changes into germ line DNA in such a way that the 
changes would lead to the development of the new, adaptive characteristics in offspring.  Any 
such process would somehow need to take into account relevant changes in environmental 
conditions and then change the nucleotide sequence of relevant germ-line genes in just the right 
way so as to result in development of properly adaptive phenotypic traits.  Even with the high 
level of understanding of contemporary genetic engineers, it still is not possible, in most cases, to 
predict the phenotypic result of a given change in nucleotide sequence, much less to know 
precisely what nucleotide sequence changes would result in properly adaptive phenotypic 
changes.  As a result, the suggestion that organisms are able to engineer themselves in such 
precise ways smacks of divine intervention rather than natural causation.  Therefore, by the late 
20th century, the two key Lamarckian mechanisms—adaptively directed generation of new 
variations and inheritance of acquired characteristics—seemed all but impossible.   
By the latter 20th century, the consensus view in evolutionary biology consisted of the 
Modern Synthesis updated with a much better understanding of molecular biology.  As for 
generation of new variations, since most of the recent advances in evolutionary biology (and in 
biology generally) had been driven by the success of genetics—both population genetics and 
molecular genetics—the understanding of how new variations are generated continued to be 
heavily gene-centric (see Section 3.2).  Chromosome shuffling and recombination (crossing over 
and karyogamy) during sexual reproduction were understood to be the sources of most 
differences between individuals of the same species.  However, since chromosome shuffling and 
recombination only work with existing genes, they are limited in their potential to generate 
completely new traits.  Plus, asexual organisms do not include such processes at all, yet they 
must have some way of generating new variations.  Therefore, the ultimate source of all new 
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variations was assumed to be blind genetic mutations, now understood as inheritable changes in 
DNA nucleotide sequence due to replication errors or direct damage to nucleic acid molecules.  
Mutations most often are detrimental because randomly changing one component of any 
biological mechanism is likely to disrupt that mechanism’s function (Wimsatt, 1974, 1997; 
Woodward, 1997, 2002b; Craver, 2001), and so most mutations decrease adaptedness.  However, 
some mutations may have no phenotypic effect at all (so-called neutral mutations), while still 
others may actually increase adaptedness in subtle or dramatic ways.  Thus, genetic mutations 
were assumed to be the ultimate source of new, inheritable variations on which differential 
natural selection could act. 
By the end of the 20th century, some other significant sources of variation (besides basic 
mutations) had gained recognition, though all still concerned genes one way or another.  For 
example, a kind of genetic recombination called transposition occurs when a section of DNA is 
moved from one area of a chromosome to another.  Active genes commonly are associated with 
a regulatory region of DNA that controls the rate at which the genes are accessed by transcription 
machinery, and transposition can separate an active gene from its regulatory region, thus 
rendering it inactive.  Alternately, transposition may move an inactive gene to a position that 
associates it with a regulatory region and allows the gene to become active.  Either way, the 
result usually is a change in phenotype.  If the section of DNA being transposed is a regulatory 
region rather than a transcribable gene, then the phenotypic effects can be quite dramatic because 
one set of genes may lose their regulatory region and cease being active, while another set of 
genes may gain a regulatory region and thereby become active contributors to phenotype.  When 
transposition occurs between microbial cells, it is called horizontal gene transfer (HGT).  In 
HGT, one cell copies and transfers a section of its genome to another cell that incorporates the 
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transferred segment into its own genome.  If the transferred segment of DNA can be transcribed, 
then it can become an active contributor to the new cell’s phenotype.  As with mutations, any 
new variations generated as a result of transposition or HGT may be detrimental, neutral, or 
beneficial to an organism’s adaptedness, and so transposition is generally considered a blind 
source of variation. 
 In recent decades, some authors have argued that not all sources of biological variation 
are blind and that acquired characteristics very often can be inherited (e.g. Landman, 1991; 
Jablonka and Lamb, 1989, 2005; Steele, et.al, 1998; Stolovicki, et.al., 2006).  I expand upon 
those efforts in the rest of this chapter.  In Section 4.3 I clarify the distinction between acquired 
versus non-acquired traits, and between blind versus directed changes.  In Section 4.4 I show that 
many processes that generate changes are not mechanisms, and that among those that are 
mechanisms, some are not entirely blind.  I also show that inheritance of acquired characteristics 
is commonplace, especially among bacteria.   
 
4.3  Change-Producing Activities 
As discussed in Sections 3.1 and 4.1, it is important to maintain the distinction between 
heredity and generation of new variations (Sarkar, 2005; Kronfeldner, 2007).  When 
characterizing generation of new variations in isolation, it is not appropriate to incorporate a 
particular variety of inheritance, genetic or otherwise, just as it was inappropriate to include an 
account of change-production in the characterization of heredity defended in Section 3.3.  Of 
course, only inheritable changes are evolutionarily relevant, so it quickly will become necessary 
to restrict the account only to inheritable changes.    
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When the requirement for inheritability is absent, characterizing the relevant change-
producing activity is fairly uncomplicated.  It is just any causal production of a trait that was not 
present in the recent lineage.  This allows for changes to living organisms as well as changes to 
hereditary material that result in new traits appearing in offspring.  Of course, this account 
includes a wide variety of changes that are evolutionarily uninteresting, such as superficial 
injuries, and so it is time to restrict the account to changes that are inheritable.  So, the relevant 
change-producing activity is causal production of a trait that was not present in the recent lineage 
and that is subsequently inheritable. 
By restricting the account to changes that were not present in the recent lineage, we leave 
out traits that appear as a result of normal developmental mechanisms inherited from parents.  
Embryological development, sexual maturation, and aging are all developmental processes that 
can produce very dramatic changes in an organism, but they are pre-arranged changes that play 
out according to regulatory mechanisms inherited from an organism’s parents.  Therefore, 
developmental changes that roughly mimic the developmental changes undergone by parents are 
not evolutionary changes because they are not changing the lineage.  Note, however, that my 
account only excludes traits that appeared in the recent lineage.  This allows for important 
phenotypic traits that can reappear in a lineage after being absent for many generations.  For 
example, consider the blind cave fish Amblyopsis spelaea (Jeffery, 2001; Romero and Green, 
2005) whose lineage has lacked eyes for thousands of years.  If a population is moved out of the 
caves and into the light, functional eyes could reappear in the lineage as a result of a surprisingly 
simple change in developmental regulation.  Reappearance of eyes and vision in a lineage 
certainly is evolutionarily significant, so those sorts of changes should be allowed by our account 
of change-inducing activity.   
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To reiterate, the activity we are interested in is production of new, inheritable variations 
that were not present in an organism’s recent lineage.  By itself, this account says nothing about 
whether the inheritable changes are acquired or are generated blindly   As discussed in Sections 
3.2 and 4.2, the most recent debates over Lamarckian evolution focused on the possibility of 
changes that are directed toward increased adaptedness and on the possibility of inheritance of 
acquired characteristics (IAC).  Since genetic heredity seemed unlikely to support IAC, most 
biologists assumed that acquired characteristics could not be inherited and so were not 
evolutionarily relevant.  In addition, they also assumed that any processes for generating new, 
inheritable variations are blind rather than directed toward greater adaptedness.  Since both will 
be an important part of the discussion in Section 4.4, I will take some time to characterize 
directed generation of new variations and acquired characteristics more carefully. 
 First I consider acquired characteristics.  In order for a new characteristic to be an 
acquired characteristic, the change must occur to an individual organism after the organism has 
been produced as a viable offspring.  Acquired changes can be contrasted with non-acquired 
changes that occur during production of cells that will be used to produce an offspring.  For 
example, replication errors inside germ cells can result in offspring with some new phenotypic 
trait, but nobody acquires that change.  The parent does not change, so the parent has not 
acquired any new characteristics, and the offspring does not yet exist so it cannot acquire 
anything at all.  Therefore, any new traits introduced during production of cells that will be used 
to produce an offspring do not qualify as acquired changes.  We also want to exclude any 
changes that occur to an organism as part of its normal developmental processes because, as 
explained above, such changes are not new to the lineage and so are not evolutionarily relevant. 
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 Historically, inheritance of acquired characteristics was not included in the Modern 
Synthesis because it seemed that genetic inheritance and the germ cell / somatic cell distinction 
did not allow for it.  Thus, it may be tempting to assume that IAC, if it exists, must use a non-
genetic mechanism of inheritance.  However, despite IAC’s historical conflict with genetic 
inheritance, we should not reject an obvious instance of IAC just because it happens to involve 
genetic inheritance.  It seems clear that if an existing organism acquires a new phenotypic trait 
because of a change to its genotype, and if that change is genetically inheritable, then we have 
inheritance of an acquired characteristic. 
 This brings us to the other main tenet of neo-Lamarckism, adaptively directed generation 
of new variations.  Before discussing directed variation itself, however, I will take a moment to 
separate directed variation from IAC.  As explained in Section 4.2, since it was difficult to 
imagine how adaptively directed changes could be encoded directly into germ-line hereditary 
material, it was assumed that any directed changes would have to somehow involve somatic cells 
and their interaction with the environment.  In other words, it was assumed that adaptively-
directed changes would inevitably be acquired changes.  Thus, the debate over directed 
generation of variation was bound up with the debate over IAC.  However, other than the 
historical association of IAC with directed variation, it is possible for an acquired, inheritable 
characteristic to be generated blindly.  It also is possible for there to be a process that generates 
adaptively-directed changes that are not acquired changes (Sarkar, 2005).  Therefore, evaluation 
of IAC and of directed variation can and should be done separately.   
 Sarkar (2005) explores the concept of directed variation in the context of genetic 
mutations, but his discussion can be generalized to include inheritable changes of any sort rather 
than just genetic changes.  Sarkar begins by characterizing a very strong notion of directed 
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generation of new variations—what he calls “instructed” changes—as a single change that is 
beneficial on the first try, sort of the way a human civil engineer would direct a specific change 
to a bridge design in order to make it stronger or more efficient.  In no way is this a blind process 
because, as Sarkar explains, information concerning what changes would be beneficial (rather 
than neutral or detrimental) is playing the main role in directing which changes are generated.  
Sarkar (2005) then goes on to describe a more relaxed kind of directedness in which an adaptive 
change “occurs (or occurs more often) in an environment where it enhances the fitness of the 
organism than in an environment in which it does not do so” (2005: 290).  While I believe he is 
on the right track, the problem I see with Sarkar’s more relaxed account is that this sort of 
directedness can come too cheaply.  When faced with some small environmental stress, a 
population could simply increase its overall rate of change in order to increase the chances of 
producing an adaptive change.  The problem is that all kinds of changes—good, bad, and 
neutral—would become more likely, and would do so during a time when the beneficial ones 
would be beneficial, and so this would meet Sarkar’s criteria for being directed even though it 
really just involved increasing the rate of blind changes.  Increasing the rate of blind changes, 
while interesting, would not seem to be very directed in the relevant sense.  Rather, in order to 
count as directed (while still falling short of being “instructed” in Sarkar’s sense), the process 
would at least need to boost the chances of a beneficial change more than it boosts the chances of 
neutral or detrimental changes.  I call such an activity “semi-directed” because it is directed only 
insofar it uses a blind change-producing process aimed at producing an adaptive change via trial 
and error.  In Section 4.4, I argue that a semi-directed process for producing inheritable 
variations is at work in bacterial colonies. 
Producing Changes As a Biological Function 
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 The activity of a biological mechanism must be a biological function, so when assessing 
whether any change-producing processes are biological mechanisms, we must determine whether 
the activity counts as a biological function.  The activity of a process is a biological function 
when the activity promotes continuation of the life in which the process is participating.  Among 
the varieties of change-generating activities discussed above, directed variation is the best 
candidate because a process that reliably generates changes that increase adaptedness clearly is 
promoting survival.  Semi-directed generation of variation is substantially riskier than fully 
directed variation because a semi-directed process would be expected to produce some 
detrimental changes as well as adaptive ones.  However, since a semi-directed process increases 
the chances of an adaptive change more than it increases the chances of a detrimental change, a 
semi-directed variation still qualifies as a biological function, as long as the risk of occasional 
detrimental changes is outweighed by the risk of doing nothing.  Thus, semi-directed variation is 
especially beneficial when faced with an environmental challenge that could end up being fatal if 
left unsolved.   
 Truly blind variation can also qualify as a biological function as long as it is tightly 
controlled.  For example, sexual reproduction is beneficial mainly because of the way it blindly 
mixes hereditary contributions from both parents to produce viable offspring with a unique set of 
traits (see Section 4.4 further discussion).  That is, sexual reproduction involves steps that 
rearrange and recombine the hereditary endowment from each parent in ways that ensure 
offspring receive all the genes and other cellular components they need, but that each offspring 
receives a slightly different combination of components, leading to a highly restricted degree of 
variation among the offspring.  Although it is far more difficult and risky than asexual 
reproduction, sexual reproduction has evolved as a common strategy because its change-
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generating features are thought to promote long term survival of the lineage by preventing 
buildup of detrimental genetic mutations (e.g. see Agrawal, 2001) and by providing the lineage 
with some flexibility to adapt to changing conditions.  The change-generating parts of sexual 
reproduction are considered blind because the process does not distinguish between 
combinations of traits that will improve adaptedness from those that are neutral or detrimental.  
That is, the change-generating processes of sexual reproduction are just as likely to result in 
offspring that are less adapted than their parents as it is to result in offspring that are better 
adapted than their parents.  Nevertheless, since it usually produces viable offspring, the risks of 
allowing this small amount of blind variation are outweighed by the long term survival benefits, 
and so highly controlled blind mutation during sexual reproduction qualifies as a biological 
function. 
 
4.4  Varieties of Change-producing Processes 
In this section I draw upon my account of change-producing activities in Section 4.3 to 
analyze and characterize the varieties of actual change-producing processes.  My main goals are 
to show that the two processes traditionally associated with Lamarck—directed variation and 
inheritance of acquired characteristics—are both operative in the biological world and play 
significant roles in biological evolution, particularly among microbes.  In doing so I also will 
determine which change-producing activities qualify as biological functions carried out by 
biological mechanisms.  I will start with the more familiar variation that results from sexual 
reproduction and then move on to more contentious cases. 
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Meiosis and Sexual Reproduction  
Most of the cells in sexually reproducing organisms have two full sets of chromosomes.  
Every chromosome is paired with another, very similar chromosome, and the two together are 
called a homologous pair.  One member of each homologous pair came from the organism’s 
mother while the other came from its father.  Germ cells, also known as gametes, have only one 
set of chromosomes (one member of each homologous pair) so that when a gamete from one 
parent fuses with a gamete from the other parent, the result is a new cell with two sets of 
chromosomes, one set from each parent.  Gametes are produced through a specialized kind of 
cell division called Meiosis.  During Meiosis, homologous pairs of chromosomes line up along 
the center of the proto-gamete, and when the cell divides, homologous pairs are separated, with 
those that happened to line up on the left going to the cell on the left, and those that happened to 
line up on the right going to the cell on the right.  The result is that an individual’s gametes 
receive some chromosomes that were originally inherited from that individual’s mother and 
some that were originally inherited from that individual’s father (i.e. from the eventual 
offspring’s grandparents). 41  Cells do not regulate which member of each homologous pair goes 
left and which one goes right because there apparently is no way to regulate which side each 
homologue lines up on before the proto-gamete divides.  Thus, each gamete receives a randomly-
determined combination of maternal and paternal chromosomes, potentially resulting in 
offspring with new phenotypic variations.   
Meiosis is achieved by biological mechanisms whose function is to produce gametes with 
one full set of chromosomes each (see section 3.4 for more discussion of hereditary 
mechanisms).  Any diversity resulting from this step is achieved passively (and blindly) because 
                                                 
41 The actual chromosomes being used are not the very same ones physically handed down from the organism’s 
parents.  Rather, these are high-fidelity copies of those chromosomes.   
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there is no mechanism for determining which side each homologue lines up on.  Meiosis ensures 
that each gamete receives a full set of chromosomes, but does not regulate how many of a 
resulting gamete’s chromosomes are maternal and how may are paternal.  It is entirely possible 
that a given gamete could end up with exclusively maternal or exclusively paternal 
chromosomes.  Therefore, generation of new variations at this step is not a biological function, 
but rather a side-effect of mechanisms whose actual function is to produce cells with one full set 
of chromosomes.   
 Contrast the above process with crossing over, which also happens during Meiosis, but 
involves highly regulated exchange of genetic fragments between homologous chromosomes 
before they separate.  Any phenotypic changes that show up in offspring as a result of crossing 
over could be adaptively beneficial, detrimental, or neutral, and so crossing over is also a blind 
process.  However, crossing over requires precise coordination of a large number of enzymes, 
cofactors, and other cellular components, and does not appear to serve any other role than to 
increase genetic variety among gametes.  That is, Meiosis without crossing over would still 
produce viable offspring, only with less diversity.  As explained in Section 4.3, generation of 
variation is beneficial for long-term continuation of the lineage, and therefore a potential 
biological function, as long as it does not significantly threaten viability.  Since crossing over 
produces exactly that kind of highly constrained variability, it qualifies as a biological function.  
Then, since the entities that manage crossing over are part of the organism and achieve their 
function non-aggregatively, they meet the criteria for biological mechanisms presented in 
Chapter Two.  Therefore, crossing over is indeed a mechanism for producing new variations.   
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Genetic Mutation 
 Crossing over and gamete fusion can generate a fair amount of variety in a population, 
but their potential is limited because they only work with existing chromosomes.  The ultimate 
source of entirely new genetic variations is genetic mutation.  As explained in Section 4.2, a 
genetic mutation is an inheritable change in nucleotide sequence, and if the mutated section of 
DNA contributes to an individual’s phenotype, then the mutation can change one or more 
phenotypic characteristics.  Most mutations are a result of uncorrected replication errors, though 
some are caused by chemical or radiological damage.  In the former case, mutations are 
malfunctions of replication mechanisms whose function is to copy DNA precisely, and in the 
latter, they are completely unregulated insults coming from the environment.  Therefore, most 
mutations are blind and unregulated.  Although an occasional beneficial mutation may show up, 
completely unregulated blind changes, such as externally-induced damage, usually are 
detrimental and all organisms go to great lengths to minimize the occurrence or impact.42  
Therefore, blind, unregulated genetic mutation cannot be a biological function under most 
circumstances, and consequently cannot be the activity of a biological mechanism.  Nevertheless, 
replication and DNA repair mechanisms are not perfect, so a steady rate of mutation—called the 
background mutation rate—is to be expected. 
Mutations introduce novel variety in a population that can help the population adapt to 
unpredictable future circumstances.  Organisms that reproduce with perfect fidelity may not be 
able to adapt to changing conditions, so allowing some amount of mutation is good.  This 
suggests that as replication mechanisms evolved, natural selection may have struck a balance 
between perfect replication fidelity and allowance for mutations (Sniegowski, et. al., 2000).  
                                                 
42 Organisms have a wide variety of ways to minimize unregulated blind changes.  Examples include outer 
coverings that block ultraviolet radiation, enzymes that neutralize toxins and free radicals, and mechanism that 
proofread and repair DNA. 
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However, even if the background mutation rate has evolved to its present value as a result of 
natural selection, replication errors or damage they are still blind and are achieved passively. 
Therefore, genetic mutation as a result of replication errors is, at best, a side effect of replication 
mechanisms rather than a diversity generating mechanism in itself. 
However, if genetic mutation due to replication errors was regulated in the right way, 
rather than just being a passive side-effect of very high fidelity replication mechanisms, then 
genetic mutation could potentially qualify as a biological function.  Since genetic mutations 
typically are detrimental, and since a biological function must promote continued survival, a 
mutational process that serves a biological function would need to somehow favor beneficial 
changes over detrimental ones, or only generate mutations when the dangers of doing so are 
outweighed by the potential benefits.   
Sarkar’s (2005) description of “instructed” mutations (see Section 4.3) would fit the bill 
very well, but there are no known biological processes that can precisely alter genes in an 
exclusively adaptive way, so I will set that possibility aside.  A more plausible possibility is the 
semi-directed use of blind genetic mutation in a way that is more beneficial than harmful.  
Although they are not discussing biological functions in quite the same way I am, Jablonka and 
Lamb’s (2005) description of four different “interpretive” mutational strategies will be helpful in 
understanding how blind mutation might become a biological function.  Their first mutational 
strategy is “induced global mutation” in which the entire genome is subjected to increased 
mutation rates, but only during periods of time determined by the cell and usually in response to 
some environmental trigger.  Jablonka and Lamb’s induced global mutations are the same as 
Sarkar’s (2005) personal notion of “directed” mutation discussed in Section 4.3.  Jablonka and 
Lamb’s (2005) second mutational strategy is “local hypermutation” in which a specific area of 
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the genome is particularly susceptible to mutations at all times.  The third strategy is “induced 
local mutations” in which a specific area of the genome is caused to be particularly susceptible to 
mutations at regulated times.  The fourth strategy is “induced regional mutation” in which a 
specific set of genes (which may or may not be near each other) are caused to be particularly 
susceptible to mutations at regulated times.  All of these have potential to be biological activities, 
and the third and fourth strategies even have the potential to be semi-directed.  Recall that a 
semi-directed process of generating variations is one that uses a blind mutational process in a 
way that promotes beneficial mutations more than it promotes detrimental mutations.   
  An interesting candidate for a semi-directed process occurs in bacterial colonies that 
have been subjected to an environmental stress harmful enough to cause a stress reaction in the 
colony but not so terrible as to kill the constituent cells too quickly.  For example, a common 
experimental design involves growing cells whose ability to metabolize lactose has been 
disrupted on a medium with lactose as the only carbon source (e.g. Cairns et al. 1988; Cairns and 
Foster 1991; Oda et al. 2001). Under such starvation conditions, some of the cells will enter a 
state of stress called an SOS response.  This triggers (among other things) replication of the 
cell’s DNA using an error-prone method, thereby introducing random mutations (Torkelson et al. 
1997; Foster 2000, 2004; Godoy et al. 2000; Bjedov et al. 2003; Kivisaar 2003; Aertson and 
Michiels 2005).  This cellular state is referred to as a transient mutator state or hypermutational 
state, and it results in duplication of many genes, most of which will have some mutations.  If the 
hypermutational process hits upon a mutation that allows a cell to solve the environmental 
problem—in this case, the ability to harvest and metabolize lactose—then the cell turns off its 
SOS response and acquires enough energy to reproduce and to activate its conjugation (gene 
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sharing) mechanisms.  In this way it can confer its newfound adaptive advantage to its offspring 
and to its neighbors.   
Even though entering a hypermutational state increases the risk of detrimental mutations, 
it is done only during times when doing nothing would be lethal.  Since it at least increases the 
chances of finding a solution, inducing a hypermutational state as part of the SOS response can 
promote the continued survival of the bacterial colony.  Therefore, inducing a hypermutational 
state during a time of stress qualifies as a biological function.  To be clear, the suggestion at hand 
is that an ability to enter a hypermutational state during times of stress is itself a response that 
has evolved, via evolution by natural selection, because it is advantageous to enter such a state 
during times of stress, and it is beneficial because it increases the chances of hitting on an 
adaptive response to the environmental stress.  This interpretation of the hypermutable state is 
criticized by Brisson (2003) who argues instead that the hypermutable state is not an adaptive 
response, but rather the result of malfunctioning replication systems during a time of low nutrient 
supply (see also Lenski and Mittler 1993; Sniegowski and Lenski 1995; and Torkelson et al. 
1997). In other words, the appearance of occasional beneficial mutations is just a lucky side 
effect of a malfunctioning system and is not a biological function that has evolved as a response 
to stressful conditions.  
Several authors, such as Foster (2000, 2004), Kivisaar (2003), and Aertson and Michiels 
(2005) argue against Brisson’s view on empirical grounds.  Before discussing their arguments, 
however, I will counter Brisson’s view on theoretical grounds.  Brisson (2003) argues that the 
hypermutable state that cells enter during times of stress is not an adaptation but is rather a side 
effect of a malfunctioning system.  He writes, “The breakdown of cellular mechanisms resulting 
in a fortuitous adaptive mutation does not indicate that the system has evolved to fail under 
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stressful conditions.  Because of myriad mutation generating mechanisms and the differential 
response at various loci, it is unlikely that they evolved for the purpose of producing adaptive 
mutations” (Brisson 2003: 33).  The problem with this argument is that it ignores the very real 
problem of distinguishing between a natural function and a mere side effect or malfunction of a 
biological system (see, for example, Wright 1973, 1976; Cummins 1975; Brandon 1981; Falk 
1981; Neander 1991; and Millikan 1998).  Brisson (2003) seems to be employing a historical, 
selectionist account of what determines a biological function.  Under such an account, an 
adaptive function of a biological structure or mechanism is the feature or activity of the 
mechanism that resulted in its being selected in previous generations.  That is, in order to be 
considered an adaptation, the feature must have aided in the survival and reproduction of the 
organisms that possessed it, resulting in its being naturally selected and passed down to present 
day offspring.  On this account, a side effect is any feature that plays no positive role in the 
system being selected (Wright 1976; Millikan 1998; see also Section 2.3).  For example, a 
function of the mammalian heart is to pump blood while its beating sound is merely a side effect.  
The former is a feature of hearts that has caused past generations of animals to survive and 
reproduce very well, while the beating sound is a feature that, in and of itself, is irrelevant to 
survival or reproduction.  Brisson (2003) considers the hypermutable state to be a side effect 
rather than an adaptive function, but the ability to enter the hypermutable state does in fact lead 
to increased survival and reproduction because doing nothing would eventually be fatal, and so 
entering the hypermutable state should qualify as an adaptive trait according to the criteria used 
by Brisson himself. Therefore, Brisson’s general theoretical strategy does not work against the 
view that the hypermutable state is an evolved biological function. 
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A separate concern is the possibility that the hypermutable state is applied to the entire 
genome, that is, to all of the cell’s DNA rather than to specific genes or types of genes.  Such a 
case would amount to Jablonka and Lamb’s (2005) induced global mutation and Sarkar’s overly 
permissive sense of directed mutations, but would not be semi-directed because it would not 
increase the chances of a beneficial mutation more than it boosts the chances of detrimental 
mutations. 
The research team that first reported this effect (Cairns et al. 1988; Hall 1998) argued that 
the hypermutational state was precisely directed toward whatever genes were most likely to 
produce a relevant change in phenotype, perhaps even something akin to Sarkar’s (2005) 
instructed mutations.  This possibility was later abandoned when it was discovered that under a 
particular stressful regime, such as the lactose-only conditions described above, there occurred 
other, unrelated mutations at a higher rate as well. For example, Torkelson, et.al. (1997) detected 
changes to genes involved in amino acid metabolism during the lactose-only conditions.  Such 
results were interpreted by some to indicate that the hypermutational state is applied genome-
wide and therefore not directed (Lenski and Mittler 1993; Sniegowski and Lenski 1995).  
However, I believe that the results do not rule out semi-directed mutagenesis because the other 
genes that were subjected to hypermutation were all peripheral genes rather than core genes.  
Core genes are absolutely essential for cell functioning, such as those that support transcription, 
translation, and basic metabolism, and changes to these genes are almost always lethal.  
Peripheral genes are genes that may be important, but are not absolutely required under all 
circumstances.  For example, genes associated with the acquisition of a specific nutrient resource 
or with antibiotic resistance are peripheral genes because even when such genes are damaged or 
absent, the cell may still continue to survive with its core functions left intact.  Notice that the 
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conditions under discussion involve the presence or absence of such peripheral genes, and it may 
be that during those conditions, the hypermutable state is applied only to peripheral genes, 
leaving the core genes unaffected. This corresponds to Jablonka and Lamb’s (2005) induced 
regional mutations, and would raise the chances of getting a beneficial mutation without aiming 
the hypermutational mechanisms at the core genes, which would likely be fatal.  Therefore, this 
process would achieve semi-directed generation of new variations.  To find out if this is indeed 
the case, we would need to determine whether the core genes are also experiencing 
hypermutation.  Unfortunately, this is a difficult task because the vast majority of cells that 
sustain mutations to their core genes are unable to survive and therefore are not detected by 
standard assay techniques.  Research involving metagenomic analysis—in which a representative 
sample of all the DNA in a given sample of cells is sequenced and identified—may help to 
answer this question, but such research has yet be conducted.   
Before continuing, it should be noted here that any phenotypic changes resulting from the 
hypermutable state are acquired changes because they are occurring to organisms that already 
exist (see Section 4.3).  Further, any changes acquired in this way are inheritable because 
unicellular organisms reproduce via simple cell division rather than using isolated germ cells.  
Recall that Weismann’s distinction between germ cells and somatic cells in multicellular 
organisms was an important basis for the assumption that acquired characteristics are not 
inherited.  Since unicellular organisms lack that distinction, any characteristics they acquire, 
whether through regulated hypermutation, unregulated genetic mutation, horizontal gene 
transfer, or any other process, are inheritable.  Therefore, inheritance of acquired characteristics 
occurs in unicellular organisms all the time. 
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Another way for the hypermutation process to be semi-directed in the appropriate sense is 
for it to occur in a subpopulation of cells in a colony of closely related individuals. For example, 
Foster (2004) reports that approximately 0.1% of the E. coli cells in the colonies under study 
entered a hypermutational state during times of stress.  In so doing, only the hypermutating 
subpopulation faces the potentially lethal danger of such a strategy, although it also faces the 
increased possibility of hitting on a beneficial mutation. Due to the dangers of hypermutation, it 
is quite possible for a hypermutating cell that has hit on a beneficial mutation to also have hit 
upon some lethal mutation that kills it. However, since healthy cells are able to pick up DNA 
from dead cells, any beneficial results can still be obtained by the colony (Redfield, 1988). The 
result is that the colony is able to subject only a small number of its constituent cells to the 
dangers of hypermutation (even genome-wide hypermutation), while the entire colony gets to 
benefit from any advantageous results. This sort of kamikaze strategy is especially effective 
when more than one mutation is required for the beneficial phenotype to be produced (Hall 1998; 
Foster 2004) and can work with regulatory genes as well as transcribable genes (Stolovicki et al. 
2006; David et al. 2010), resulting in even greater potential for diversity. 
We see an analogous kind of semi-directed generation of new variations in the 
mammalian immune system and its ability to proliferate a large variety of antibodies to combat 
an unknown pathogen.  The immune system uses a blind process of recombination to search for 
antibodies that can bind to the unknown invader, and since the genetic manipulation is restricted 
to genes associated with antibody production, there is relatively little chance of producing 
seriously detrimental variations.  Therefore, the response of the mammalian immune system is 
semi-directed toward increased adaptedness.  Of course, for any new traits to be evolutionarily 
relevant, the newly acquired adaptive characteristics (the new antibodies) would have to be 
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inheritable.  Some authors have argued that genes associated with acquired immunity can be 
incorporated into germ line DNA, allowing it to be inherited via normal genetic inheritance 
(Steele, 1981; Steele, et.al., 1998; Blanden, et.al. 2006).   Any process resulting in reliable 
genetic inheritance of acquired, adaptive characteristics in mammals would be evolutionarily 
very significant, but the possibility has not yet received enough research attention to determine 
how often it actually happens.  However, there is reliable evidence that at least some of a 
mother’s acquired immunity can be passed on to offspring via breast milk (see, e.g., Low, et.al. 
2010).  Although it is not genetic inheritance, such a process nevertheless is a process of 
inheritance according to the criteria established in Section 3.3.  Therefore, mammals employ a 
semi-directed mechanism for acquiring adaptive characteristics that are potentially inheritable, 
and so mammals engage in a very limited kind of Lamarckian evolution in their defense against 
pathogens. 
This leads us back to microbes and to O’Malley and Dupré (2007) who argue that mature 
bacterial colonies should be categorized as multicellular organisms.  They start their argument by 
pointing out that the original account of what it takes to be a multicellular organism was 
formulated when attention was focused exclusively on macrobes (plants and animals mostly, but 
also fungi), and so the account is unfairly skewed in favor of macrobes.  A multicellular 
organism, according to the traditional account, is composed of cells that all have the same 
genome but are specialized to perform particular functions.  Proper coordination of the various 
specialized cells allows the multicellular organism to accomplish tasks that no individual cell 
would be able to accomplish alone.  O’Malley and Dupré (2007) point out that bacterial colonies 
known as “biofilms” also display cell specialization and coordination that enable whole biofilms 
to perform tasks (such as certain sorts of food collection) that no individual cell would be able to 
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accomplish alone (see also Shapiro, 1998), making them little different from uncontroversially 
multicellular organisms such as algae, fungi, or even jellyfish and hydras.   
The main impediment to bacterial multicellularity, then, is the relatedness of cells in a 
biofilm versus those in standard multicellular organisms.  Bacteria draw themselves together into 
colonies via chemical signaling, but the signaling is not species specific, so a single biofilm 
could be composed of many different taxa, and the characteristics of the colony depend on the 
characteristics of the kinds of cells that end up in the colony.  Thus, bacteria appear to engage in 
a sort of highly flexible, mix and match development that stands in contrast to the relatively rigid 
development of most macrobes.  Therefore, a critic of O’Malley and Dupré might argue that 
biofilms do not qualify as multicellular organisms, but merely as collections of cells.  O’Malley 
and Dupré counter this line of reasoning by pointing out that the cells composing a standard 
multicellular organism often are not as genetically identical as the critic assumes.  First of all, 
mitosis of somatic cells during normal development inevitably results in some replication errors, 
and so there is some diversity in somatic cell genomes.  Secondly, most multicellular organisms 
live symbiotically with other organisms, usually microbes.  Symbiotic cells and their host 
organisms perform essential roles for each other such that neither would be viable without the 
other.  Therefore, argue O’Malley and Dupré (2007), the genetic diversity of cells in a biofilm is 
not such a radical departure from the diversity of cells that compose standard multicellular 
organisms.  O’Malley and Dupré conclude that microbial multicellularity is just a different 
multicellular strategy than that displayed by macrobes. 
I am sympathetic to O’Malley and Dupré’s conclusion, but even if the ‘multicellular 
organism’ label is rejected for biofilms, they nevertheless are coherent, coordinated biological 
systems capable of reproducing themselves, and so they are subject to evolution.  Distinct 
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biofilm lineages may be difficult or even impossible to individuate over long time periods, but 
the same can be said for the difficulty of individuating bacterial lineages due to their penchant 
for horizontal gene transfer (Woese, 1998, 2002; Vestigian, et. al., 2006).  With this view of 
biofilms as multicellular organisms (or, at least, multicellular somethings), the hypermutable 
state of bacterial colonies described above looks even more similar to the semi-directed 
generation of variation happening in the mammalian immune system.  In mammalian acquired 
immunity, the increased rate of genetic changes is restricted to B cells and also to genes 
associated with antibody binding features.  In bacterial colonies, the increased rate of genetic 
changes is restricted to about 0.1% of individuals (Foster, 2004) and may be restricted to 
peripheral genes.  The evolutionary impediment faced by mammals was that acquired immunity 
is, at best, only partly inheritable.  But with bacteria, since there is no distinction between 
somatic cells and germ cells, any adaptive characteristics a colony acquires as a result of the 
hypermutable state can be inherited by a new colony, even if the hypermutated cells all die in the 
kamikaze strategy described above.  Therefore, semi-directed hypermutation in bacterial colonies 
closely resembles the process advocated by neo-Lamarckians at the turn of the 20th century (see 
Sections 3.3 and 4.3), though, of course, updated by modern molecular biology. 
    
Non-genetic Changes 
In Chapter Three, I argued that genetic inheritance (DNA replication and transmission to 
offspring) is not the only hereditary process.  All other parts of a living cell, including any cell 
walls, membranes, organelles and cytoplasmic contents must also be transferred to offspring in 
order for offspring to resemble their parents.  Changes to these other, non-genetic parts of cells 
are also potentially inheritable because formation of new cell structures is determined in part by 
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existing cell structures.  Some changes to cell walls and membranes are potentially inheritable 
(Landman, 1991), though such changes typically are a blind result of damage or malfunction.  As 
such, they are similar to blind genetic mutation due to replication errors.  That is, they are not the 
result of any change-producing mechanisms, but nevertheless are potentially inheritable.   
 Similarly, changes tracked by evolutionary developmental biology (evo-devo) and 
Developmental Systems Theory typically are not the result of any change-producing 
mechanisms, but instead are the result of blind changes to factors that contribute to some stage of 
development (see the cave fish example in Section 4.3).  The change may be a genetic mutation 
to a regulatory section of DNA or a change in some environmental factor, such as temperature or 
nutrient availability, that blindly alters development of phenotypic characteristics.  Since the 
risks associated with introducing changes into a developmental pathway tend to outweigh any 
possible benefits, mechanisms of heredity and development tend to be very tightly controlled in 
order to ensure that offspring are viable and resemble their parents.  Therefore, introduction of 
developmental changes is not a biological function, but rather is a malfunction or side effect of 
hereditary and developmental mechanisms.   
 
Summary 
 In this Chapter I showed how the gene-centric view that emerged from the Modern 
Synthesis led most biologists to assume that directed variation and inheritance of acquired 
characteristics did not occur.  I then showed that more recent research shows that both processes 
really do happen in significant portions of the biological world.  The most significant examples 
occur in bacterial colonies where the two processes work in tandem to accelerate the pace of 
bacterial evolution.  The historical figure that came to be most closely associated with directed 
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generation of variations and IAC is Lamarck, and when those processes were assumed to be 
absent in the biological world, Lamarck ended up as somewhat of a pariah in the scientific 
community.  Therefore, recognizing that both processes are operative in nature is somewhat of a 
vindication for Lamarck, although the underlying mechanisms turned out to be much different 
than what he had in mind.   
I also showed that blind variation typically is not accomplished by a biological 
mechanism.  Rather, blind generation of new variations typically occurs as a side effect of 
mechanisms whose activity involves heredity and development.  That is, many of the biological 
mechanisms for heredity reproduction allow some amount of imprecision (e.g. DNA replication 
errors) or randomness (e.g. orientation of homologous pairs of chromosomes in preparation for 
Meiotic division) that result in blind variations.   
In chapter Five, I shift to natural selection, which is the third process needed for ongoing, 
adaptive evolution.  I use the mechanistic approach and the preceding accounts of heredity and 
generation of new variations to understand natural selection as a process separate from the other 
two.   
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CHAPTER FIVE 
NATURAL SELECTION 
5.1  Introduction 
Natural selection was the key element needed to develop a successful theory of biological 
evolution and origin of species.  The most important task of a theory of biological evolution is to 
explain why organisms are so well adapted to their environments, and before evolution by 
natural selection was proposed, adaptedness of organisms could only be explained through 
divine intervention, unobservable vital forces, or pure luck, none of which are scientifically 
satisfying.  Creationism, which was the dominant view until less than a century ago (and which 
still has many contemporary adherents), explains that organisms are the result of God’s plan and 
creative abilities.  That explanation is scientifically unsatisfying because God’s plans and causal 
methods (if they are supposed to be distinct from natural causes) are mostly mysterious and 
opaque to investigation.  The theory just does not make enough testable claims about how and 
why the creator worked.  Plus, any significant testable claims made by creationists have turned 
out to be false.  Creationism’s more recent variant, intelligent design, attempts to shed the 
religious component (Behe, 1996, 2007; Monton, 2009) but even if it is successful in doing so, it 
so far has not been any less opaque to research than creationism (Young and Edis, 2004; Matzke, 
2007).  Other naturalistic attempts, such as Lamarckism or vitalism, proposed special animating 
forces or fluids that automatically worked toward greater complexity and adaptedness.  But those 
proposals required goal-oriented forces that were not much better than the divine intervention 
they were supposed to replace.  As understanding of molecular biology increased, Lamarckism 
and vitalism had trouble describing their animating forces or fluids in a way that opened them up 
to empirical investigation, and so they seemed utterly mysterious.  Only when natural selection 
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finally was accepted into evolutionary theory was it possible to explain the adaptive features of 
organisms without appealing to any mysterious, indescribable forces. 
As discussed in Chapter One, modern-day scientists claim to be interested in finding 
mechanisms that can explain how and why phenomena occur, rather than just describing the 
phenomena themselves (Casadevall and Fang, 2009).  Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that once 
natural selection replaced the other, more mysterious options for explaining adaptedness, 
biologists started to refer to natural selection as a mechanism (Skipper and Millstein, 2005).  
However, the process of natural selection is unlike other proposed biological mechanisms such 
as hearts, neurons, or ion pumps.  Standard biological mechanisms are, roughly speaking, 
discrete units organized to accomplish a specific biological function.  Natural selection, by 
contrast, involves ever-changing interactions between individuals and their environments, and so 
the entities involved are not all part of a single system.  In section 5.4 I discuss recent debates 
over whether natural selection is a mechanism and I draw upon my account of biological 
mechanisms in Chapter Two to argue that natural selection is not a biological mechanism.   
Before assessing whether natural selection is a mechanism, however, I must make clear 
what I believe to be the activity of natural selection.  There continues to be a great deal of debate 
over the correct characterization of natural selection and over what actually gets selected (the so-
called units of selection).  In Section 5.3 I join the debate by providing my own account of 
natural selection and defending it against various other prominent accounts.  My account differs 
from most others in its strict separation of the three distinct processes that constitute biological 
evolution: hereditary reproduction, generation of new variations, and natural selection.  Most 
other accounts of natural selection include reproduction or generation of new variations (or 
both), and so are not proper descriptions of natural selection in and of itself.  In order to frame 
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the debate over the correct characterization of natural selection, I first provide an overview of the 
history of attempts to explain the existence and adaptedness of organisms.  Some of the history 
described in section 5.2 overlaps with the historical overviews in Sections 3.2 and 4.2, but here 
the emphasis is on how natural selection came to be part of the explanation for adaptedness of 
organisms.   
 
5.2  Historical Development of Concepts and Terms 
In order to trace the history of natural selection, it is necessary to understand the two 
most salient phenomena that natural selection is intended to help explain.  Any legitimate theory 
of biological origins must explain the adaptedness of organisms as well as the great diversity of 
organisms (see also Sections 3.2 and 4.2).   Before any acceptable naturalistic theories of 
evolution had been proposed, the best available explanation for diversity and adaptedness was 
that all organisms had been designed and created by a supernatural being (e.g. Paley, 1802; 
Plantinga, 1991).  As intentional creations by a supernatural being, each species was also viewed 
as an immutable type of organism.  Typological thinking has been addressed in previous chapters 
(particularly Sections 3.2 and 4.2), but the issues are relevant again here so I will repeat some of 
the most important points.   
Even though some superficial variability could be observed in any species, most 
biologists in the 19th century assumed there to be a standard form or essence for every species 
and that individual members of a species never stray too far from the standard form.  Such 
typological thinking about species was tempered by plant and animal breeders who recognized 
that novel traits could emerge in a population and be passed on to offspring, and that selective 
breeding could change a species quite radically.  However, despite the plant and animal breeders’ 
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track record of changing species in dramatic ways, typologists were able to dismiss their results 
by pointing out that domesticated animals, when returned to the wild, tended to revert to their 
wild forms and to lose any special traits that had been promoted through artificial breeding 
programs (Mayr, 1982, 2001b).  Thus, the effects of artificial breeding programs, though 
sometimes quite dramatic, seemed superficial and readily reversible, and there was little reason 
to think that the very large-scale, permanent evolution of one species into a new species was 
possible.   
By the early 19th century, enough evidence from the fossil record had been gathered to 
indicate very strongly that some sort of long-term change in species had occurred, and so 
typologists needed to come up with an explanation.  For those who wished to avoid any large-
scale changes in species, evidence from the fossil record could be interpreted as showing that 
older species occasionally disappeared and were replaced by new ones.  One possibility was that 
a supernatural creator that designed and instantiated each type of organism occasionally decided 
to eliminate some and replace them with others, but such speculations about divine intervention 
are difficult if not impossible to test.  A naturalistic option proposed by the influential anatomist 
and paleontologist George Cuvier was that old species were replaced by new species via 
immigration from other areas (Mayr, 1982; Hull, 1984).  Although naturalistic, Cuvier’s proposal 
was not much of an explanation because it left mysterious where all those new species were 
coming from and why the fossil record shows an overall trend toward increased complexity.  
Nevertheless, absent a better theory, suggestions such as Cuvier’s were tentatively accepted by 
typologists opposed to evolution.   
There were typologists who were not opposed to evolution of species, but they faced a 
problem because a standard typological assumption was that an organism’s set of traits form a 
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coherent whole, and that changing just one or a few traits would disrupt the essence of the 
organism to the point that it would not be viable (Mayr, 1982).  For this reason, gradual, step-by-
step evolution was considered to be impossible because any small changes would result in non-
viable offspring.  A prominent way of reconciling evolution with typology was to adopt some 
version of “saltationism” (Mayr, 1982; Dawkins, 1983) in which very rare but very radical 
changes (saltations) could appear suddenly in a lineage—even over a single generation—thus 
converting the species into a different viable type.  Although no plausible mechanisms were 
suggested that could perform the activity proposed by saltationsts, it actually seemed consistent 
with the fossil record, which was relatively discontinuous at the time, and so saltationism (or 
something like it) remained entrenched among evolutionists in the mid-19th century (Mayr, 1982; 
Hull, 1984). 
Saltationism was a common view up until the early 20th century, though the seeds of its 
replacement were sown in the mid- to late 19th century, particularly by Darwin (1859). 43  One of 
Darwin’s (1859) great contributions to evolutionary thinking, apparently inspired by 19th century 
economist Thomas Malthus, was his reconception of species as populations rather than as types.  
One of the most important differences between population thinking and typological thinking 
concerns the nature of variability.  Typology assumes that each individual in a species is an 
imperfect instantiation of an abstract universal, and so it allowed for variability in the form of 
small deviations from a standard, unchanging body plan.  This was labeled “continuous” 
variation (Mayr, 1982) since the variability was allowed to drift anywhere within a small range.  
Although dramatic differences might appear on occasion, according to typology, such 
“discontinuous” variations could not persist, thus drawing the species back toward the standard 
                                                 
43 Alfred Russell Wallace, roughly simultaneously, made many of the same contributions as Darwin, though Darwin 
has ended up with most of the credit. 
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type (see Section 4.2 for more discussion of continuous and discontinuous variations).  In 
populations, by contrast, there is no standard body plan to which each individual is compared, 
and so variability is considered normal rather than deviant.  As a consequence, there is no 
distinction between so-called continuous variation and discontinuous variation in populations—it 
is all just variability.  It should be noted also that typology, even among scientists of the 19th 
century, was rooted in religious ideology.  There remained an assumption among many 
intellectuals of the time that God had created a perfectly balanced and harmonious natural world, 
with every species perfectly designed to fulfill its own natural purpose (Mayr, 1982).  This 
stands in stark contrast to population thinking, which allows for dramatic imbalances between 
population size and resource availability leading to a great deal of suffering and death.  Thus, in 
addition to any empirical or theoretical objections, certain ideological commitments stood in the 
way of Darwin’s ideas. 
If the constraints of typology are shed, then species are allowed to change very 
dramatically over time, and can do so gradually.  Plant and animal breeders had already provided 
examples of dramatic changes in captive lineages, and so Darwin (1859) used their examples to 
argue that similar kind of change occurs in the rest of nature.  Plant and animal breeders 
intentionally select which individuals survive and reproduce, and their decisions are based on 
pre-determined sets of desirable characteristics.  The result is a population of individuals that, by 
and large, only have the desirable characteristics.  Darwin argued that an analogous process is at 
work in wild populations.  All organisms tend to produce more offspring than can be supported 
by available resources.  As long as resources are scarce, there inevitably will be competition for 
those resources, with some individuals winning and others losing.44  Individuals that are better 
                                                 
44 This is where Darwin apparently was inspired by Malthus’ description of human populations and economic boom 
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equipped to obtain the scarce resources will, more often than not, out compete those less able to 
obtain resources.  As a result, by and large, only the best competitors end up surviving and 
reproducing offspring like themselves, while the lesser competitors die, leaving the population 
overall better adapted to its environment.  The results are so similar to the results from plant and 
animal breeders, that Darwin considered them both to be processes of selection.  Plant and 
animal breeders are engaged in “artificial selection” because they use a pre-conceived set of 
characteristics as the basis for their intentional, intelligently guided selection.  In wild 
populations, survivors are determined by environmental conditions rather than by a pre-set plan, 
and so Darwin dubbed the process “natural selection.”   
Combined with hereditary reproduction and a source of new variations, natural selection 
explains how organisms have come to be so well adapted to their environments.  Since 
individuals that happen to be better equipped to survive and reproduce in their environments are 
the ones most likely to actually survive and reproduce, natural selection results in a population 
with more well-adapted individuals than poorly adapted ones.  Evolution by natural selection 
also helps explains diversity45 because each population faces a different set of environmental 
challenges, and so different sets of characteristics will be selected in different environments.  
Darwin went so far as to suggest that all life may be descended from a single ancestral 
population from which many sub-populations splintered off and migrated all over the word, each 
gradually adapting in unique ways to each new environment they encountered.   
Darwin’s theory of evolution by natural selection combined with his assumption of 
common decent is what I’m calling “Darwinian” evolution.46  Although it provided a plausible 
naturalistic explanation for diversity and adaptedness of organisms and was widely read and 
                                                 
45 Diversity also is partially explained by the sources of new variations (see Chapter 4). 
 
46 Contemporary evolutionary theory is still basically Darwinian because it includes these two core concepts.  
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debated, Darwinian evolution was not accepted by most of the scientific community in the mid-
19th century.  Darwin’s theory, with its emphasis on harsh, messy competition and unguided 
change clashed too much with the utilitarian and typological views of nature that still were 
prominent at the time, and it seemed unsupported by the discontinuous nature of the fossil 
record.   
In contrast to most others in the scientific community, plant and animal breeders were 
more open to Darwinian evolution because they understood the power of selective breeding.  
Breeders were joined by biometricians and naturalists who studied trait variations in wild 
populations and so were less inclined toward typological assumptions.  Biometricians understood 
that although casual observation seemed to support the typological belief in species conformity 
and immutability, more careful and systematic measurements revealed a great deal of variation 
and gradual change.  Perhaps the best example of biometric work in support of Darwinian 
evolution is the famous set of experiments on peppered moths conducted by Bernard Kettlewell 
in the mid 19th century.  Kettlewell showed that peppered moths changed from predominantly 
light colored to predominantly dark colored when their environment (English woodlands) 
became darker as the result of coal burning.  Kettlewell not only showed a correlation between a 
changing environment and a changing phenotype, but he showed that the change was a result of 
Darwinian natural selection (combined, of course, with hereditary reproduction).  Through 
painstaking observations of moth behavior in the wild, Kettlewell showed that when trees had 
light colored bark, dark colored moths were being eaten by birds more often than light colored 
moths because the dark variety was not sufficiently camouflaged.  As a result, moth populations 
in areas with light colored trees were dominated by light colored moths.  Then, when the trees 
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had become dark due to accumulated soot, the light colored moths became the prey of choice for 
local birds, and over just a few generations, the dark colored moths predominated. 
Although work like Kettlewell’s seems in retrospect to be very persuasive, it failed to 
move many scientists who were skeptical of natural selection.  They acknowledged the work of 
biometricians and naturalists, but complained that their work showed only very minor, 
superficial changes that could quickly change back.47  To be swayed by Darwinian evolution, 
critics wanted to see speciation in which one species gradually evolves into a different species.  
That is, typologists could countenance some microevolution, but if they observed one type 
gradually change into some other type, then they would be forced to get rid of types altogether 
and accept something like Darwin’s gradual evolution of species.    
Another problem for Darwin was the postulated age of the earth, which put severe 
constraints on the pace of evolution.  As discussed in Sections 3.2 and 4.2, Darwin originally 
preferred that new variations were generated blindly with respect to their adaptedness, and that 
differential natural selection be allowed to sort the adaptive from the maladaptive.  By the late 
19th century, however, the earth was thought to be no more than several million years old, which 
did not allow enough time for natural selection acting on blind variation to produce the huge 
diversity of organisms we see today.  In light of this time constraint, Darwin enlarged the roles of 
directed generation of new variations and inheritance of acquired characteristics in order to help 
explain the complexity and adaptedness of organisms (Mayr, 1982).  While this helped 
Darwinian evolution conform to the time constraint, it did so at the expense of downplaying the 
role of natural selection in explaining the adaptedness of organisms, and made his theory more 
closely resemble Lamarck’s.  As discussed in previous chapters, many prominent and influential 
scientists had rejected Lamarckian processes, and so Darwin faced an uphill battle.    
                                                 
47 Today this is called “microevolution,” where large-scale evolution of species is called “macroevolution.” 
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Another setback for evolution by natural selection came from the re-discovery of 
Mendelian genetics at the beginning of the 20th century.  Given the understanding of basic 
Mendelian inheritance patterns at the time, even if a new, adaptive trait appeared in one or a few 
individuals, it was not clear that such rare traits could be preserved and proliferated in future 
generations.  Darwin’s theory required that new traits occasionally arise and spread in a 
population, but according to the geneticists’s formulae, such rare traits would quickly disappear 
from any sexually reproducing species, thus providing a barrier to any gradual process of 
evolution such as Darwin’s.  This was an important obstacle because the field of genetics 
commanded greater scientific respect than the work of biometricians and naturalists whose work 
was inherently more qualitative and less experimental than the geneticists’.  Thus, Darwinian 
evolution by natural selection still remained a minority view in the scientific community (Mayr, 
1982).   
The path toward acceptance of natural selection finally opened up in the late 1920s and 
early ‘30s when basic Mendelian genetics gave way to population genetics.  Population genetics 
had the conceptual and mathematical tools needed to show how new, rare traits could be 
preserved and proliferated in a population over many generations, which made genetics 
compatible with gradual evolution by natural selection.  Since genes are importantly responsible 
for an individual’s phenotypic characteristics, tracking any changes in the makeup of a 
population’s gene pool can allow researchers to track the evolution of that population.  Since 
natural selection was no longer seen as incompatible with genetics, the scientific community 
finally felt comfortable accepting gradual evolution by natural selection (Mayr, 1982).  Plus, 
improved knowledge of radioactive isotopes in geology resulted in a revised age estimate for the 
earth at around 4.5 billion years, which is plenty of time for gradual evolution to produce the 
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adaptedness and diversity of life on earth from a single common ancestral population.  All of 
these advancements finally overwhelmed the entrenched resistance and allowed for 
establishment of the Modern Synthesis, which combined population genetics with neo-
Darwinism48 to create the first comprehensive theory of gradual evolution to be accepted by the 
scientific community.   
 
Fitness 
Natural selection has often been expressed as “survival of the fittest,” a phrase coined by 
Herbert Spencer (1864) and later adopted by Darwin, but the meaning of ‘fitness’ changed 
significantly after adoption of the Modern Synthesis.  Darwin used fitness as shorthand for an 
individual’s degree of adaptedness to local environmental conditions, and so fitter individuals are 
more likely to survive and reproduce than less fit individuals.  The meaning changed when the 
Modern Synthesis placed population genetics at the center of evolutionary theory.  Population 
genetics is primarily concerned with tracking alleles49 over multiple generations.  By tracking 
how allele frequencies change over time, population genetics can quantify evolution of a 
population.  In addition to mere tracking of alleles, population genetics can provide a numerical 
estimate—called a fitness value—of how likely each allele is to be passed on to the next 
generation, and can use those values in probability calculations to generate predictions and 
explanations concerning how allele frequencies change over time.  The success of this approach 
began shifting the focus of natural selection away from individuals and onto genes, and ‘fitness’ 
                                                 
48 Neo-Darwinism, promoted by August Weismann, combined Darwinian evolution by natural selection with blind 
generation of new variations and no inheritance of acquired characteristics (see Section 3.2 and 4.2).  
 
49 Alleles are gene variants and the source of much of the phenotypic variability observed in a population. 
  
141
 
came to refer to the potential of individual alleles to be passed on to the next generation rather 
than referring to the overall adaptedness of whole organisms.   
The mathematical grounding and the predictive abilities of population genetics helped 
give evolutionary biology its scientific credibility and was the original basis of the gene-centrism 
of evolutionary theory described in Chapters Three and Four.  Since population genetics was 
central to the Modern Synthesis, any hypotheses concerning the details of evolutionary theory 
had to be compatible with genetics, an approach that proved to be very successful.  One 
prominent example concerns altruism in which one individual appears to sacrifice its fitness in 
order to boost the fitness of some other individual.  “Survival of the fittest” implies a zero-sum 
game in which the strongest survive while weaker individuals are left to die.  Fitter individuals 
are much more likely to have their alleles represented in the next generation, so altruistic 
sacrifice of one’s own fitness seemed evolutionarily self defeating.  Any altruists would be less 
likely than their selfish conspecifics to pass on their altruistic traits, and evolution of selfish 
behavior would quickly overwhelm any altruistic behavior.  It seemed, therefore, that altruism 
could not evolve, so the existence of actual altruism in the biological world was rather puzzling.     
One proposed solution was to include group selection in addition to organismal selection 
or gene selection.  According to group selectionists of the early 20th century, individual altruism 
could be evolutionarily advantageous because it is good for the group to which an individual 
belongs.  In other words, groups (populations) with altruists may be selected over groups without 
altruists.  This solution was shot down by Williams (1966) who showed that such thinking is 
based on a mistaken understanding of how biological evolution was understood within the 
Modern Synthesis.  Williams explained that a trait can only make it into the next generation if 
individuals that possess the trait pass it on to their offspring.  Groups cannot reproduce 
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themselves, only individual organisms can, so even if a trait somehow benefits a group, the trait 
cannot be passed on unless the individuals that possess the trait pass it on.  And since it was 
assumed that altruism inevitably decreases an individual’s chances of reproducing while 
selfishness increases those chances, in the long run, selfish traits will always win out over 
altruistic traits.  So, according to this reasoning, even if altruism is in some sense good for the 
group, it still would be an evolutionarily self defeating strategy in the face of selfish competition, 
Therefore, Williams (1966) concluded, there can be no traits that have evolved for the good of 
the group at the expense of the individual.   
Later mathematical work in population genetics to reveal how altruism, under certain 
circumstances, could be an evolutionarily stable trait without running afoul of Williams’s 
criticisms.  For example, if altruism is directed toward close relatives, then it can promote 
reappearance of one’s own genes in the next generation by promoting the survival and 
reproduction of close relatives with whom one shares many genes (Hamilton, 1972).  Thus, an 
individual can actually increase its own fitness (the population genetics sense) by aiding family 
members, even at the expense of its own individual survival. 
The above example is significant because it demonstrates the effectiveness of 
evolutionary explanations based on population genetics relative to explanations coming from 
other subfields of evolutionary biology.  In contrast to population genetics, ecological field 
studies are much more difficult to control than are laboratory breeding studies, and the multiple 
interacting species in an ever-changing environment that ecologists observe are so complex that 
they do not lend themselves to mathematical analysis.  As for the fossil record, it is only a static 
record, and, despite major advancements, still is seriously incomplete.  Therefore, any 
evolutionary explanations or predictions from fields like ecology or paleontology have 
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traditionally relied much more on creative interpretation rather than more objective statistical 
analyses, at least as compared to population genetics.  This has left researchers in those other 
fields open to the charge of generating “just-so” stories in which creative scientists weave a 
narrative linking their disparate pieces of evidence in an “explanation” of how various 
phenotypic traits have evolved.  At their worst, such narratives ignored important facts from 
other fields that rendered the explanation implausible, which is what happened with the “group 
selection” explanation for altruism described above.  Even when they did not conflict with well-
established knowledge from other fields, such narratives typically provide only one possible way 
that a phenotypic trait may have evolved, which falls short of scientifically rigorous explanation.   
The relative success of explanations in terms of genes and population genetics had the 
effect of shifting the focus of evolutionary theory, and natural selection in particular, ever further 
away from organisms and even more onto genes.  Not everyone has gone along with that shift, 
however, so there is a distinct lack of consensus on the correct characterization of natural 
selection and its role in adaptive evolution.  In Section 5.3 I show how the shift toward gene-
centrism has led to a conflation in the contemporary literature between natural selection and 
reproduction, and I propose my own account of natural selection to resolve the problem.     
 
5.3  Activity of Natural Selection 
 Recall from Chapter Two that a biological mechanism must have both an activity and 
entities that carry out that activity.  So, in order to determine whether natural selection is a 
mechanism, we must have a precise characterization of the activity of natural selection.  
Unfortunately, there continues to be a great deal of debate over what natural selection is, how it 
works, and what it selects.  Much of that debate, I believe, results from a failure to consistently 
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distinguish natural selection from the other two processes at work in adaptive evolution.  In this 
section I present my own account of natural selection as a process separate from reproduction or 
generation of new variation and defend my characterization against other prominent accounts.  
As explained in the Introduction, it is possible for each process to occur without either of the 
others, and only when all three are acting in concert can there be long-term, adaptive evolution.  
Of course, all three are closely intertwined in most biological systems, but they still can be 
distinguished from one another.  Therefore, my account of natural selection on its own does not 
include variation between individuals or reproduction.  This puts me at odds with many 
prominent accounts of natural selection and so I must clarify exactly where my account differs 
from others, and explain why I believe mine is preferable.   
Perhaps my most significant deviation from standard accounts is my insistence that 
natural selection, by itself, does not involve reproduction.  First of all, recall from the 
Introduction that there is a difference between viability selection and so-called reproductive 
selection, and that viability selection helps explain adaptedness while reproductive selection does 
not.  Reproductive selection certainly requires viability, but by itself, reproductive selection does 
not promote evolution of environmental adaptations.  In fact, reproductive potential can be 
increased by diverting energy or other resources toward reproduction at the expense of personal 
survival.  Therefore, if there is no viability selection favoring individuals that are better adapted 
to surviving in their environments, evolution will not lead to increasing adaptedness even if it 
leads to increasing reproductive potential. 
In addition to viability selection and reproductive selection, sexually reproducing species 
may also experience sexual selection in which individuals select mates based on their possession 
of certain attractive traits.  Like viability selection, sexual selection involves environmental 
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interactions, at least insofar as other members of one’s own species are part of an individual’s 
environment, but does not include reproduction.  Sexual selection often includes mating, but it 
does not necessarily involve reproduction because even sterile individuals may be sexually 
selected despite their inability to reproduce.  Of course, in order for sexual selection to lead to 
evolution of a sexually attractive trait, hereditary reproduction must follow sexual selection, but 
reproduction itself remains a separate process from the selection process, whether it is sexual 
selection or viability selection.  Like reproductive selection, sexual selection does not necessarily 
have anything to do with environmental adaptedness.  In fact, many famous examples of sexual 
selection involve selection of traits that are detrimental individual survival.  Therefore, while 
evolution by sexual selection helps explain some prominent features of some species, it does not 
explain environmental adaptedness of species.   
Here, then, is my own account of natural selection so that I can contrast it with other 
views in the literature.  In broad terms, natural selection (as it occurs in biology) is the constant 
causal interaction between a living individual and its environment, where the interactions cause 
the individual to continue surviving and functioning or cause it to die.  Natural selection is causal 
because it necessarily involves physical interaction between an individual living system and its 
environment.  It is constant because an individual always exists in some environment or other, 
and so is always interacting in some way with an environment.  As highly complex, low-entropy, 
dynamic systems, living organisms are continuously working to counteract their own senescence 
and decay, even when not facing any special challenges like pathogens or predators.  Every 
living system, therefore, is exposed to natural selection every moment that it lives.  If the 
individual continues to survive, then it is selected (or selected for), but if it does not, then it is 
selected against.   
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Now, to fill in the details.  Natural selection requires at least one living individual 
existing in an environment, and the physical characteristics of that environment must causally 
interact with the individual in ways that depend on the individual’s own physical characteristics 
as well as those of the environment.  That is, the interaction between individual and environment 
cannot be such that it would be exactly the same no matter what characteristics either possessed.  
Further, it must be the case that some potential interactions between environment and individual 
could be disruptive to the individual (e.g. may cause it to break apart or stop functioning) while 
other potential interactions are beneficial the individual (e.g. may support its structural integrity 
or allow its continued functioning), while still others may be roughly neutral with regard to 
survival or functioning of the individual.  If the individual has characteristics that lead to 
beneficial interactions with the environment, then it will have greater chances of surviving and 
functioning, and so has been selected for.  An individual that possesses characteristics that lead 
to detrimental interactions with the environment will have decreased chances of continued 
survival and functioning, and so has been selected against.  Whenever these sorts of causal 
interactions occur, an individual is being naturally selected for (or against) continued survival 
and functioning.  Although natural selection often is associated with population genetics, 
according to my account, natural selection is more closely associated with physiology, ecology, 
biochemistry, embryology, and the like because those fields study how individual organisms 
work to survive and function in their environments.  Those fields, rather than population 
genetics, are central to understanding natural selection because they get at the causes—the 
mechanisms, in many cases—that underlie evolutionary theory’s ability to explain why some 
individuals survive while others do not, and thus its ability to explain how adaptations continue 
to evolve. 
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Although I have been speaking in terms of biology and living organisms, it should be 
noted that natural selection can be generalized to include non-living individuals as well 
(Lewontin, 1970; Dawkins, 1980; Dennet, 1995; Hull, et. al., 2001).  Whenever interaction 
between an individual thing and its environment affects the continuing existence or activity of 
that individual, then the individual is being subjected to natural selection.  One example is 
pebbles on a beach that are sorted by wave action, where some pebbles are removed while others 
remain.  Other examples include “survival” and “death” of computer-based entities that exist in a 
digital environment in which the entities compete for computer resources they need to avoid 
deletion (e.g. Grabowski, et. al., 2011), and cosmic evolution involving natural selection working 
on a diverse set of universes (Smolin, 1992, 2006). 
There are a number of features of my account of natural selection that set it apart from 
most others.  For example, contrary to some prominent accounts (e.g. Millstein, 2006; Matthen 
and Ariew, 2002), my account of natural selection requires only a single individual rather than a 
population of phenotypically diverse individuals.  This is consistent with my strict distinction 
between natural selection by itself and the larger process of adaptive evolution.  Adaptive 
evolution is a process that accumulates adaptive changes, but selection by itself can only result in 
an individual succeeding or failing.  An individual just continuing to survive is not change, but 
merely continuation.  So selection cannot produce evolutionary changes by itself.  When natural 
selection happens within a population of individuals with diverse characteristics, then there is the 
possibility of differential natural selection, where some individuals tend to have more successful 
interactions with the environment than others, resulting in a change in the population when some 
die while others live and go on to reproduce.     
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As further support for my view that natural selection by itself does not require a 
population, artificial selection, which is closely analogous to natural selection, can also happen to 
just one individual.  In artificial selection, where humans decide which plants or animals to keep, 
if the human caretaker is left with just a single individual, then she can decide to keep the 
individual alive (and maybe get it to reproduce, if it can do so asexually) or she can decide to let 
it die.  Thus, she can select that single individual.  Similarly, if a wild population is down to a 
single individual, that individual can still be subjected to natural selection within its 
environment.  In fact, even in populations, especially ones in which individuals are scattered 
across a wide area, each organism faces its environmental pressures as an individual.  Therefore, 
natural selection not only can operate on individuals, but always acts on individuals.     
 Another consequence of my characterization of natural selection is that it does not require 
diversity.  This puts me at odds with Ernst Mayr (2001a, 2001b), one of the most influential 
founders of the Modern Synthesis.  I believe that natural selection does not require diversity 
because, as I argued above, natural selection acts on single individuals, and a lone individual 
cannot be diverse in the way required.  Plus, if we consider a population in which all individuals 
are identical, each individual may still be subjected to natural selection despite the lack of 
diversity (see the Introduction for more discussion of natural selection in a population of with 
zero diversity).   
Another issue concerning the activity of natural selection is whether natural selection 
necessarily involves competition, as many authors have claimed (e.g. Dawkins, 1976, 1980; 
Hull, 1980; Mayr, 1976, 1982; DeDuve, 2005).  Competition is a very good example of natural 
selection in action, but natural selection does not require competition.  First of all, if it is true that 
natural selection can act on single individuals living apart from any larger population, then 
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competition is not required for natural selection because a lone individual has nobody with which 
to compete.  Similarly, if there is a great surplus of resources, then even in a crowded population, 
individuals will not need to compete with each other at all, yet natural selection may nevertheless 
be operative because each individual must still be viable in that environment, and some 
individuals may still be better than others at obtaining the abundant resources.  Perhaps such a 
situation could still be thought of as a kind of competition, analogous to a pie eating contest 
(whoever gorges most wins), but it is a very watered down notion of competition when compared 
to the old notions of survival of the fittest50 that were used to popularize Darwin’s theory.   
Another reason to think that natural selection does not require competition is that natural 
selection can involve cooperation.  There are many examples of mutualistic symbioses in which 
members of different species promote each other’s survival because they provide each other with 
valuable resources or services.  This is not mere altruism.  Altruism involves giving up resources 
without receiving a comparable benefit in return, while mutualistic symbiosis occurs when each 
individual receives an important benefit by helping its co-symbiont.  Such symbiotic cooperation 
is the antithesis of competition, and yet is an interaction that promotes continued survival and 
functioning.  Therefore, natural selection does not necessarily require any kind of competition.  
 
Contrasts with other prominent accounts 
 I maintain that most prominent accounts of natural selection in the literature end up 
including too much of one or more of the other two processes in evolution.  That is, in their 
accounts of natural selection, they inappropriately include hereditary reproduction or generation 
of new variations even though those are separate processes that need not occur in order for 
                                                 
50 This characterization is attributed to Herbert Spencer in the mid to late 19th century, and was adopted by Darwin 
as a shorthand way of describing natural selection. 
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natural selection to occur.  To reiterate, all three processes are needed for ongoing adaptive 
evolution, but all three are separable and need not occur together.   
Much of the literature on natural selection is centers on the units of selection, and debate 
over the units of selection was prompted by the need to explain altruistic behavior in biological 
populations.  Recall from Section 5.2 that evolution of altruism was puzzling because it involves 
one individual sacrificing its own ability to survive or reproduce in favor of another individual, 
and that seems maladaptive.  However, since altruistic behavior appears to have evolved and 
persisted in many different lineages, it must have some adaptive benefit.  This led some to 
propose “group selection” in which groups of altruists were naturally selected over groups of 
non-altruists, thus leading to a prevalence of altruists in creatures such as ants, bees, and many 
species of birds and mammals.  The problem with this explanation, as pointed out most famously 
by Williams (1966) was that groups cannot reproduce, only individuals can.  Consequently, even 
if a group benefits from altruistic behavior (because the group persists longer than it would if all 
of its members were strictly selfish), altruistic individuals still would be less likely to reproduce 
than selfish individuals, and so altruism would be eliminated in favor of selfishness.  Therefore, 
the proposed explanation for altruism coming from group selectionists failed, and it was 
concluded that group selection did not occur.  In other words, groups were not thought to be 
units of selection. 
 A problem with Williams’s (1966) conclusion is that his argument was against the 
possibility of group traits evolving by natural selection, not against natural selection of groups, 
per se.  Williams pointed out correctly that groups typically cannot reproduce in the way required 
for adaptive evolution by natural selection, but then he used that fact to conclude that groups 
cannot be units of selection.  The problem is that an inability to reproduce does not imply an 
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inability to be subjected to natural selection.  Instead, it only means that any natural selection 
cannot contribute to ongoing evolution.  Therefore, Williams (1966) presents an argument 
against adaptive evolution of groups, not against group selection by itself.   
 Unfortunately, Williams’s approach persisted in the literature, including Lewontin’s 
(1970) extremely influential essay “The Units of Selection.”  Lewontin argues that adaptive 
evolution by natural selection requires just three basic elements.  First, there must be a 
population of individuals with variable phenotypes.  Second, different phenotypes must have 
different rates of survival and reproduction.  And third, there must be a correlation between 
parents and offspring in the contribution of each to future generations.  As long as these three 
elements are present together, explains Lewontin, then the population will evolve by natural 
selection.  Lewontin (1970) explicitly left open the possibility that the “individuals” in his 
account could be genes, organisms, or even groups.  As long as the entities in question meet the 
criteria, then they can be units of selection.   
Although I largely agree with Lewontin (1970) regarding the three elements required for 
adaptive evolution, he makes the same mistake as Williams (1966) by drawing conclusions about 
units of selection based on what it takes for something to undergo adaptive evolve.  Natural 
selection may be a necessary element of adaptive evolution, but something can be a unit of 
selection—it can still be a target of natural selection—yet fail to participate in the larger process 
of adaptive evolution due, for example, to an inability to reproduce.  Another problem with 
Lewontin’s (1970) account that should be mentioned here is that, as explained by Mitchell 
(1987), Lewontin’s second element—that different phenotypes must have different rates of 
survival and reproduction—only implies that the phenotypes themselves are the reason for the 
differential rates of survival and reproduction.  Unless that is made explicit, then the different 
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rates of survival and reproduction could be due to chance (sometimes called “drift”) rather than 
natural selection.  Therefore, Lewontin’s (1970) three elements, as stated, will produce evolution 
by whatever means, rather than just evolution by natural selection.  Mitchell (1987) suggests 
adding a fourth element stating that the differential survival and reproduction must be due to 
differential adaptedness of the different phenotypes.  That way, differential survival and 
reproduction will be the causal result of differential interactions between individuals and their 
environments, where some individuals have phenotypes that allow for more beneficial 
interactions than do others.  Whether it is considered a fourth element or a modification of 
Lewontin’s second element, Mitchell (1987) clearly is correct that beneficial or detrimental 
interactions between individuals and their environments is necessary for any natural selection.   
 Williams (1966) and Lewontin’s (1970) failure to distinguish natural selection from the 
larger process of adaptive evolution shows up throughout the literature on units of selection.  
Lloyd (2005) offers a similar critique of the debate over units of selection, but rather than 
framing the issues in terms of three separate process that make up adaptive evolution, she points 
to four separate questions with which debaters appear to be concerned.  First is the interactor 
question, which concerns what is interacting with the environment.  Second is the replicator 
question, which is less concerned with any environmental interaction and more concerned with 
what gets copied and passed on through multiple generations.  Third is the beneficiary question, 
which explores what actually benefits from the various adaptations that have evolved.  Fourth is 
the manifestor of adaptation question, which concerns what thing actually possesses or displays 
adaptive traits.  
Before discussing how Lloyd’s (2005) four questions help us organize the literature on 
natural selection, I will take a moment to describe my ways of addressing each question, and 
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how they relate to natural selection.  First of all, I believe that the interactor question is the only 
one directly relevant to natural selection.  As explained above in Mitchell’s (1987) critique of 
Lewontin (1970), natural selection happens when an organism interacts with its environment.  
The replicator question, by contrast, concerns reproduction rather than natural selection.  As for 
the beneficiary of adaptations question, much depends on what it means to benefit in this 
context.  If we assume that “to benefit” is to be aided in survival, then any living system that is 
helped to continue living by the presence of an adaptive trait is a beneficiary of that adaptation.  
This is not directly relevant to units of selection because an item does not need to be subjected to 
selection or contribute to adaptedness in any way in order to be a beneficiary of adaptation.  For 
example, every organism’s genome contains so-called “junk DNA” that does not seem to have 
any functionality, but since DNA maintenance and replication machinery cannot distinguish 
functional DNA from junk DNA, it all survives and is passed on to the next generation together.  
Thus, junk DNA benefits from an organism’s adaptedness even though it does not contribute to 
adaptedness and is not itself subjected to any environmental interactions.  The manifestor of 
adaptations question is more closely related to natural selection than is the replicator question or 
the beneficiary question because whatever manifests an adaptation is a target of natural selection.  
An adaptation is a trait possessed by an individual (and typically acquired via evolution) that 
helps the individual overcome some challenge it faces in its interactions with its environment.  
Therefore, in order for an individual to manifest an adaptation, the adaptation must be part of the 
individual, the individual must be interacting with its environment, and the adaptation must be 
helping in those interactions.  Those individuals that manifest more and better adaptations are 
naturally selected, while those that manifest fewer or less effective adaptations may be selected 
against.  The upshot of this paragraph is that of Lloyd’s (2005) four questions, the interactor and 
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manifestor of adaptation questions are most relevant to natural selection, while the replicator and 
beneficiary questions are less relevant. 
When Lloyd (2005) discusses how her four questions relate to the units of selection 
debate, we can see how the debate often ends up answering either the replicator question or the 
beneficiary of adaptations question rather than the interactor question.  For example, in the 
debate over altruism that spawned the units of selection debate, group selectionists (at least those 
in the 1960’s) seem mainly to be considering the beneficiary question.  As Sober and Wilson 
(1994) explain in their review of the debate over units of selection, “The problem of the units of 
selection…concerns whether traits evolve because they benefit individual organisms or because 
they are good for the group in which they occur” (534).  The idea is that individuals act 
altruistically even though individual altruists do not benefit from that trait.  Instead, it is the 
group that benefits because individual acts of altruism lead to a larger, longer-lasting group.  
Group selectionists used this observation to argue that groups could be units of selection.  They 
also concluded that natural selection of groups could lead to adaptive evolution of groups. 
By contrast, Williams’s (1966) critique of group selection addressed the replicator 
question.  Groups cannot replicate (reproduce) in the required way, so groups cannot undergo 
adaptive evolution.  With this argument, Williams successfully refuted the conclusion that 
groups could undergo adaptive evolution, but he did not refute the conclusion that groups could 
be subjected to selection.  Nevertheless, Williams’s success against group selectionists helped 
shift the focus of the debate onto replicators, leading some authors to conclude that replicators 
were actually the units of selection.  The perceived success of Williams’s arguments, combined 
with the success of population genetics (as discussed in Section 5.2) made the gene-selectionist 
view very popular (Robert, 2004; Jablonka and Lamb, 2005).  
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 Perhaps the most influential arguments in favor of gene selection came from Dawkins 
(1976, 1980) who actually addressed all four of Lloyd’s (2005) questions, but placed the greatest 
weight on the replicator question.  Dawkins’s arguments and their serious problems were 
discussed in Chapters Three and Four, but they are relevant here as well, so I must discuss them 
again, though with greater emphasis on his account of gene selection rather than on heredity or 
variation.  Most relevant to the units of selection debate is Dawkins’s distinction between 
replicators (nucleic acid-based genes), and vehicles (organisms).  In Dawkins’s terminology, 
vehicles interact with their environments in ways that affect whether the replicators get 
replicated and passed on to the next generation.  Although he describes the vehicles as the things 
that interact with the environment, Dawkins argues that since genes are the only things that 
persist across generations, genes are the beneficiaries of any adaptations.  Therefore, he 
concludes, genes are the units of selection. 
 One of the most serious problems for Dawkins’ argument is that selection requires 
interaction between selector and selectee, which means that in order to be a unit of natural 
selection, it is necessary that the selectee interact with its environment.  Genes interact with other 
intracellular components, but by themselves they do not interact with the larger environment in 
the required way, and so genes cannot be units of selection.  Therefore, whole, integrated 
organisms (vehicles) are units of selection because whole organisms are what interact with the 
environment and either survive or die.     
Dawkins understood this concern, and responded by arguing that genes interact with their 
environments via their construction of organisms.  That is, phenotypes interact with the 
environment, but what get selected are genes responsible for those phenotypes.  As discussed in 
greater detail in Section 3.3, this gene-centric argument falsely assumes that a living organism is 
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a mere support system for genes.  While it may be an interesting and occasionally useful 
heuristic to think of an organism as nothing more than the genes’ way to make more genes, a 
useful heuristic should not be confused with reality (Gould, 2002; Robert, 2004).  The reality is 
that it is incorrect to pick out genes (or any other proper part of an organism) as the causal 
starting place or sole beneficiary of a complex, dynamic, and interconnected living system.  
Organisms may not be able to live without their genes, but they also cannot live without their 
membranes or their precisely regulated cytoplasmic contents or any other major cellular 
components.  In other words, genes are just one part of an integrated, living system in which 
every part works to sustain every other part, and so it is misleading to claim that genes make 
organisms (Robert, 2004; Jablonka and Lamb, 2005).  This also means that genes are not the sole 
beneficiaries of adaptations as Dawkins claimed.  Genes do not persist across generations any 
more or less than the rest of an organism, and so they do not have the special status that Dawkins 
awards them (see also Section 3.4). 
S.J. Gould (2002) diagnosed the problems with Dawkins’s gene selectionism as a 
tendency to focus on certain measurable results of evolution by natural selection instead of 
focusing on natural selection itself.  For example, one measurable result of natural selection 
acting on reproducing organisms is a change in allele frequencies in the population to which the 
organisms belong.  Population genetics is in the business of tracking such changes, and since 
population genetics formed the basis of the Modern Synthesis, the concepts and tools used in 
population genetics ended up being the concepts and tools used for understanding biological 
evolution more generally (Gould, 2002; Robert, 2004).  For example, “fitness,” which is defined 
by population genetics as an individual’s genetic contribution to the next generation, has often 
been used as a synonym for natural selection, and a common definition of biological evolution is 
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change in allele (or gene) frequencies in a population over time (e.g. Dobzhansky, 1951).  As 
Gould (2002) points out, tracking individual fitness and populational changes in allele 
frequencies are useful techniques, but they do not provide a sufficient account of adaptive 
evolution by natural selection.  In particular, such measurements do not distinguish between 
changes that result from differential natural selection versus those that are mere accidents having 
nothing to do with differences in phenotypic characteristics between individuals.  In other words, 
population genetics focuses on what happens after natural selection has already occurred—
reproduction—rather than on the causal interactions between individuals and their environment 
that constitute natural selection.  While population genetics tracks differential contributions to 
the next generation, natural selection is more concerned with how individuals managed to 
survive long enough to contribute (Gould, 2002).  Therefore, fitness is concerned with hereditary 
reproduction and the replicator question rather than natural selection and the interactor question. 
Gould (2002) was not the only modern author to focus on causal interaction in 
characterizing natural selection, although he was one of the few to do so consistently.  One 
example of inconsistent focus on causal interaction is Hull (1980).  Hull largely followed 
Dawkins’s (1976) approach, but sought to emphasize the importance of causal interaction in 
natural selection by referring to organisms as “interactors” rather than “vehicles.”  According to 
Hull’s (1980) formulation, a replicator is “an entity that passes on its structure, directly in 
replication,” while an interactor is “an entity that directly interacts as a cohesive whole with its 
environment in such a way that replication is differential.”  With these definitions in place, Hull 
(1980) defines natural selection as “a process in which the differential extinction and 
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proliferation of interactors cause the differential perpetuation of the replicators that produced 
them” (p. 318).51     
 While Hull (1980) is correct to emphasize causal interaction in his account of natural 
selection, he does not distinguish fully between the process of natural selection and the process 
of reproduction with heredity.  While it is true that long-term biological evolution can only 
proceed when natural selection is followed by reproduction with heredity, natural selection and 
hereditary reproduction nevertheless are separate processes and make separate contributions to 
biological evolution.  To put the problem another way, recall that evolution by natural selection 
is supposed to explain why organisms appear so well adapted to their environments.  However, 
Hull’s characterization of natural selection as “differential extinction and proliferation of 
interactors” does not explicitly tell us that the individuals that survived usually were the ones that 
had traits that helped them survive in their environments.  In this way, Hull (1980) makes a 
mistake similar to Lewontin (1970) in assuming that differential survival and reproduction is 
sufficient for natural selection.  As Mitchell (1987) explained in her critique of Lewontin (1970), 
natural selection is not just differential survival, but rather differential survival due to differential 
interactions between individuals and their environment.  Without this added element, the 
differential survival and eventual reproduction (if any) could be due entirely to chance rather 
than adaptedness, and if survival and reproduction are due only to chance, then the amazing 
adaptedness of organisms is left unexplained. 
Hull’s (1980) mistake of conflating two separate processes is already there in his 
definition of an interactor.  It seems fine for Hull to say that interactors interact with their 
                                                 
51 Notice that Hull describes natural selection as a two-step process and that each step works with a different entity 
(or set of entities).  The first step involves interactors while his second step involves replicators.  Since there is no 
single entity involved in both steps, Hull concludes that there actually is no unit of selection, that is, no single kind 
of entity on which selection acts. 
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environments, but when he adds that they do so “in such a way that replication is differential,” he 
is not saying something general about interactors, but rather something contingent about 
interactors that are also reproducers.  If a reproducer (e.g. a typical biological organism) has 
beneficial interactions with its environment, then the reproducer is more likely to successfully 
reproduce when it tries to reproduce.  However, it is perfectly fine for a non-reproducing, living 
individual to also have beneficial interactions with its environment despite its inability to 
reproduce.  Therefore, if we want to have a proper account of natural selection itself, then we 
must not include its contingent (though evolutionarily very interesting and important) connection 
to the separate process of hereditary reproduction. 
Hull, et. al. (2001) try to update Hull (1980) and to provide a general account of selection 
by drawing on a variety of selection processes observed in nature.  However, their account still 
ends up conflating natural selection with other processes.  In fact, Hull, et.al. (2001) include all 
three processes when they define selection as “repeated cycles of replication, variation, and 
environmental interaction so structured that environmental interaction causes replication to be 
differential” (p. 513).  In other words, Hull, et. al. (2001) collapse all of evolution by natural 
selection into just natural selection.  They admit as much in the very next sentence when they 
write, “The net effect is the evolution of the lineages produced by this process.”  While it is true 
that all three processes working in tandem will result in adaptive evolution, it is a mistake to 
pack all three processes into natural selection.   
 A similar mistake shows up in the later of work Ernst Mayr.  For example, Mayr (2001a) 
writes that natural selection (rather than the larger process of adaptive evolution) is a two-step 
process, the first of which includes “all the processes leading up to the production of a new 
zygote” that are responsible for generating variation.  Then, “At the second step, that of selection 
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(elimination), the ‘goodness’ of the new individual is constantly tested” (p. 119).  The problem 
here is that step one—all of the processes leading up to production of a new zygote—includes 
hereditary reproduction and generation of new variation, both of which are separate processes 
from natural selection.  Natural selection only really occurs during the second step, which Mayr 
himself refers to as “selection.”  It is curious that Mayr chose to include the first step in his 
account of natural selection when he seemed to understand that the second step was where 
selection actually happens.  In an earlier work, Mayr (1976) makes the far more reasonable claim 
that biological evolution (rather than just natural selection) is a two-step process, where the first 
step is the production of variation and the second is natural selection.52  Perhaps this means that 
Mayr’s later collapse of all three processes into natural selection was an honest mistake.  
Unfortunately, the problematic formulation is repeated in Mayr (2001b) when he writes, “Now 
that it is realized that chance in evolution is part one of the two-step nature of the process of 
natural selection, the processes of selection or elimination during the second step of natural 
selection can make use of the positive contribution made by random variation at the first step” 
(p.493).  Again we see Mayr explicitly separating natural selection into two steps, with selection 
happening only in the second step, and so the change seems to be intentional.  
If the problematic change in Mayr’s later thinking was intentional, then I am unsure what 
prompted it.  Perhaps Mayr (2001a, 2001b) intended to use the source of variation (blind 
mutations and recombination) to characterize natural selection as natural, rather than some other, 
non-natural kind of selection.  If so, the move seems unjustified.  The ‘natural’ part of natural 
selection refers not to the source of variation, but to the interactions that all organisms have with 
their environments in their struggle to survive.  Organisms whose variability was generated 
                                                 
52 This is better for his account of natural selection, but I disagree with the way he combines reproduction and 
generation of variation into a single process.    
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intentionally by human genetic engineers—and therefore is unnatural in the relevant sense—
could then be placed in the wild and subjected to natural selection.  As Mayr (1976) himself 
reported in his history of evolutionary thinking, “Darwin was satisfied…to take for granted the 
existence of genetic variability and the replenishment of genetic variability as the source material 
for natural selection” (p. 273).  And in Mayr’s (1982) chapter on Darwin’s conception of natural 
selection he writes, “Variation and its inheritance belong to the subject matter of genetics, and 
Darwin’s assumptions and theories [on variation and inheritance] will be analyzed in detail [in a 
separate chapter]” (p. 491).  Darwin did not invoke a specific source of variation to clarify the 
naturalness of natural selection and to distinguish it from artificial selection.  Artificial selection 
occurs when humans (or some other intelligent beings) precisely control which individuals in a 
population are allowed to survive and to breed, all in order to promote certain characteristics 
preferred by the selectors.  Natural selection, by contrast, does not have an intelligent chooser 
doing the selecting.  It is just what tends to happen when organisms struggle to survive in their 
environments.  Therefore, a proper account of natural selection by itself need not and should not 
include a source of variation.  An account of ongoing, adaptive evolution should incorporate a 
source of variation, but an account of natural selection by itself should not.   
A different approach to characterizing natural selection (one that does not seek to identify 
units of selection) comes from Matthen and Ariew (2002).  They argue that natural selection is 
not actually a causal process at all, but rather a mere statistical phenomenon indistinguishable 
from drift.  They start their argument by distinguishing two concepts of fitness, which they call 
vernacular fitness and predictive fitness, and then argue that neither can be a cause of evolution.  
As Matthen and Ariew (2002) explain, predictive fitness is “a statistical measure of evolutionary 
change, the expected rate of increase (normalized relative to others) of a gene, a trait, or an 
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organism's representation in future generations, or, on another interpretation, its propensity to be 
represented in future generations, suitably quantified and normalized” (56, emphases in original).  
Since predictive fitness is a statistical measure rather than a physical entity or force, it is not the 
sort of thing that has causal power, so Matthen and Ariew correctly conclude that predictive 
fitness cannot cause of evolutionary change. 
Vernacular fitness, on the other hand, is “an organism's overall competitive advantage 
traceable to heritable traits,” and “According to one standard way of understanding natural 
selection, vernacular fitness—or rather the variation thereof—is a cause of evolutionary change” 
(Matthen and Ariew, 2002, p. 56, emphasis in original).  If that way of understanding natural 
selection is correct, then natural selection cannot be a causal contributor to adaptive evolution 
because variation itself cannot be a cause of anything.  However, that way of understanding 
natural selection is mistaken.  First of all, Matthen and Ariew’s account of vernacular fitness, 
which they borrow from Kitcher (1984), states that competitive advantage must be “traceable to 
heritable traits.”  That addition is necessary for ongoing adaptive evolution by natural selection, 
but is not necessary for natural selection by itself.  If the goal is to understand whether natural 
selection can be invoked as part of a causal explanation for adaptive evolution, then we must be 
careful to isolate the role natural selection is supposed to play in our explanations, and we must 
not expect natural selection to play any roles reserved for hereditary reproduction or generation 
of variation.   
That brings us to Matthen and Ariew’s (2002) other reason for rejecting natural selection 
as a causal process.  Even if we remove the part about being traceable to inheritable traits, 
vernacular fitness (and adaptedness) is inherently qualitative because it cannot quantify exactly 
how much of an individual’s survival (or reproduction) is due to its adaptedness and how much 
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comes from pure luck.  Matthen and Ariew argue that if natural selection is a causal process, 
then we should be able to separate its causal contributions to survival and reproduction from all 
other contributions, much like physical forces can be isolated in Newtonian Mechanics (e.g. 
Sober, 1984)  Since this does not appear to be possible, they conclude that natural selection is not 
a causal process, and it cannot be used as part of a causal explanation of adaptive evolution.  By 
contrast, predictive fitness, which simply tracks reproductive rates and marks no distinction 
between adaptive success and drift, is rigorously quantitative.  Because of this, Matthen and 
Ariew (2002) believe that our conception of natural selection should shed any particular physical 
realizations in order to make it more compatible with mathematical modeling (similar arguments 
are found in Beatty, 1984; and Darden and Cain, 1989).  To that end, Matthen and Ariew (2002) 
rely on equations from population genetics that assign different growth rates to different parts of 
a population (e.g. genes) to determine how the makeup of the population changes over time.  
Different growth rates of genes will cause their frequencies in the population to change and, as 
Matthen and Ariew explain, “The resulting differential growth of gene frequencies is natural 
selection” (p. 56).  This purely statistical approach “defines selection as what happens to the 
parts of a population when these parts have different growth rates…This definition of selection is 
mathematical in nature, and independent of the particular causal laws that produce growth” (p. 
73-74, emphasis in original). 
 Finally, Matthen and Ariew (2002) argue that the above account not only captures natural 
selection, but all of biological evolution.  As they explain, “In this way of looking at things, the 
distinction between evolution (the total change of gene frequencies due to all causes), and natural 
selection (the portion of evolution due to differences in competitive advantage) is unmotivated.  
Natural selection is…the aggregative result over time of differential growth rates in a 
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population” (p. 78).  The central problem with Matthen and Ariew’s (2002) account of evolution 
is that it does not provide an explanation for adaptive evolution.  While it is true that their 
proposed account of natural selection and overall evolution is more quantitative, it only captures 
one aspect of adaptive evolution.  Their account can tell us that there was differential 
reproduction, but since it does not include causal interaction between individuals and their 
environments, their account does not include any explanation for why reproduction was 
differential.  This is similar to Gould’s (2002) critique of gene selectionists and to Mitchell’s 
(1987) critique of Lewontin (1970).  Both complained about an over-emphasis on the sorting 
effects of natural selection rather than the causal reasons for the sorting. 
To be fair, Matthen and Ariew (2002) do not completely ignore the underlying causal 
processes, but they downplay the central contribution those processes make to a full, explanatory 
theory of adaptive evolution.  When Matthen and Ariew (2002) provide their standard 
formulation of evolution by natural selection, they refer to the physical instantiation of the 
population, including all phenotypic traits and the larger environment, as the “substrate” that 
instantiates a process of evolution.  Every process of adaptive evolution must occur in a 
substrate, but Matthen and Ariew believe that our theory of adaptive evolution by natural 
selection is independent of any substrate.  I maintain, roughly following the likes of Mitchell 
(1987), Gould (2002), Millstein (2002), Bouchard and Rosenberg (2004), and Rosenberg and 
Bouchard (2005), that the complex causal interactions happening in the substrate are absolutely 
central to evolutionary theory.  When biologists talk about natural selection in action, they are 
talking about what’s happening in the substrate, that is, in the daily lives of individual organisms 
and their complex causal interactions with their environments.   
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As explained in Chapter One, scientists seek to understand and explain the underlying 
causal processes that produce an interesting regularity or other phenomenon, not just describe the 
final results (Mitchell, 2002; Casadevall and Fang, 2009).  Population genetics and statistical 
models play important roles in describing and quantifying some of the changes that result from 
evolution by natural selection, but the full explanation requires contributions from physiology, 
ecology, and the other life science sub-fields that study how organisms interact with their 
environments.  Those are the fields that explain why some individuals survive while others do 
not, and so they are indispensable in understanding how adaptations evolve.  As explained in 
Section 5.2, the Modern Synthesis was a successful theory of evolution because of the way it 
reconciled population genetics with natural selection and the work done by naturalists,53 cell 
biologists and paleontologists.  Even though population genetics achieved some successes before 
the Modern Synthesis was formed, by itself it could not provide a full theory of evolution.  Only 
when the explanations coming from those other disciplines were included was there an 
acceptable theory of evolution, and this still is true today.  It’s still true that evolutionary theory 
successfully explains adaptedness (and diversity) in large part because of the contributions from 
the areas of biology that explore the complex causal reasons why some individuals are better 
able to survive than others.  And while Matthen and Ariew (2002) may be correct that natural 
selection is difficult to describe and measure as a force analogous to forces described in 
Newtonian mechanics, that does not mean natural selection is not a causal process.  It just means 
that we cannot expect quantitatively precise measurements of adaptedness and selection in our 
studies of natural selection in action.  Therefore, accounts such as found in Matthen and Ariew 
(2002), Beatty (1984), and Darden and Cain (1989) that claim natural selection is best 
                                                 
53 Naturalists studied and catalogued organisms as they existed in the wild.  Today, they likely would be called 
“ecologists” or “taxonomists.” 
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understood through population genetics, or that subsume all of evolutionary theory into 
population genetics, do not work.   
In summary, my own account of natural selection focuses on interactions between an 
individual and its environment, and makes no claim that natural selection, by itself, can produce 
adaptive evolution.  Natural selection by itself requires only that at least one living individual 
exists in an environment, and that the physical characteristics of that environment must causally 
interact with the individual in ways that depend on the individual’s own physical characteristics 
as well as those of the environment.  Further, it must be the case that some potential interactions 
between environment and individual could be disruptive to the individual (e.g. cause it to break 
apart or stop functioning) while other potential interactions are beneficial the individual (e.g. 
support its structural integrity or allow its continued functioning).  Whenever these sorts of 
causal interactions occur, an individual is being naturally selected for (or against) continued 
survival and functioning.  This account of natural selection can now be used to help determine 
whether there is a biological mechanism that has natural selection as its activity.    
 
5.4  Is Natural Selection a Mechanism? 
The biological literature on evolution contains many casual references to natural selection 
as a mechanism, but only recently has that attribution been seriously examined.  Skipper and 
Millstein (2005) introduce the issue very well: 
“Actually, evolutionary biologists call natural selection, and the other evolutionary 
mechanisms, many things, which they all seem to think amounts to the same thing.  Natural 
selection is a ‘cause,’ a ‘force,’ a ‘process,’ a ‘mechanism,’ a ‘factor’.  Sometimes, natural 
selection is called a ‘principle,’ or ‘concept,’ but when the explication continues, cause, 
force or mechanism talk is apparent.  We think there is no question that contemporary 
evolutionary biology exemplifies the view that natural selection is a mechanism.  The 
interesting and harder question to answer is philosophical, namely, ‘What is the nature of 
the mechanism of natural selection?’” (p. 329). 
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Unfortunately, in their analysis of the issue, Skipper and Millstein (2005) end up using an 
account of natural selection that includes both hereditary reproduction and generation of new 
variation.  Their description of the structure of natural selection (p.330) includes seven steps, 
only the second of which, “Interaction,” is actually natural selection because that is the step at 
which an individual organism interacts with its environment.  Their first step, “Initial 
Conditions,” includes both variation and heredity, while steps three through seven are all 
“Effects” of what happened after all the interaction at step two.  Like Hull, et. al. (2002), Skipper 
and Millstein (2005) include all of adaptive evolution into their account of natural selection.  
They then use that account of natural selection (which is really the whole process of evolution by 
natural selection) to conclude that natural selection is not a mechanism because there are no 
identifiable entities that carry out all those steps.  I agree that there is no single mechanism that 
could be responsible for the whole process of adaptive evolution, but that does not tell us 
whether natural selection by itself is a mechanism. 
 In reply to Skipper and Millstein (2005), Barros (2008) argues that natural selection does, 
or at least can, meet the criteria for mechanism laid out by MDC (2000).  Since he is relying on 
MDC’s (2000) account of mechanisms, Barros (2008) must identify the activity and the entities 
that constitute his proposed mechanism of natural selection.  As an example, he describes a 
predator-prey relationship between crabs and sea snails in which presence of the crab predator 
seems to have resulted in adaptive changes in snail shells.  In arguing that natural selection is a 
mechanism, Barros (2008) first argues that predation by a crab is accomplished by a mechanism, 
namely its claw’s crushing mechanism.  “This characterization of crab predation as a mechanism 
is consistent with the MDC account of mechanisms.  The entities (the crab’s claw and the snail’s 
shell) and activities (crushing) are organized in a way that they may be productive of a change (a 
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crushed shell) from the start of the attack to the end of the attack” (p. 314).  With this much I 
agree.  Even when we throw in my own requirements that the entities work non-aggregatively 
and that the activity serve a biological function (see Chapter Two), the crab’s claw and its 
crushing of snail shells is a good example of a mechanism.   
In order to extend his argument to natural selection rather than just predation with crab 
claws, Barros (2008) believes he must move to the population level rather than the individual 
level.  He does this because he believes that natural selection is supposed to explain how 
adaptive traits evolve, and adaptive evolution is something that happens to populations rather 
than to individuals.  Barros concludes that “Natural selection thus is a multistage mechanism that 
tends to increase the prevalence of a beneficial trait within a population over time” (p. 317).  
This again collapses all of evolution into just natural selection, but as I have argued repeatedly in 
this chapter, natural selection by itself is not supposed to explain long-term adaptation.  Rather, 
the explanation for long-term, ongoing adaptation comes from evolution by natural selection, 
which includes hereditary reproduction and generation of new variation in addition to natural 
selection.  Barros’s (2008) specific problem is that the population-level component of his 
characterization of natural selection involves variation and hereditary reproduction rather than 
just natural selection, and so he is considering the wrong activity for his proposed mechanism of 
natural selection. 
 Although I strongly disagree with the characterizations of natural selection used by 
Skipper and Millstein (2005) and Barros (2008), their arguments nevertheless contain the chief 
reasons I believe that natural selection is not a biological mechanism.  In order for there to be a 
biological mechanism of natural selection, the activity and entities must match the criteria laid 
out in Chapter Two.  The activity must be a biological function that supports the continued life of 
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which the proposed mechanism is a part, and the entities must be part of the living process they 
are supporting and must achieve their function nonaggregatively.  I believe that even when we 
are working with the correct activity for natural selection, on both points natural selection fails to 
meet the criteria for a biological mechanism. 
As for the entities, since natural selection always involves an interaction between an 
individual and its environment, any instance of natural selection involves some entities from the 
individual and some from its environment, and so the entities involved in the selection process 
will never all be part of a single organism.  Therefore, the entities responsible for natural 
selection are not all part of any one living individual, and so cannot be considered a biological 
mechanism.  Barros tried to resolve this problem, but I think his efforts do not work.  In 
discussing environmental interactions he writes, “The source of the critical environmental 
factor…need not be only one entity.  It could be the sum of the activities of many entities 
imposing various types of selection pressure.  As I use the term here, selective pressure is an 
abstract activity that refers to the impact that the critical environmental factor has on the 
population being studied” (317).  Barros then goes on to include a very wide variety of 
environmental factors, such as rainfall and local air temperature, as potential entities in the 
mechanism of natural selection.  Inclusion of so many different factors working in so many 
different ways makes it impossible to identify any specific entities that are responsible for the 
activity of natural selection, and so Barros is forced to set his mechanistic account of natural 
selection at a more abstract level, independent of any specific physical entities.  “Indeed,” he 
writes, “the environment in a particular location can be seen as an abstract entity that is the sum 
of all other entities in that location” (317).  In addition to inappropriately packing all of adaptive 
evolution into just natural selection, Barros is stretching our notion of entities beyond what MDC 
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(2000) had in mind for mechanisms, and the entities he describes certainly do not fit into my 
account of biological mechanisms. 
As for the activity of natural selection, it is not a biological function and so cannot be the 
activity of a biological mechanism.  A biological function necessarily promotes continuation of 
life, while natural selection oftentimes is selection against continued survival.  Selection against 
continued survival obviously does not promote the continuation of life, and so cannot be a 
biological function.  Even when there is selection for continued survival, any mechanisms at 
work are ones that have something other than selection as their function.  For example, 
mechanisms might function to acquire food (as in the crab claw example) or to regulate internal 
temperature, but those functions, by themselves, do not count as selection.  When those 
mechanisms operate in a particular environment, natural selection helps sort the more effective 
mechanisms from the less effective ones.   
When we look out into the environment, we also do not find anything that has natural 
selection as its function.  Most of the external environment is made up of nonliving entities or 
climatic conditions, and as discussed in Section 2.4, nonbiological entities in the environment do 
not have any functions at all.  They just are what they are.  Of course, other biological entities 
can be part of an individual’s environment, but any biological functions they have still are aimed 
at their own survival.  Natural selection of other organisms is not their function.  So, biological 
mechanisms have functions aimed at the organisms of which they are a part, and natural 
selection happens when those mechanisms operate in a particular environment.  Parental care of 
offspring may be the closest thing there is to a biological mechanism of natural selection.  
Parental care is an interaction between an individual (the offspring) and part of its environment 
(its parent), and its function is to continue the ongoing, multi-generational, living process of 
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which the parent and the offspring are both parts.  However, even this kind of natural selection 
necessarily involves interaction between an individual and some part of the environment, and a 
single biological mechanism must be part of a single living individual.  Therefore, even parental 
interaction fails to qualify as a biological mechanism of natural selection.   
While it is true that natural selection is carried out by causal interactions between an 
individual and its environment, the activity of natural selection is not a biological function and, 
therefore, natural selection is not a biological mechanism according to the criteria laid out in 
Chapter Two.  The same may be said about evolution overall.  There is no biological mechanism 
that carries out adaptive evolution of a lineage because the entities and activities do not meet the 
criteria for biological mechanisms (Skipper and Millstein, 2005).  Recall that in Section 1.2, I 
discussed some other senses of “mechanism” used by scientists and philosophers.  For example, 
scientists (especially those that are not biologists) often call any specifiable physical process a 
mechanism (Casadevall and Fang, 2009), and sometimes abstract procedures or algorithms are 
thought of as mechanisms.  Perhaps one of these other senses of “mechanism” might apply to 
natural selection, but natural selection is not a biological mechanism.   
 
Summary 
 In this chapter I showed that natural selection requires nothing more than causal 
interaction between an individual and its environment that affect the individual’s continued 
survival.  It does not require a diverse population of individuals or any competition, though 
without those factors, not much evolution is likely to occur.  If there is more than one individual, 
and those individuals differ in their interactions with the environment, then there can be 
differential natural selection in which some individuals continue to survive while others do not.   
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Then, when differential natural selection is associated in the right way with hereditary 
reproduction and generation of new variations, a lineage of organisms will undergo adaptive 
evolution.   
I also showed that many characterizations of natural selection found in the literature do 
not distinguish properly between natural selection itself and the larger process of adaptive 
evolution.  A satisfactory account of adaptive evolution requires all three, but since each process 
can happen apart from the others, and since each makes a separate contribution to adaptive 
evolution, it is misleading to include all three under the single label of natural selection.  
 Finally, I showed that contrary to many casual assertions, natural selection is not a 
biological mechanism because the activity of natural selection is not a biological function.  There 
may be a more permissive or abstract sense of ‘mechanism’ that applies to natural selection, but 
it is not a biological mechanism.  For similar reasons, the overall process of adaptive evolution is 
also not a biological mechanism.  There are many biological mechanisms that contribute to the 
process of adaptive evolution, but adaptive evolution itself is not a biological mechanism.  
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